United States v. Cardenas , 134 F. App'x 751 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                  June 21, 2005
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-11062
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    JOSE A CARDENAS
    Defendant - Appellant
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:04-CR-57-ALL-Y
    --------------------
    Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Jose A. Cardenas pleaded guilty to bribery of a public
    official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A).     Under the
    Sentencing Guidelines, the district court sentenced Cardenas to
    24 months in prison and to three years of supervised release.
    At the request of the Government, the court also issued an
    alternative judgment, in the event that the Supreme Court
    extended its holding in Blakely v. Washington, 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
    (2004), to the Sentencing Guidelines and effectively rendered the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 04-11062
    -2-
    Guidelines advisory.   In the alternative judgment, the district
    court imposed the same 24-month prison term, “if there is no
    parole,” or three years if there was a possibility of parole
    under an advisory sentencing scheme.
    As an initial matter, we observe sua sponte that Cardenas’s
    written plea agreement contained a waiver-of-appeal provision.
    Because the magistrate judge who took Cardenas’s plea did not
    call specific attention to this provision, however, we conclude
    that the provision does not deprive us of jurisdiction to address
    the merits of Cardenas’s appeal.   See FED. R. APP. P. 11(b)(1)(N);
    United States v. Baymon, 
    312 F.3d 725
    , 729 (5th Cir. 2002);
    United States v. Robinson, 
    187 F.3d 516
    , 518 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Cardenas contends that the district court erred in imposing
    an eight-level offense-level increase under U.S.S.G.
    § 2C1.1(b)(2)(B), on the ground that the offense involved a
    “payment for the purpose of influencing an elected official or
    any official holding a high-level decision-making or sensitive
    position.”   After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
    v. Booker, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    (2005), this court has held that the
    application and interpretation of the guidelines continue be
    reviewed de novo and that factual findings be reviewed for clear
    error.   See United States v. Villegas, 
    404 F.3d 355
    ,      ,
    No. 03-21220 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2005), 
    2005 WL 627963
    at
    *2; United States v. Villanueva,       F.3d   , No. 03-20812
    (5th Cir. Apr. 27, 2005), 
    2005 WL 958221
    at **8-9 & n.9.
    No. 04-11062
    -3-
    Cardenas, who worked as a tax preparer, admitted that he
    offered $1,000 to Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) agent John
    McMicken, in order to reduce the tax liability of a pair of his
    clients following an audit conducted by McMicken.      Although
    McMicken’s role as a revenue agent was not supervisory, see
    U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, comment. (n.1), his job duties did entail
    decision-making authority in the matter of the collection of
    substantial sums of tax revenue.    We conclude that the district
    court did not err in determining that Agent McMicken occupied a
    “sensitive” position and that the U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(B)
    increase was applicable.     See United States v. Snell, 
    152 F.3d 345
    , 347-48 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Reneslacis,
    
    349 F.3d 412
    , 416 (7th Cir. 2003).
    Now citing Booker, Cardenas continues to argue, as he
    did below, that the Sentencing Guidelines increases were
    unconstitutional because they were based on factors that were
    neither submitted to a jury for proof nor admitted by Cardenas.
    Insofar as the district court’s primary judgment was based on a
    pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines regime, Cardenas is correct.        See
    
    Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756
    .    Cardenas overlooks, however, the
    district court’s issuance of an identical alternative sentence,
    which was based on speculation that the Supreme Court would
    declare the mandatory Guidelines scheme unconstitutional and
    require an advisory sentencing regime.      Where, as here, a
    defendant has preserved a Booker challenge in the district court,
    No. 04-11062
    -4-
    “we will ordinarily vacate the sentence and remand, unless we can
    say the error is harmless under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules
    of Criminal Procedure.”   United States v. Mares, 402, 511, 520
    n.9 (5th Cir. 2005).   In this case, based on the alternative
    judgment, the Government has met its burden of demonstrating
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the Sixth Amendment violation at
    issue did not contribute to the sentence that Cardenas received.
    See United States v. Akpan,      F.3d     , No. 03-20875, 
    2005 WL 852416
    at *12 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 2005).   Accordingly, we AFFIRM
    Cardenas’s sentence.
    AFFIRMED.