Elizabeth Domel v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ( 2020 )


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  •      Case: 19-50753      Document: 00515320117        Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/24/2020
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 19-50753
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                      February 24, 2020
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    ELIZABETH DOMEL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    No. 1:18-CV-801
    Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Elizabeth Domel appeals the dismissal of her action seeking a
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
    5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-50753      Document: 00515320117         Page: 2    Date Filed: 02/24/2020
    No. 19-50753
    declaration that the statute of limitations bars JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
    (“JPMC”), from foreclosing on its lien against her real property. We affirm.
    I.
    Nearly ten years ago, Domel obtained a Chapter 7 discharge in bank-
    ruptcy. During those proceedings, she filed her intention to retain certain real
    property by continuing to provide JPMC with the property’s associated mort-
    gage payments. Nevertheless, those payments ceased in short order. 1
    JPMC obtained a judgment declaring its lien to be valid and enforceable.
    JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Domel, No. A-14-CV-767-LY, 2016 U.S. Dist.
    LEXIS 182340, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. July 29, 2016). After the court entered final
    judgment, Domel raised a statute-of-limitations defense in a post-judgment
    motion to amend. The court denied Domel’s motion, reasoning that she had
    waived the defense by failing to raise it in her answer. JPMC then began state
    foreclosure proceedings.
    Domel filed this suit to declare that—notwithstanding the declaratory
    judgment—JPMC’s right to foreclose is barred by limitations. The district
    court dismissed Domel’s claims with prejudice, and she appeals.
    II.
    “Appellate review of a district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim
    under Rule 12(b)(6) is de novo.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank
    PLC, 
    594 F.3d 383
    , 387 (5th Cir. 2010). We view “all well-pleaded facts . . . in
    the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but [she] must allege facts that support
    the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.” City of
    1Domel claims that JPMC stopped accepting her payments in 2012, but JPMC asserts
    that Domel stopped sending payment in August 2011. For purposes of adjudicating the
    motion to dismiss, we accept Domel’s alleged facts as true; our analysis remains unaffected.
    2
    Case: 19-50753     Document: 00515320117     Page: 3   Date Filed: 02/24/2020
    No. 19-50753
    Clinton v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 
    632 F.3d 148
    , 152–53 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
    Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    (2007)). We are not limited to the
    district court’s reasoning; indeed, we “may affirm the district court’s dismissal
    on any grounds supported by the record.” 
    Id. at 153
    (quotation marks and
    citation omitted).
    Domel contends that the declaratory judgment does not render her limi-
    tations defense res judicata because the defense was not available to her at
    that time. In other words, although JPMC’s declaratory judgment might have
    been valid when issued, Domel would have us declare that limitations has
    expired in the interim.
    Such misunderstanding upon misunderstanding rests on a fundamen-
    tally incorrect premise: Contrary to Domel’s theory, her discharge in bank-
    ruptcy extinguished her “personal liability for the debt” but did not affect
    “[JPMC’s] continuing lien on the collateral.” In re Kinion, 
    207 F.3d 751
    , 757
    (5th Cir. 2000). Instead, Texas’s four-year statute of limitations’ period began
    “when [JPMC] actually exercise[d] its option to accelerate,” i.e., in November
    2017. Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 
    44 S.W.3d 562
    , 566 (Tex.
    2001). See also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.035(b). The limitations
    defense was indeed not available to Domel when JPMC filed its declaratory
    action; neither is it available to her now.
    AFFIRMED.
    3