Guillot v. Day ( 2004 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 95-31235
Summary Calendar
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ELLIS GUILLOT,
Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
ED DAY, Warden; M R WINSTEAD, JR; LYN H PIGOTT
Defendants-Appellants
_______________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(94-CV-1832-A)
_________________________________________________________________
August 6, 1996
Before KING, DAVIS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendants Ed Day, Sgt. M.R. Winstead, Jr., and Lyn H.
Pigott appeal the district court’s decision requiring them to
comply with general discovery requests in a § 1983 action filed
by Ellis Guillot.
I. Background
Guillot, Louisiana prisoner #87428, proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.
_____________________
*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
§ 1983 against Day, warden of the Washington Correctional
Institute (“WCI”), Winstead, Pigott, K. McGinnis, and Dr.
Visitacion Ramirez, all WCI employees, alleging that they
violated Guillot’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In the
defendants’ answer, they raised, inter alia, a qualified immunity
defense. Following a preliminary conference, the magistrate
judge appointed counsel to represent Guillot and all parties
agreed to proceed before the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §
636(c). Through counsel, Guillot filed an amended complaint
against Richard L. Stadler, Secretary of the Louisiana Department
of Public Safety and Corrections, Day, Winstead, and Pigott,
alleging that they had violated his First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by denying him access to the courts and
retaliating against him for filing grievances. Day, Winstead and
Pigott1 filed a motion for summary judgment which was taken under
advisement. At the same time, the magistrate judge ordered the
defendants to comply with the Guillot’s discovery requests within
two weeks. Day, Winstead, and Pigott then filed a motion to
quash notice of deposition and the subpoena duces tecum and, on
the same day, filed a motion for a protective order so that they
would not have to comply with the discovery request until the
court had ruled on their qualified immunity defense. Day,
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Service was never made on Stadler.
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Winstead, and Pigott argued that the deposition date was beyond
the cut-off dates prescribed by the court and that their defense
of qualified immunity was pending. The magistrate judge denied
the motion for the protective order without written reasons.
Day, Winstead, and Pigott timely appealed the order of the
magistrate judge verbally entered on October 25, 1995, and
entered on the record on November 16, 1995, requiring defendants
to comply with general discovery requests.
II. Discussion
There are three issues that need to be resolved. The first
is whether this court has jurisdiction over this appeal. The
second issue is whether Guillot has met the heightened pleading
requirement by pleading sufficient facts, which, if taken as
true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity. The last
issue which needs to be resolved is whether the discovery order
is avoidable or overly broad.
We review the district court’s order for discovery for an
abuse of discretion. “It is well-established that control of
discovery is committed to the sound discretion of the district
court and that we will reverse its discovery rulings only if they
are arbitrary or clearly unreasonable.” Williamson v. United
States Dep’t of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1987).
1. Appellate Jurisdiction
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Day, Winstead, and Pigott contend that this court has
jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge’s discovery order
because the order has effectively denied them the benefits of
qualified immunity and, therefore, is an appealable interlocutory
order. Guillot contends that we are without jurisdiction to
review the discovery order because the order was “specifically
tailored to uncover only facts necessary to rule on the
defendants’ immunity claim.”
“Ordinarily, an order compelling limited discovery is
interlocutory and not appealable under the final judgment rule.”
Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 506 (5th Cir. 1987)(citing
28 U.S.C. § 1291). However, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511(1985) the Supreme Court held that orders denying a substantial
claim of qualified immunity are immediately appealable under the
collateral-order doctrine. Qualified immunity is an entitlement
to immunity from suit, not a mere defense to liability. Id. at
526. Therefore, if a qualified immunity defense has not been
ruled on and the discovery order is not limited, the defendants
are effectively denied their qualified immunity defense and thus
the order is immediately appealable. Wicks v. Mississippi State
Employment Servs., 41 F.3d 991, 994 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2555 (1995). “A party asserting a qualified immunity
defense is not immune from all discovery, only that discovery
which is avoidable or overly broad.” Id. When the magistrate
judge cannot rule on the immunity defense without first
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clarifying the facts relating to the immunity, and when a
discovery order is narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts
needed to rule on the immunity claim, the order is neither
avoidable or overly broad and, thus, not appealable. Id. In
this case there is nothing limiting the discovery order to facts
needed to rule on the qualified immunity defense; therefore, it
denies Day, Winstead, and Pigott the benefits of qualified
immunity. Consequently, we have jurisdiction to examine the
discovery order.
