United States v. Garza ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 21-40759         Document: 00516678273             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/15/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 21-40759                            FILED
    Summary Calendar                    March 15, 2023
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Eric Richard Garza,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:19-CR-5-1
    Before Smith, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Eric Richard Garza was charged with one count of Hobbs Act robbery
    and one count of discharging a firearm during the commission of a crime of
    violence. Garza was convicted after a jury trial. Garza asserts four errors on
    appeal. We AFFIRM in part and VACATE and REMAND for resentencing.
    *
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 21-40759      Document: 00516678273          Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/15/2023
    No. 21-40759
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In December 2018, Eric Richard Garza was arrested for attempted
    armed robbery of Central Watch and Clock Repair in Corpus Christi, Texas.
    A few days prior to his arrest, Garza and his friend, co-defendant Christopher
    Rangel-Musial, drove to this store to sell a Rolex watch. The two negotiated
    the sale with the store owner, Ambrose Denvir, who bought the watch for
    $600. With that money, Rangel-Musial paid for a hotel room for himself and
    his girlfriend, Belizia Pineda. He also paid Garza for driving him.
    On the day of the robbery, Garza picked up Rangel-Musial and Pineda
    from the hotel. Rangel-Musial told Garza he did not have the money to pay
    for a new hotel room. According to Rangel-Musial, Garza suggested they
    could rob the watch store, and Rangel-Musial agreed. Garza drove the three
    of them to the store. Garza and Rangel-Musial went inside while Pineda
    stayed in the vehicle.
    The store owner, Ambrose Denvir, later testified that when the two
    entered his store, he heard the motion detector alarm and saw “two men
    were already around [his] counter and standing in the doorway to [his]
    workshop pointing a gun at” him. He also testified that the two men “looked
    like the same two men who sold [him] the Rolex watch a week earlier.”
    Denvir turned to obtain a gun from his vault. Rangel-Musial then shot Denvir
    twice, once in the abdomen and once in the back. Despite being shot twice,
    Denvir still managed to retrieve his gun and returned fire on the men,
    shooting Rangel-Musial twice. Garza and Rangel-Musial fled, and Denvir
    called the police.
    Garza drove Rangel-Musial and Pineda to the hospital so Rangel-
    Musial could receive treatment for his injuries. Garza left the hospital.
    Subsequently, police arrived at the hospital and arrested Rangel-Musial and
    Pineda. After viewing surveillance footage from the watch store, the police
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    No. 21-40759
    obtained the make, model, and license plate number of Garza’s vehicle. Later
    that evening, police stopped Garza’s vehicle and performed a “high-risk
    vehicle stop” with multiple police units.         They arrested Garza, then
    inspected his vehicle and found a “significant amount of blood.”
    In February 2019, a grand jury for the United States District Court for
    the Southern District of Texas indicted Garza for attempted Hobbs Act
    robbery in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
     and § 2 (count one), and discharge of
    a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(iii) and § 2 (count two). Garza’s jury trial began in June 2021.
    During voir dire, the district court asked prospective jurors whether they had
    ever been a victim of a crime and whether they, or their family, had ever
    worked in prosecution or law enforcement. For those who responded
    affirmatively, the judge asked additional questions. Counsel then conducted
    their own questioning. Relevant here, Garza’s counsel asked some of the
    prospective jurors whether they, or their family or friends, had been crime
    victims, whether there should be greater gun control laws, and whether they
    believed the criminal justice system was too lenient. Defense counsel did not
    object to the seating of any of the 12 jurors who were selected.
    At the close of trial, the district court instructed jurors that, in order
    to convict Garza of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, they
    needed to find Garza committed the offense of attempted Hobbs Act robbery
    as charged in count one. The district court further instructed jurors that
    Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of violence. The jury found Garza
    guilty on both counts.
    The district court sentenced Garza to 78 months of imprisonment for
    count one and 120 months of imprisonment for count two, served
    consecutively, and a total of five years of supervised release. Garza filed a
    timely notice of appeal.
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    DISCUSSION
    In his initial brief, Garza argues (1) the district court abused its
    discretion in conducting voir dire, (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective
    assistance, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
    Garza later filed an unopposed motion for leave to file a supplemental brief,
    which this court granted. In his supplemental brief, Garza argues his Section
    924(c) conviction is invalid because attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a
    crime of violence according to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United
    States v. Taylor, 
    142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022)
    , decided after Garza’s trial and after
    his initial brief was filed.
    We first discuss whether the Section 924(c) attempted Hobbs Act
    robbery conviction is a crime of violence. Because Garza did not raise this
    issue in the district court or in his initial briefing, the issue was forfeited. See
    United States v. Vasquez, 
    899 F.3d 363
    , 372 (5th Cir. 2018). Our review is
    therefore limited to plain error. 
    Id.
     at 372–73. To establish plain error, “a
    defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, and (3) that
    affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Hinojosa, 
    749 F.3d 407
    , 411 (5th Cir. 2014). Even if those three elements are satisfied, we
    have discretion to “remedy the error only if it (4) ‘seriously affect[s] the
    fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009)).
