Mowdy v. Employee Retirement System ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT November 23, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-50168
THOMAS C. MOWDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF TEXAS; ET AL.,
Defendants,
TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
A-03-CV-215-SS
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Before REAVLEY, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant, Thomas C. Mowdy (“Mowdy”), appeals the
district court’s grant of Defendant-Appellee Texas Health and
Human Services Commission’s (“HHSC”) motion for summary judgment
dismissing Mowdy’s claims brought under the Equal Pay Act, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (“EPA”), the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (“Title VII”), and the Texas Commission
on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code ch. 21 (“TCHRA”). Mowdy
basically contends that HHSC paid less to him than it paid to
certain of his female co-workers for performing equal work on
jobs that required substantially equal skill, effort, and
responsibility.
We review a grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the district court. Coserv LLC v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 350 F.3d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 2003).
Having reviewed the record and considered the briefs and
arguments on appeal, we affirm the district court’s grant of
Defendant-Appellee’s motion for summary judgment for the
following reasons.
With respect to Mowdy’s wage discrimination claim under the
EPA, Mowdy failed to raise a fact issue that he performed
substantially equal work as that of his female co-workers.
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
Therefore, summary judgment on this issue was proper because
Mowdy could not establish a prima facie case under the EPA.
With respect to Mowdy’s gender discrimination claims under
Title VII and the TCHRA, Mowdy failed to raise a fact issue
regarding the substantial similarity of his job and that of his
female co-workers. Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch.
Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, summary
judgment on this issue was proper because Mowdy could not
establish a prima facie case under Title VII or the TCHRA.
With respect to Mowdy’s constructive discharge claim under
Title VII, Mowdy failed to raise a fact issue that HHSC made his
working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee
would have felt compelled to resign. Ward v. Bechtel Corp., 102
F.3d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Therefore, summary judgment on
this issue was proper because Mowdy could not establish a prima
facie case under Title VII.
Finally, with respect to Mowdy’s retaliation claim under
Title VII and the TCHRA, Mowdy did not suffer an adverse
employment decision, much less an ultimate employment decision,
when his supervisor corrected a typographical mistake to reflect
Mowdy’s actual position at HHSC. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, summary judgment
on this issue was proper because Mowdy could not establish a
prima facie case under Title VII or the TCHRA.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the district court
is in all ways AFFIRMED.