2. The Heightened-Pleading Requirement
Before addressing the scope of the discovery order, we must
first consider whether Guillot’s pleadings assert facts which, if
true, would overcome the defense of qualified immunity. Schultea
v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1433-34 (5th Cir. 1995)(en banc); Wicks,
41 F.3d at 995. If the complaint falls short of this heightened
pleading standard, the magistrate judge should rule on the
pending motion before any discovery is allowed. Schultea, 47
F.3d at 1434; Wicks, 41 F.3d at 995. “The allowance of discovery
without this threshold showing is immediately appealable as a
denial of the true measure of protection of qualified immunity.”
Wicks, 41 F.3d at 995. If the complaint satisfies the heightened
pleading standard, then the magistrate judge may permit limited
discovery as necessary to clarify the facts upon which the
immunity defense turns. Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434; Wicks, 41
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F.3d at 995.
Day, Winstead, and Pigott argue that Guillot has not pled
sufficient facts that, if true, would overcome their claims of
qualified immunity. Guillot argues that the magistrate judge’s
order implicitly denied Day, Winstead, and Pigott’s claim of
qualified immunity, that he satisfied the heightened pleading
standard, and that, consequently, the case should be remanded.
Alternatively, Guillot asks the court to remand the case to the
magistrate judge for an explicit ruling on the defendants’ claims
of qualified immunity or to allow the magistrate judge to tailor
the discovery order to the question of qualified immunity.
a. Denial of access to the courts claim
In his amended complaint, Guillot alleged that he has
“effectively” been denied access to the courts because Day and
Pigott have prevented him from participating in the
Administrative Remedy Procedure (“ARP”) process and thus,
prevented him from exhausting his administrative remedies.
Guillot elaborated in his opposition to the summary judgment
motion that Day and Pigott “obstructed” his access to the courts.
A denial-of-access claim is valid only if the litigant makes
a showing that his legal position was prejudiced by the
deprivation. Henthorn v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 988 (1992). Guillot has not alleged
specific facts showing that his legal position has been
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prejudiced. Absent the allegation of a violation of a
constitutional right, Guillot has failed to allege a valid claim
against Day and Pigott on that ground.
b. Retaliation Claims
In his complaint, Guillot alleged that Winstead and Pigott
retaliated against him when they filed their disciplinary
reports. To prove a retaliation claim a plaintiff must either
produce direct evidence of motivation or allege a chronology of
events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred. Woods
v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S.Ct. 800 (1996). An act motivated by retaliation for the
exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable,
even if the act, when taken for a different reason, might have
been legitimate. Id. at 1165. “A prison official may not
retaliate against or harass an inmate for exercising the right of
access to the courts, or for complaining to a supervisor about a
guard’s misconduct.” Id. at 1164. “The plaintiff must be
prepared to establish that but for the retaliatory motive the
complained of incident . . . would not have occurred.” Id. at
1166. Guillot’s pleadings contain specific allegations, which,
if taken as true, would establish a chronology of events
regarding actions taken by Winstead from which retaliation may be
inferred. Guillot did not plead specific allegations against
Pigott, however, which would establish any chronology of events
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that would suggest retaliation. Therefore, Guillot has satisfied
the heightened pleading standard as to this claim against
Winstead.
3. The Discovery Order
As to Guillot’s retaliation claims, the question then
becomes whether the discovery order issued prior to the court’s
ruling on the qualified immunity defense was avoidable or overly
broad. See, e.g., Gaines v. Davis, 928 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir.
1991).
Guillot’s interpretation of the magistrate judge’s order as
“narrowly tailored” is not supported by the record. The notice
of deposition for Winstead, Pigott, and two other WCI employees
did not indicate that the scope of the deposition would be
limited. The accompanying subpoena duces tecum required the
parties to produce a host of items related to Guillot, related to
the ARP, and the issuance of disciplinary reports. Following an
in-chambers conference, which is not included in the record, the
magistrate judge ordered Day, Winstead, and Pigott to respond to
Guillot’s outstanding discovery request.
On its face, the discovery order appears overly broad. We
find that the district court abused its discretion by ordering
discovery in this case. Accordingly, we vacate the discovery
order and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand the
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magistrate may order limited discovery for the purpose of
clarifying facts concerning qualified immunity if it is deemed
necessary. See, e.g., Gaines, 928 F.2d at 707.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE and REMAND.
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