    Section 924(c)(1) sets forth the penalties for anyone who possesses a
    firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or uses or carries a firearm
    “during and in relation to” a crime of violence, with heightened penalties
    when, as here, the firearm was discharged. 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A). A
    crime of violence under Section 924(c) is a felony offense that “has as an
    element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
    the person or property of another.” § 924(c)(3)(A). Subpart (B) of that
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    subsection, which refers to “a substantial risk that physical force” will be
    used, was declared to be unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis, 
    139 S. Ct. 2319
    , 2324 (2019); see also United States v. Smith, 
    957 F.3d 590
    , 592–93
    (5th Cir. 2020) (defining a crime of violence in light of Davis).
    Robbery under the Hobbs Act is
    the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the
    person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means
    of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,
    immediate or future, to his person or property. . . .
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
    (b)(1). In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that a conviction
    for attempted Hobbs Act robbery requires the Government to prove “(1)
    [t]he defendant intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property by
    means of actual or threatened force, and (2) he completed a ‘substantial step’
    toward that end.” 142 S. Ct. at 2020. Attempted Hobbs Act robbery,
    though, does not necessarily involve the use, attempted use, or threatened
    use of force and, thus, does not constitute a Section 924(c) crime of violence.
    Id. Accordingly, Garza’s attempted Hobbs Act robbery conviction is not a
    crime of violence to support his Section 924(c) conviction, which rested
    entirely upon attempted Hobbs Act robbery as the predicate crime of
    violence. This error was plain. It also affected Garza’s substantial rights by
    subjecting him to a greater sentence. We exercise our discretion and vacate
    Garza’s sentence on count two and remand for resentencing.
    Garza presents three other issues on appeal. First, Garza asserts the
    district court abused its discretion during voir dire because his jury was
    composed of victims of crimes similar to the one here. Garza claims the
    district court abused its discretion by impaneling these jurors, which affected
    his substantial right to a fair trial and impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth
    and Fourteenth Amendments.
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    “A district court has broad discretion in assessing a potential juror’s
    impartiality during voir dire, a decision we will not overturn absent a clear
    abuse of discretion.” United States v. Dejean, 
    988 F.3d 813
    , 816 (5th Cir.
    2021) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “In reviewing claims of this
    type, the deference due to district courts is at its pinnacle.” 
    Id.
     (quotation
    marks and citation omitted). Here, the record confirms that the district
    court’s questioning of the prospective jurors “was thorough and was
    designed to elicit the information required for the informed exercise of
    peremptory challenges by counsel and for the court to rule on the issue of
    challenges for cause.” United States v. Garza, 
    574 F.2d 298
    , 303 (5th Cir.
    1978).    The court asked appropriate questions and followed up when
    necessary to determine whether a potential juror could be impartial and fair.
    Garza’s counsel had ample opportunity to question the prospective jurors,
    which they did. Further, Garza did not challenge for cause any of the
    prospective jurors he now challenges on appeal. No objections were made
    during voir dire regarding the impaneled jury. There was no abuse of
    discretion.
    Second, Garza argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to
    challenge these prospective jurors during voir dire. This claim was not raised
    before the district court. “[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
    cannot be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has not been raised before
    the district court since no opportunity existed to develop the record on the
    merits of the allegations.” United States v. Gulley, 
    526 F.3d 809
    , 821 (5th Cir.
    2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).           We review claims of
    ineffective assistance on direct appeal “[o]nly in those rare occasions where
    the record is sufficiently developed,” and the claim can be fairly evaluated
    from the record. 
    Id.
     That is not the case here because “the district court did
    not hold a hearing and the record does not provide sufficient detail about trial
    counsel’s conduct and motivations to allow this court to make a fair
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    evaluation of the merits of the defendant’s claim.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks,
    alterations, and citation omitted). Accordingly, we deny Garza’s appeal on
    this issue without prejudice to collateral review.
    Third, Garza argues there was insufficient evidence to establish the
    burden of proof for Hobbs Act robbery. We review a sufficiency of the
    evidence challenge de novo, but review “is highly deferential to the verdict.”
    United States v. Davis, 
    735 F.3d 194
    , 198 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and
    citation omitted). Overwhelming evidence supports Garza’s convictions —
    two witnesses (Rangel-Musial and Pineda) testified against him and
    described his involvement in the crime, and the victim of the crime testified
    about the encounter.      Garza challenges Rangel-Musial’s and Pineda’s
    credibility on appeal because they “both have been convicted of moral
    turpitude crimes.” This challenge fails, though, because “[t]he credibility of
    the witnesses and the weight of the evidence is the exclusive province of the
    jury.” United States v. Garcia, 
    995 F.2d 556
    , 561 (5th Cir. 1993). We
    conclude a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Garza
    participated in the attempted Hobbs Act robbery.
    We AFFIRM other than as to the sentence on count two. We
    VACATE that sentence and REMAND for resentencing.
    7