McCloud v. McDonough ( 2023 )

Case: 22-10357 Document: 00516677819 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/15/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 15, 2023
No. 22-10357 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Jacqueline McCloud,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Denis McDonough, Secretary, U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:19-CV-03082
Before Jones, Dennis, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff Jacqueline McCloud alleges that she suffered discrimination
and a hostile work environment while working at a Department of Veteran
Affairs (VA) healthcare facility in Dallas, Texas. During her employment,
McCloud filed multiple Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints
against the VA. The VA investigated the hostile work environment claims,
and an EEOC administrative law judge ruled for the VA. McCloud then filed
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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this pro se suit against the Secretary of the VA, alleging the same hostile work
environment claims she did in her administrative complaint. After reviewing
the parties’ arguments and the record, we AFFIRM on the same grounds as
explained by the magistrate judge and adopted by the district court.
I
McCloud is an African-American woman who was around 50 years old
when she began working as a physical therapist at a VA facility in Dallas in
2012. At some point while working at the facility, McCloud sustained a
chronic shoulder injury which limited how much weight she could lift. In
early 2016, McCloud transitioned to a therapist position in the facility’s
clinical video telerehab (CVT) program.
The VA subsequently hired Margaret Parker as the new supervisor
for the CVT program. 1 McCloud’s relationship with Parker soured quickly
after Parker assumed her post. McCloud alleges that Parker harassed her in
several ways such as by decreasing her patient numbers and not crediting her
for certain work. McCloud ultimately resigned after being placed on a
Performance Improvement Plan for misconduct such as tardiness, leaving
her post, and failure to follow orders.
Before her resignation, McCloud filed an EEO complaint with the
VA. After making several additions, McCloud alleged 31 instances of
harassment based on race, sex, disability, and reprisal for filing a prior
complaint. 2 The agency accepted all but McCloud’s whistleblower claim for
investigation. After the investigation, an administrative law judge with the
1
McCloud’s second-level supervisor, Dr. Weibin Yang, remained the same.
2
McCloud claims she experienced racial discrimination as early as 2014 and, by
2015, she had contacted an EEO counselor and filed two complaints. She later dropped
these complaints.
2
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued summary
judgment for the VA, concluding that McCloud “offered no evidence to
show that the Agency’s articulated reasons for its actions are a pretext for
discrimination.” 3
On December 31, 2019, McCloud filed a pro se lawsuit in federal
district court against the Secretary of the VA under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. She alleges the same 31
instances of harassment asserted in her EEO complaint and requests
“settlement/compensation of $4,995,000, removal of all unsubstantiated
documents placed in Plaintiff[’s] personnel file” and for the VA to bear all
litigation costs.
The VA moved for summary judgment. McCloud filed what the lower
court construed as a response to the VA’s motion and a separate motion for
summary judgment. The district court referred the motions to a magistrate
judge for initial findings of fact and conclusions of law. See McCloud v.
McDonough, No. 3:19-cv-3082, 2022 WL 1230303 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2022).
The magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the
VA’s motion. The judge first concluded that McCloud had administratively
exhausted only her hostile work environment claims and thus those were the
only claims properly before the court. Id. at *3. Still, the magistrate judge
determined that the hostile work environment claims failed because the Fifth
Circuit does not recognize a reprisal claim. Id. The judge determined that
McCloud otherwise failed to show any genuine issue of material fact that she
3
McCloud timely appealed the ALJ’s decision to the EEOC. The EEOC however
took longer than 180 days to decide, so McCloud filed this suit. The EEOC finally affirmed
the ALJ’s decision on January 9, 2020.
3
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suffered pervasive harassment because of a protected characteristic or any
harassment affected a term or condition of her employment. Id. at *4–5.
After considering McCloud’s objections, which largely restated her
factual allegations, the district court fully adopted the magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendations and entered judgment for the VA. See
McCloud v. McDonough, No. 3:19-cv-3082, 2022 WL 682747, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 8, 2022). McCloud filed this appeal.
II
We review summary judgment de novo, reviewing all facts “in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in
its favor.” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 2002). To defeat
summary judgment, the non-moving party must point the court to specific
facts “showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). A party cannot defeat summary
judgment with “conclusory allegations,” “unsubstantiated assertions,” or
“only a scintilla of evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). “If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party, then there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
III
McCloud assigns eight points of error to the district court’s decision,
but they can be consolidated into three main issues: (1) whether the district
court erred in holding that McCloud only exhausted her hostile work
environment claims; (2) whether the district court erred in holding that the
Fifth Circuit did not recognize a reprisal claim; and (3) whether the district
4
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court erred in granting summary judgment for the VA on her hostile work
environment claims. 4 We address each of McCloud’s arguments in turn.
A
McCloud argues that the district court erred in holding that she failed
to exhaust her discrimination claims. “Before seeking relief in federal court,
Title VII plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative remedies.” Story v.
Gibson on behalf of Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 896 F.3d 693, 698 (5th Cir. 2018).
A claim is exhausted if: “(1) the employee receives notice of final agency
action or by the EEOC upon appeal from an agency decision, or (2) 180 days
have passed from the filing of the administrative complaint or appeal thereof
without final agency action.” Ruiz v. Brennan, 851 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir.
