Glatzer v. Chase Manhattan Bank , 108 F. App'x 204 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT September 20, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-20031
Summary Calendar
BERNARD H. GLATZER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; MARIAN B. GLATZER;
ORANGE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES;
MARLENE THOMASON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-03-CV-4471
Before JONES, BARKSDALE and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Bernard H. Glatzer appeals from the dismissal of his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging that the defendants conspired to
deprive him of his parental rights. Glatzer alleged that Thomason,
while acting as a temporary judge, conspired with his ex-wife and
issued without jurisdiction an order in California proceedings
affecting custody and child support. He further alleged that the
defendants improperly seized his assets in New York based on the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
order. Glatzer sought damages and an injunction to stay separate
proceedings that he initiated in New York state court. The
district court dismissed the suit under the Rooker-Feldman1
doctrine as a collateral attack on the California order. In the
alternative, to the extent that state court proceedings were still
pending, the district court dismissed the suit based on the
Younger2 abstention doctrine.
Glatzer argues that the district court’s application of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was erroneous because the California
order was jurisdictionally void and his claims are based on the
defendants’ independent constitutional violations. We conclude
after reviewing the record and the briefs that Glatzer’s claims are
inextricably intertwined with the state court order and the
district court did not err. See United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d
923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994); Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d
315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994). Glatzer also argues that the district
court erroneously applied the Younger abstention doctrine. We
conclude, however, that the district court’s alternative ruling was
correct. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 (1987);
Wightman v. Texas Supreme Court, 84 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1996).
Thomason's motion to file a sur-reply brief and Glatzer’s motion to
file a sur-sur-reply brief are DENIED.
AFFIRMED; ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS DENIED.
1
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
2
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).