Reddin v. Kijakazi ( 2023 )

Case: 22-30384 Document: 00516678265 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/15/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-30384 FILED
Summary Calendar March 15, 2023
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Mark Reddin,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:20-CV-908
Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Mark Reddin brought this action to obtain judicial
review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision that Reddin is not
entitled to disability insurance benefits or supplemental social security
income. On appeal, Reddin contends that the district court, in affirming the
Commissioner’s decision, (1) erred by finding that Reddin did not meet the
*
This decision is not designated for publication. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.
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listing of medical impairments under 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404; and (2) erred by
relying on consultative examination findings rather than treating physician
records. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the Commissioner’s final
administrative decision.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Before considering the merits of Reddin’s claims, we review the
factual and procedural history of this case. On August 10, 2018, Reddin filed
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income, alleging a disability onset date of June 21, 2018. In his applications,
Reddin alleged that he suffers from depression and post-traumatic stress
disorder (“PTSD”) due to his military service, which has allegedly made it
difficult to hold gainful employment.
After initially denying Reddin’s applications, the ALJ held an
administrative hearing on October 9, 2019, at which Reddin, his attorney, and
a vocational expert (VE) appeared. At the time of the hearing, Reddin was
thirty-seven years old, possessed at least a high school education, and had
previously worked as a short order cook and an electrician. Reddin testified
that he found it difficult to work because he was often uncomfortable around
other people and because his mind frequently wandered. Reddin further
testified that he tends to keep to himself out of concern for possibly hurting
someone or getting triggered. Reddin admitted that he previously struggled
with addictions to alcohol and various drugs and had been treated at different
Veterans’ Affairs (“VA”) hospitals for suicidal ideation. Reddin testified
that after one of these visits, he was diagnosed with severe major depressive
disorder with psychotic features. Reddin asserted that he can handle all
activities associated with living independently, however.
On October 29, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision that concluded that
Reddin was not disabled. The ALJ held that although Reddin “has severe
2
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impairments, they are not as limiting as he has alleged,” and he is therefore
able to hold gainful employment. Reddin requested a review of the ALJ’s
opinion by the Appeals Council, but the Appeals Council denied this request
on May 22, 2020. Therefore, the ALJ’s October 29, 2019 decision is the
Commissioner’s final administrative decision for the purposes of judicial
review. Soon after, Reddin brought this action under § 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana. The magistrate judge issued a Report and
Recommendation advising dismissal on May 4, 2022, which the district court
judge adopted. Reddin timely appealed.
II. Law and Analysis
We review the district court’s decision de novo, and our review of the
Commissioner’s decision is limited to “(1) whether the decision is supported
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and (2) whether the
Commissioner applied the proper legal standard.” 1 Substantial evidence is
“more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance,” 2 and “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” 3 In applying this standard, we may not “re-weigh the
evidence, try the questions de novo, or substitute our judgment for the
Commissioner’s, even if we believe the evidence weighs against the
Commissioner’s decision.” 4
1
Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005).
2
Id. (quoting Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2002)).
3
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
4
Masterson, 309 F.3d at 272.
3
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A claimant is “disabled” under the Social Security Act if he is unable
“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than 12 months.” 5 A claimant has the burden of proving that he
suffered from a disability during the relevant time period. 6 The
Commissioner employs a five-step process to determine if a claimant was
disabled during the relevant time period: (1) whether the claimant performed
substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant had a severe
impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals an impairment
listed in the relevant regulations; (4) whether the impairment prevented the
claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment
prevented the claimant from performing any other substantial gainful
activity. 7 If at any step the Commissioner determines that the claimant was
not disabled, the inquiry ends. 8
At step one of the disability inquiry, the ALJ determined that Reddin
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of
June 21, 2018. Under step two, the ALJ found that Reddin suffered from the
severe impairments of personality disorder, major depressive disorder,
polysubstance abuse, and carpal tunnel syndrome. Under step three,
however, the ALJ concluded that Reddin did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ
5
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
6
Perez, 415 F.3d at 461.
7
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
8
Morgan v. Colvin, 803 F.3d 773, 776 (5th Cir. 2015).
4
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found that Reddin retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, with two exceptions:
Reddin was limited to jobs that require only occasional interaction with the
public and to jobs in which the ability to feel texture is unnecessary.
With regard to step four, the ALJ determined that Reddin’s
impairments prevented him from performing his past positions as a cook and
electrician. In applying step five, the ALJ looked to the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines, which is a framework that directs a finding of “disabled” or “not
disabled” depending on the claimant’s vocational profile. 9 The ALJ
considered testimony from the vocational expert, who found that Reddin was
able to perform the occupations of “Cleaner, Housekeeping,” “Marker,”
and “Linen Room Attendant.” The ALJ also took into account Reddin's age,
level of education, past work experience, and RFC. The ALJ ultimately
concluded that Reddin’s impairments do not prevent him from performing
“jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.”
Reddin disputes the ALJ’s (and thus the Commissioner’s) findings
regarding steps three and five. Reddin contends that the ALJ erred in finding
that Reddin’s characteristics do not satisfy the listing in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1, because he was “factually found by the ALJ to have
a severe mental illness.” Reddin asserts that this finding “carries with it the
implication” that Reddin “meet[s] or equal[s] a listing under 12.04” of
Appendix 1. Reddin claims that the ALJ ignored the discharge summaries
from time spent at the V.A. Medical Centers in Louisiana and Colorado in
9
20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 2.
5
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2018. Citing the unpublished case Hernandez v. Berryhill, 10 Reddin asserts
that the ALJ cannot rule a certain way on one step and then the other way on
another step.
We are unpersuaded by Reddin’s arguments. First, it appears that
Reddin has conflated steps two and three of the relevant inquiry. Step two of
the inquiry analyzes whether a claimant has a severe impairment, while step
three determines whether that impairment meets or equals one of the listed
impairments in in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 11 Hernandez
does not stand for the notion that the finding of a “severe” impairment
means that the impairment satisfies step three. 12 Instead, Hernandez states
that if an ALJ finds that an impairment is severe, the ALJ should provide
“some explanation” as to “why such a severe impairment would not have
had any limitation on plaintiff’s ability” to work. 13 We have previously held
that “the suffering of some impairment does not establish disability; a
claimant is disabled only if she is ‘incapable of engaging in any substantial
gainful activity.’” 14 To satisfy step three, a claimant must meet all of the
specified medical criteria in the C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
listing. 15
10
No. 3:16-CV-2561-C (BF), 2017 WL 3447862, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2017),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-CV-2561-C (BF), 2017 WL 3425723 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 9, 2017).
11
Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4).
12
2017 WL 3447862, at *5; see also Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir.
1992).
13
Id. at *5.
14
Id. (quoting Milam v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1284, 1286 (5th Cir. 1986)).
15
Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990).
6
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Second, the ALJ (and thus the Commissioner’s) findings regarding
Reddin’s disability status are supported by substantial evidence. It is clear
from the final administrative opinion that the ALJ considered Reddin’s
inpatient treatments at the VA Medical Centers in July and August 2018. The
ALJ also considered Reddin’s counseling sessions with a social worker after
those visits. However, the ALJ pointed out that Reddin’s severe impairments
were not as limiting as alleged, especially because they improved when
Reddin followed the treatment plans from his medical providers. As the
district court pointed out, the ALJ concluded that Reddin was able to account
for his severe impairments within his RFC.
III. Conclusion
The Commissioner applied the correct legal standard in evaluating
Reddin’s claim for disability benefits, and the final administrative decision is
supported by substantial evidence. We therefore AFFIRM.
7