2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)). McCloud only pursued hostile work
environment claims in her administrative complaint. Indeed, the EEO
investigation can be construed only as investigating hostile work environment
claims. Thus the district court correctly held that only McCloud’s hostile
work environment claims were exhausted.
B
Turning to her exhausted hostile work environment claims, the
district court correctly granted the VA summary judgment on the reprisal
claim, as “[w]e have not recognized a retaliatory hostile work environment
cause of action.” Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech.
Coll., 850 F.3d 731, 741 n.5 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Montgomery-Smith v.
4
McCloud also contends that the district court erred in striking parts of her
summary judgment filings for revealing confidential settlement information. McCloud
does not expand on this argument and thus it is forfeited. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8
F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (a party forfeits an argument “by failing to adequately brief
the argument on appeal”); see also Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993)
(same for pro se plaintiffs).
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George, 810 F. App’x 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2020) (“This circuit has not
recognized a retaliatory hostile work environment cause of action[.]”). We
need not decide whether one exists now because McCloud generally cannot
establish the elements of a hostile work environment claim as discussed
below.
To succeed on the other bases, McCloud must show that (1) she
“belongs to a protected group”; (2) she suffered “unwelcome harassment”;
“(3) the harassment complained of was based on [the protected
characteristic]”; (4) the harassment “affected a term, condition, or privilege
of employment”; and (5) her “employer knew or should have known of the
harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action.” 5 Ramsey,
286 F.3d at 268. For harassment to affect “a term, condition, or privilege of
employment,” it must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993)); see also Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir.
2012).
McCloud fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on at least two
of these prongs: As the ALJ, EEOC, magistrate judge, and district court all
concluded, McCloud has not shown a genuine factual dispuate that any of the
5
We have similarly recognized a hostile work environment cause of action under
the ADEA. To succeed on a such a claim, plaintiffs must prove that: (1) they over the age
of 40; (2) they were “subjected to harassment, either through words or actions, based on
age; (3) the nature of the harassment was such that it created an objectively intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment; and (4) there exists some basis for liability on the
part of the employer.” Dediol v. Best Chevrolet, Inc., 655 F.3d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 2011). The
same is true for claims under the Rehabilitation Act. See Travis v. Potter, 221 F. App’x 345,
348 (5th Cir. 2007) (harassment must be linked to the plaintiff’s disability). Because
McCloud’s claims fail on the overlapping prongs, we do not separately analyze her claims
under each statute.
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31 instances of harassment were based on any of her protected characteristics
or constituted “severe or pervasive harassment.”
McCloud’s claims largely involve workplace disputes over work
opportunities and discipline untethered from any evidence that such disputes
stemmed from one of McCloud’s protected characteristics. For example,
McCloud asserts she was accused of workplace misconduct and having low
clinic numbers. But she points to no facts showing that these accusations
were lobbed against her because of her race, sex, age, or disability other than
her adamant belief. This cannot defeat summary judgment. See Badgerow v.
REJ Props., Inc., 974 F.3d 610, 618 (5th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff’s subjective
belief that the alleged harassment was based on her gender was insufficient
to defeat summary judgment); Eberle v. Gonzales, 240 F. App’x. 622, 629 (5th
Cir. 2007) (same).
The claims that McCloud connects to a protected characteristic are
still not severe or pervasive such as to “affect a term, condition, or privilege
of [McCloud’s] employment.” See Ramsey, 286 F.3d at 268. “In determining
whether harassment is sufficiently pervasive or severe, we consider ‘the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Thompson
v. Microsoft Corp., 2 F.4th 460, 471 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Patton v. Jacobs
Eng’g Grp., Inc., 874 F.3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2017)).
For example, McCloud alleges that Parker asked one of McCloud’s
co-workers if McCloud would shoot Parker if Parker disciplined her. We have
held that these types of statements “do not rise to the level of severity
necessary to maintain a hostile work environment claim.” See, e.g., Baker v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 278 F. App’x 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2008)
(“The phrases ‘fired girl walking’ and ‘stupid’ are not ‘based on race’ and,
7
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thereby, do not sustain a race-based hostile work environment claim.”). And
the isolated nature of this incident makes it less pervasive and severe. See,
e.g., Frazier v. Sabine River Auth., 509 F. App’x 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2013) (use
of racially derogatory language was “isolated and not severe or pervasive
enough” to create a hostile work environment).
McCloud also points to times when she disagreed with the VA’s
accommodation of her shoulder injury, which she characterizes as disability
harassment. Construing this as a harassment claim and not a failure to
accommodate claim, we have held that similar conduct falls short of
pervasive or severe. See Clark v. Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 585
(5th Cir. 2020) (“[A] disagreement with an employer over . . . an
accommodation [does] not amount to harassment.”).
Moreover, even if McCloud’s other assertions of harassment based on
workplace disagreements with, and accusations from, her superiors were
connected to a protected characteristic, they do not qualify as severe or
pervasive. McCloud does assert that she faced a physical threat, alleging that
Parker shoved a piece of paper in her face. But we have held that this behavior
does not constitute severe or pervasive harassment where it is isolated. See
McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 554, 558 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (affirming summary judgment for employer even though a coworker
“twice thr[ew] wadded-up paper in [the plaintiff’s] face”).
Viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to McCloud, we
agree with the district court that she has not shown any genuine issue of
material fact that she suffered a hostile work environment under any of the
statutory protections she cites. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
8