Robinson v. Veneman , 124 F. App'x 893 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT March 23, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-60423
Summary Calendar
WILLIAM ROBINSON; BEVERLY ROBINSON,
Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants-Appellants,
versus
ANN VENEMAN, Secretary of Agriculture, United States Department
of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, FARM SERVICE ADMINISTRATION; NORMAN G. COOPER,
Director National Appeals Division,
Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(2:99-CV-120)
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Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, AND STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
William Robinson, Jr., and Beverly Robinson (the “Robinsons”)
appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
defendants in the Robinsons’ civil action challenging a property
valuation by the Farm Service Agency (“FSA”) in a lease/buyback
program. The Robinsons assert that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment on their claims under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706, insisting that the final
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
agency rulings are arbitrary and capricious, violate the Equal
Protection and Due Process provisions of the Constitution,
constitute gender discrimination under both the disparate treatment
and disparate impact standards, and constitute retaliation for
filing discrimination complaints against the FSA. The Robinsons
additionally contend that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment on their claims under the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1691.
"Under the APA, the administrative record is reviewed to
determine whether the challenged action was arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law . . . ." State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Verity, 853
F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1988); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The
administrative record is also reviewed to determine whether the
challenged action was “contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). We will not
substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and we defer to the
agency’s interpretation of its governing legislation. Weisbrod v.
Sullivan, 875 F.2d 526, 527 (5th Cir. 1989). As a formal hearing
was held on this matter, we review the agency’s factual findings
only for substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E); Gore,
Inc. v. Espy, 87 F.3d 767, 773 & n.42 (5th Cir. 1996).
The administrative record shows that the FSA followed the
proper regulations and considered the relevant facts in making its
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decision. See 7 C.F.R. § 1951.911(b)(1) (2004); 7 C.F.R. §§
1951.911(a)(7)(ii), 1922.201 (1997). The Robinsons have not shown
that this decision was arbitrary and capricious. See Verity, 853
F.2d at 327.
Neither have the Robinsons shown that they were treated
differently than others who were similarly situated. Two of the
three persons whom they contend were similarly situated had their
property valuations conducted when the applicable regulations
concerning appraisals were markedly different, and the appraiser
did not find that there was merchantable timber on the third
person’s property, as he found present on the Robinsons’ property.
Compare 7 C.F.R. § 1809.1(c) (1992) with 7 C.F.R. § 1922.201
(1997). Therefore, the denial of the Robinsons’ equal protection
claim is supported by substantial evidence and not otherwise
erroneous. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000). As there is no evidence that the FSA’s actions shock the
conscience or interfere with fundamental rights, the Robinsons’
substantive due process claim is also without merit. See United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
As the FSA’s determination that the Robinsons were not treated
differently than similarly situated persons is supported by
substantial evidence, the Robinsons have not established a prima
facie case of gender discrimination under the disparate treatment
standard. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-
03 (1973). As the Robinsons did not identify any facially neutral
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practice of the FSA that allegedly had a disproportionate impact on
women, the FSA and district court did not err by not considering
the Robinsons’ disparate impact claim. See Anderson v. Douglas &
Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994).
The administrative record shows that the Robinsons filed their
discrimination complaint against the FSA after the FSA made the
valuation that they are challenging. Although there are record
references to a previous discrimination complaint that was filed by
a member of the Robinson family, there is no evidence that the
cognizant decisionmakers had knowledge of that complaint.
Furthermore, there is no evidence establishing a causal link
between the FSA’s actions and any discrimination complaint.
Accordingly, the FSA’s denial of the Robinsons’ retaliation claim
is supported by substantial evidence and not otherwise erroneous.
See Ackel v. Nat’l Communications, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 385 (5th
Cir. 2003).
Although (1) the lease/buyback program was an FSA Preservation
Loan Servicing Program, (2) some FSA documents referred to the
Robinsons as borrowers, and (3) the leases between the FSA and the
Robinsons mentioned the possibility that the FSA might finance
their purchase of the property, there is no evidence that the
Robinsons ever sought or received credit from the FSA.
Accordingly, the Robinsons’ dealings with the FSA did not involve
a credit transaction and the ECOA was inapplicable. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1691(a), 1691a(d); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(m); see also Shaumyan v.
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Sidetex Co., 900 F.2d 16, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1990). The Robinsons’
contention that the district court found that the ECOA was
applicable, and that the defendants did not cross-appeal that
ruling, is without merit. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants on the merits of the Robinsons’ ECOA
claims without reaching the question whether the ECOA was
applicable. We may affirm the district court’s judgment “on any
grounds supported by the record.” United States v. McSween, 53
F.3d 684, 687 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995).
The Robinsons have not shown the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact regarding either their APA or their ECOA claims.
See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)
(en banc). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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