United States v. Salazar-Castaneda ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 28, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
____________________ Clerk
No. 05-51744
Summary Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
GLORIA SALAZAR-CASTANEDA
Defendant - Appellant
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas, El Paso
No. 3:05-CR-41
_________________________________________________________________
Before KING, WIENER, and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-appellant Gloria Salazar-Castaneda appeals from
her conviction and sentence for importation of and possession
with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), and 841(a)(1), respectively. Salazar-
Castaneda contends that the evidence was insufficient to
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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establish the requisite knowledge that her vehicle contained
concealed illegal drugs. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 12, 2004, Gloria Salazar-Castaneda (“Salazar-
Castaneda”) was arrested while attempting to cross the border
from Mexico into the United States. At the primary inspection
point, United States Customs and Border Protection Officer Ronald
Kraft (“Kraft”) stopped Salazar-Castaneda in a white 1996
Chevrolet Cavalier. Salazar-Castaneda allegedly told Kraft that
she had been “belly dancing” in Juarez, Mexico, the previous
night. According to Kraft, Salazar claimed that the vehicle
belonged to her and that she had owned it for approximately four
months. Kraft also noticed that Salazar-Castaneda’s hands were
shaking when he asked her to count the approximately $200 she had
on her person at the time.
After tapping on the vehicle’s quarter panels aroused his
suspicion, Kraft used a portable density meter to investigate
whether any illegal contraband was contained in the driver and
passenger side panels. When Kraft then asked Salazar-Castaneda
to produce her resident alien card, he again noticed that her
hands were shaking. A subsequent canine inspection of the
vehicle revealed approximately 78.35 pounds of marijuana
concealed behind the back seat, within the rear quarter panels,
and behind the cold air intake below the windshield wipers.
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During the canine inspection of her vehicle, Salazar-
Castaneda was questioned further by Customs and Border Protection
Officer Eric Hannemann (“Hannemann”) at the secondary inspection
station. Salazar-Castaneda declared that she was not bringing
anything into the United States from Mexico. She also told
Hannemann that she had owned the car for two to three months but
that it was registered to a woman named Monica.1 After seizure
of the marijuana concealed within the vehicle, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Special Agent Francisco Garcia (“Garcia”)
informed Salazar-Castaneda of her Miranda rights and presented
her with a written advisement, which she signed to indicate her
willingness to cooperate with the investigation.2 Salazar-
Castaneda told Garcia that her usual car was a white 1988 Ford
Mustang that she had owned for approximately seven years. A
subsequent search confirmed Salazar-Castaneda’s ownership of the
Mustang and revealed at least five vehicles registered in her
name.3 A lane-
1
A subsequent registration check revealed that the car was
registered to a Monica Mesa on October 18, 2004. The address
listed on the registration, however, was a post office box that
belonged to someone else.
2
Salazar-Castaneda also gave Garcia permission to search
her cell phone. Although Salazar-Castaneda testified that her
cell phone could not be used to call Mexico, her cell phone
indicated that calls had been made to and received from Mexico on
December 11 and 12.
3
At trial, Salazar-Castaneda claimed to have only three
cars registered under her name--a 1988 Ford Mustang, a 1997
Mercury, and a 1993 Jeep. When questioned about a 2000 Plymouth
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crossing check indicated that all of these vehicles, except one,
had made multiple crossings through various ports of entry
between 2003 and June 2005.
Once Garcia informed her that something illegal had been
discovered in her vehicle, Salazar-Castaneda surmised that it was
“probably drugs” but did not further elaborate. She then
explained that she was romantically involved with a man named
Lencho Aguirre (“Aguirre”), who she claimed actually owned the
Cavalier. According to Salazar-Castaneda, Aguirre let her borrow
the Cavalier approximately two to three weeks after they met,
particularly when she experienced mechanical problems with her
Mustang. Salazar-Castaneda later learned from Aguirre’s sister
that Aguirre had been deported from the United States because of
a previous drug-related conviction. Also, on at least one
previous occasion, Aguirre specifically asked Salazar-Castaneda
to “cross a car” containing drugs into the United States, but she
refused to do so.
On the evening before her arrest, Salazar-Castaneda drove
her Mustang to Mexico and attended a dance with Aguirre.4 The
following morning, Salazar-Castaneda allegedly experienced
Breeze registered under her name, Salazar-Castaneda claimed that
her son had traded in such a vehicle for the 1993 Jeep. She
claimed to be unaware of a 1994 Ford also registered under her
name.
4
According to Salazar-Castaneda, the couple attended a
traditional Mexican holiday celebration known as “los
matachines,” at which Aguirre was apparently a dancer.
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mechanical problems with her Mustang and agreed to drive
Aguirre’s Cavalier back to El Paso, apparently in exchange for
Aguirre offering to send her money to fix her Mercury back in the
United States. She was subsequently stopped at the Ysleta Port
of Entry near El Paso, Texas, which eventually gave rise to her
indictment on charges of importation of and possession with
intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), and 841(a)(1), respectively.
Salazar-Castaneda’s first trial resulted in a mistrial on
April 27, 2005. Before her second trial was submitted to the
jury, Salazar-Castaneda’s counsel moved in open court for a
judgment of acquittal. The district judge orally denied the
motion and submitted the case to the jury at the close of all
evidence. The jury returned a verdict convicting Salazar-
Castaneda on both counts listed in the indictment on August 31,
2005. On November 28, 2005, the district court sentenced
Salazar-Castaneda to twenty-one months on each count, to be
served concurrently, three years of non-reporting supervised
release, and a $200 special assessment. Salazar-Castaneda timely
appealed her conviction and sentence on November 29, 2005.
