United States v. Williams ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT November 30, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-50033
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KEVIN RAYNELL WILLIAMS, also
known as Kevin Williams,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(EP-03-CR-1686-2-FM)
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Kevin Raynell Williams appeals his guilty-plea conviction and
sentence for conspiracy to import marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), 960(b)(3), and 963. Williams
contends: the district court erred in denying his presentence
motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and he received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
“A district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Powell, 354 F.3d 362, 370 (5th Cir. 2003). “A defendant does not
have an absolute right to withdraw [his] guilty plea. However, a
district court may, in its discretion, permit withdrawal before
sentencing if the defendant can show a ‘fair and just reason.’”
Powell, 354 F.3d at 370 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)) (citation
omitted).
Williams based his withdrawal motion on his assertion that he
was not aware he was facing enhanced punishment as a “career
offender”. This court, however, has repeatedly rejected such a
contention. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 981 F.2d 180, 184
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 980 (1993); United States
v. Gaitan, 954 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Pearson, 910 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990).
“For a plea to be knowing and voluntary, ‘the defendant must
be advised of and understand the consequences of the [guilty]
plea.’” Gaitan, 954 F.2d at 1011 (quoting Pearson, 910 F.2d at
223). Along this line, “[a]s long as the [defendant] understood
the length of time he might possibly receive, he was fully aware of
his plea’s consequences”. Young, 981 F.2d at 184 n.4 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Here, the prosecutor, as directed by the
district court, informed Williams at his re-arraignment that he
faced a maximum of 20 years (240 months) imprisonment; Williams
testified that he understood this admonishment; and he received a
prison term of 160 months. Accordingly, Williams was adequately
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informed and aware of the consequences of his plea. Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea.
Williams also claims ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC)
in district court. Williams faults his counsel for failure to
investigate his criminal record, which would have been revealed
Williams was punishable as a career offender. He testified at the
plea-withdrawal hearing that, had he known this, he would not have
pleaded guilty.
Our court will resolve IAC claims on direct appeal only if the
record is adequate for a determination of the merits. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bounds, 943 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 845 (1993). In this instance, the record is
adequate.
To obtain relief for IAC, a defendant must show both “that
counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense”. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). An IAC claim can be rejected because of a
failure to show prejudice, without inquiring into the adequacy of
counsel’s performance. Id. at 697.
“[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement [for an
IAC claim], the defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v.
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Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Furthermore, the conviction must
be upheld if the plea was voluntary, even if counsel provided
ineffective assistance. E.g., DeVille v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 654, 659
(5th Cir. 1994).
William’s plea agreement stated, in part: “The Defendant is
aware that any estimate of the probable sentencing range that he
may receive from his counsel ... did not induce his guilty plea ...
and does not bind ... the Court”. (Emphasis added.) Williams
testified at re-arraignment that: he had reviewed the plea
agreement with counsel; he understood it; and he entered into it
voluntarily. Williams is not entitled to relief on this IAC claim
because the record shows his guilty plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered. See DeVille, 21 F.3d at 659.
AFFIRMED
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