Cormier v. Dolgencorp, Inc. , 136 F. App'x 627 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                               United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT                       June 21, 2005
    _______________________                 Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    Summary Calendar
    No. 04-31238
    _______________________
    MAIRE LEJEUNE CORMIER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    DOLGENCORP, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana,
    Lake Charles Division
    2:04-CV-0901
    Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant Marie Lejeune Cormier (“Cormier”)
    appeals   the   district    court’s    award   of   summary    judgment       to
    Defendant-Appellee Dolgencorp, Inc. (“Dolgencorp”) for her personal
    injury suit arising from her fall inside one of Dolgencorp’s Dollar
    General stores.     We review the district court’s summary judgment
    decision de novo, using the same standard as that court.                 Royal
    Ins. Co. of America v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 
    391 F.3d 639
    , 641 (5th Cir. 2004).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    On May 16, 2003, Cormier entered the Dollar General in
    Jennings, Louisiana.        As she entered the store, she tripped over
    the entrance rug and fell, severely breaking her leg.                 It was a
    sunny day outside, and Cormier does not assert that her fall was
    caused by anything other than the mat, which she contends had
    ridges sufficient to catch her heel and force her to trip.             Cormier
    filed suit in Louisiana state court against Dolgencorp, which owns
    the store, alleging negligence against Dolgencorp for breaching its
    duty   of   care    by   having   a   defective   mat   in   the   entranceway.
    Dolgencorp removed the suit to federal court.
    To prevail on such a claim, an injured plaintiff must
    prove that (1) the object was in the defendant’s custody; (2) the
    thing contained a vice or defect which presented an unreasonable
    risk of harm to others; (3) the defective condition caused the
    damage; and (4) the defendant knew or should have known of the
    defect.     La. Civ. Code arts. 2317; 2317.1.           As the district court
    properly decided, Cormier failed to submit sufficient evidence on
    multiple elements of this prima facie case to survive summary
    judgment.
    The parties agree that Dolgencorp had custody of the mat
    in question.       However, Cormier failed to obtain any evidence of a
    defect in the mat.        Cormier admitted that the mat was dry at the
    time of the incident, that it was not extending outside the doorway
    or curled up, and that the mat contained no liquid or other foreign
    substances that might constitute a defect.                In district court,
    2
    Cormier claimed that Dolgencorp had intentionally destroyed the mat
    in question to keep her from demonstrating the mat’s inherent
    flaws; however, Cormier acquired a similar mat during summary
    judgment proceedings and Dolgencorp expressly stipulated that the
    mat submitted by Cormier was like the mat in the store on the day
    in question.   This mat contained no defects, and Cormier failed to
    submit any evidence or testimony beyond her conclusory allegations
    that the mat contained defects.            This failure is fatal to her
    claim.    See, e.g., White v. FCI USA, Inc., 
    319 F.3d 672
    , 677 (5th
    Cir. 2003) (mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary
    judgment evidence and thus cannot be used to defeat a motion for
    summary judgment).
    Even   assuming     arguendo   that     the   mat   was    defective,
    Cormier   further    failed     to   produce   summary     judgment      evidence
    sufficient   to    create   a   fact   issue   as    to   whether      Dolgencorp
    employees had knowledge of the defective condition.                   To preclude
    summary judgment on this issue, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
    employees knew or should have known of the defective condition.
    See, e.g., Walters v. Kenner CiCi’s, 
    780 So. 2d 467
    , 469 (La. App.
    2001) (holding plaintiff carried her burden by eliciting testimony
    from the store manager that he had found screws missing from
    similar chairs that caused the accident and plaintiff’s injuries);
    Saulny v. Tricou House, L.L.C., 
    839 So. 2d 392
    , 394-95 (La. App.
    2003) (affirming judgment for plaintiff who was injured by a
    collapsing plastic chair where she produced evidence that the same
    3
    type of chairs had repeatedly broken over a two year period).
    Here, Cormier failed to produce any evidence that store employees
    knew or should have known about the alleged defects in the mat:
    She produced no documentation of previous accidents, nor did she
    introduce any affidavit or deposition testimony of store employees
    that they knew a defect existed, nor did she acquire any other
    evidence   that   may   have   demonstrated   constructive   or   actual
    knowledge.   This omission is also fatal to her claim.
    Cormier’s final contention is that the mat used in the
    store constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition.       Cormier’s
    sole support for this claim is Weaver v. Winn-Dixie of Louisiana,
    Inc., 
    406 So. 2d 792
    (La. App. 1981), in which the court held that
    a merchant must “have a mat that lies flat so that a patron’s foot
    will not catch under some rise in the mat, causing him or her to
    fall.”   
    Id. at 794.
       However, Cormier does not claim that her foot
    was caught under the mat, but instead that the ridges on top of the
    mat caught her tennis shoe and tripped her.          Thus, Weaver is
    inapposite and no Louisiana law supports Cormier’s contention that
    the mat constituted an unreasonably dangerous condition.
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-31238

Citation Numbers: 136 F. App'x 627

Judges: Jones, Barksdale, Prado

Filed Date: 6/21/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024