II. DISCUSSION
On this appeal, Salazar-Castaneda challenges only the
sufficiency of the evidence with respect to establishing that she
knew that marijuana was concealed in the vehicle. The government
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responds that there was ample circumstantial evidence to support
the jury’s verdict and that the jury simply rejected Salazar-
Castaneda’s version of the events.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
consider the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the
light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable
inferences and credibility choices in support of the jury’s
verdict. See United States v. Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d 900, 904 (5th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Anchondo-Sandoval, 910 F.2d 1234,
1236 (5th Cir. 1990). The evidence is sufficient if a rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d at 904;
Anchodo-Sandoval, 910 F.2d at 1236. The evidence need not
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and the jury is
free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.
See United States v. Lopez, 74 F.3d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1996). We
have cautioned, however, that reversal is required if the
evidence gives “equal or nearly equal circumstantial support” to
a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence. United States v.
Sanchez, 961 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Clark v.
Procunier, 755 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1985)).
A conviction for the offense of importation of marijuana
under 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) requires proof that: (1) the defendant
played a role in bringing a quantity of marijuana into the United
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States from a place outside the United States; (2) the defendant
knew the substance was marijuana; and (3) the defendant knew the
substance would enter the United States. See United States v.
Casilla, 20 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 1994). In contrast, a
conviction for the offense of possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) requires proof that the
defendant (1) knowingly (2) possessed marijuana (3) with intent
to distribute it. See Lopez, 74 F.3d at 577. Under both
statutory provisions, the government must adduce sufficient
evidence of guilty knowledge to convict. See Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d
at 904.
Because Salazar-Castaneda challenges only the sufficiency of
the evidence to establish the requisite knowledge elements of her
offenses, we further note that “[p]ossession of or control over a
vehicle does not, standing alone, suffice to prove guilty
knowledge.” Anchondo-Sandoval, 910 F.2d at 1236 (citing United
States v. Martinez-Mercado, 888 F.2d 1484, 1491 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir.
1988)). Additionally, in a case such as the this, where the
illegal drugs are found within “hidden compartments” of the
vehicle, the court will sustain a jury’s guilty verdict if the
government produces additional circumstantial evidence that is
suspicious in nature or demonstrates guilty knowledge. Cano-
Guel, 167 F.3d at 904. “This requirement stems from the
recognition that, in hidden compartment cases, there ‘is at least
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a fair assumption that a third party might have concealed the
controlled substances in the vehicle with the intent to use the
unwitting defendant as the carrier in a smuggling enterprise.’”
Id. (quoting United States v. Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d 951, 954
(5th Cir. 1990)).
Salazar-Castaneda insists that the gaps and inconsistencies
in her version of the events can be attributed to simple
linguistic misunderstandings with the government officials,5
rather than bases on which the jury could reasonably infer that
she knew that she was transporting drugs across the border.
Moreover, she contends that any display of nervousness was a
natural reaction to the circumstances and not related to any
underlying awareness of criminal behavior. See United States v.
Jones, 185 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 1999) (“While nervousness
alone is insufficient, it may support an inference of guilty
knowledge when combined with facts suggesting that the
nervousness is derived from an underlying consciousness of
criminal behavior.”). The government responds that the inherent
inconsistencies in Salazar-Castaneda’s story combined with the
ample circumstantial evidence of her guilt are sufficient to
5
For instance, Salazar Castaneda contends that she never
lied about ownership of the Cavalier; instead, she claims that
her answers reflected an understandable confusion between
“ownership” and mere “possession” in the Spanish translation of
the question. Similarly, Salazar-Castaneda maintains that she
never claimed to have been “belly dancing” the night before her
arrest, but that Kraft had simply misheard the Spanish word
“baile,” which means “dance” in Spanish.
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sustain the jury’s verdict.
Upon our review of the record, we agree with the government.
First, the seizure of more than seventy-five pounds of marijuana
valued at approximately $24,000 from the vehicle provides
circumstantial support for the inference that Salazar-Castaneda
was aware of her criminal conduct. We have previously recognized
that the value and quantity of the drug being transported may
provide valuable circumstantial evidence of guilt. See, e.g.,
United States v. Villarreal, 324 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Garcia-Flores, 246 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir.
2001); United States v. Ramos-Garcia, 184 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir.
1999). Moreover, putting aside the arguably innocent
misunderstandings and inconsistencies in her version of the
events, the government correctly points out that Salazar-
Castaneda admitted to knowledge of Aguirre’s past drug conviction
and acknowledged that he had previously requested she “cross a
car” for him. See Ramos-Garcia, 184 F.3d at 466 (concluding, in
a similar drug-trafficking case, that “failure to ask any
questions about the trip smacks of a willful ignorance consistent
with guilty knowledge”). Finally, in light of the aforementioned
circumstantial evidence, the jury was permitted to draw the
reasonable inference that Salazar-Castaneda’s nervous behavior
during the investigation at the border was related to her guilty
knowledge. Id. (“Viewed in context with the implausibility of
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[the defendant’s] story, the jury could have inferred [the
defendant’s] guilty knowledge from his nervousness under
questioning.”). Accordingly, drawing all reasonable inferences
and credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict, we
conclude that the evidence sufficiently established the requisite
knowledge to sustain Salazar-Castaneda’s conviction and sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM both Salazar-
Castaneda’s conviction and sentence.
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