Hartfield v. Georgia Pacific ( 2001 )


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  •             IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _______________
    m 01-60220
    Summary Calendar
    _______________
    JOHNNY W. HARTFIELD,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    VERSUS
    GEORGIA PACIFIC CORPORATION; LEAF RIVER FOREST PRODUCTS, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    _________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    (2:99-CV-295)
    _________________________
    September 21, 2001
    Before JONES, SMITH, and                                Johnny Hartfield appeals a summary judg-
    EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.                   ment dismissing his personal injury action
    against Georgia Pacific Corp. (“Georgia Paci-
    JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*                      fic”) and Leaf River Forest Products, Inc.
    (“Leaf River”). The district court ruled that
    Hartfield was a borrowed servant under
    Mississippi law and therefore that the
    *
    defendants are sheltered from liability by the
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
    provision of workers’ compensation benefits
    determined that this opinion should not be
    by Manpower, Inc. (“Manpower”), the em-
    published and is not precedent except under the
    limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.       ployer from whom Hartfield was borrowed.
    47.5.4.                                              The court also held that Georgia Pacific is not
    liable for negligence with regard to the forklift        N. Elec. Co. v. Phillips, 
    660 So. 2d 1278
    that was the cause of Hartfield’s injury,                (Miss. 1995), which concluded that an
    because Georgia Pacific introduced affidavits            employer using workers from an employment
    showing that it did not own the forklift at the          agency was immune from suit by virtue of
    time of injury, which evidence Hartfield did             employment agency’s provision of workers’
    not contradict. Finding no error, we affirm,             compensation insurance.1 Where one is
    essentially for the reasons stated by the district       employed by two employers in relation to the
    court in its comprehensive opinion of February           same act , or in which the employee is a
    5, 2001.                                                 “borrowed employee” of one employer from
    the other, both employers are exempt from lia-
    I.                                 bility for workplace negligence actions, “al-
    Hartfield was an employee of Manpower,                though only one of them has provided
    an employment placement agency, which had                workmen’s compensation insurance.” Honey
    a contract with Leaf River to supply                     v. United Parcel Serv., 
    879 F. Supp. 615
    , 618
    employees. Under this contract, Hartfield was            (S.D. Miss. 1995). Accordingly, there can be
    placed at Leaf River as a forklift operator and          no recovery from Leaf River.
    reported to, and was under the direction of,
    Leaf River’s supervisors, similarly to                                         III.
    employees hired directly by Leaf River, but he              Hartfield also appeals the summary
    was paid by Manpower, which maintained                   judgment in favor of Georgia Pacific, arguing
    workers’ compensation insurance coverage on              that he should be allowed to go to trial on the
    Hartfield.                                               issues of (1) whether Georgia Pacific provided
    Leaf River with a defective forklift and
    Hartfield was injured on October 31, 1996,            (2) whether the forklift was owned by Georgia
    when the fuel tank on the forklift he was oper-          Pacific. Citing cases from other jurisdictions,
    ating exploded, allegedly from a defective               Hartfield contends that any negligence of
    valve. Manpower’s workers’ compensation                  Georgia Pacific, as corporate grandparent of
    policy provided payments to Hartfield, who               Leaf River, is not immunized by Manpower’s
    continued to work at Leaf River as a forklift            provision of workers’ compensation insurance,
    operator for seven months.                               because Hartfield was borrowed by Leaf
    River, not Georgia Pacific. Hartfield argues
    II.                               that, therefore, if he can prove that Georgia
    Hartfield sued Georgia Pacific and Leaf
    River, a wholly owned subsidiary.             In
    Mississippi, workers’ compensation is the                   1
    exclusive remedy against one’s employer for                   “Summary judgment is appropriate [under the
    ‘borrowed servant’ doctrine] where a temporary
    on-the-job injuries. MISS. CODE ANN. 71-3-9.
    employment agency assigns an employee to another
    Utilizing the appropriate test under Mississippi         employer and the employee performs the normal
    law, the district court held that Hartfield was          work of the second employer and is controlled and
    a borrowed employee and therefore that Leaf              supervised by that employer. In Mississippi, one
    River is immune from suit, because                       may be employed by more than one employer and
    Manpower’s workers’ compensation insurance               both employers gain immunity from common-law
    covered Hartfield. The court closely followed            negligence actions.” N. Elec., 660
    So. 2d at 1282.
    2
    Pacific’s negligence caused his injuries, he may
    pursue a claim against it.
    Hartfield seizes on the fact that the forklift
    was purchased by Georgia Pacific. Because
    Georgia Pacific was not involved in any of the
    operations at the Leaf River facility, however,
    Hartfield may pursue a claim against Georgia
    Pacific for negligence in maintaining the fork-
    lift only if Georgia Pacific owned the forklift
    or had some duty to maintain it for Leaf River.
    Recognizing this requirement, the district
    court granted summary judgment for Georgia
    Pacific because Georgia Pacific had provided
    affidavits stating that the forklift had been
    transferred to Leaf River before Hartfield’s in-
    jury.      Hartfield produced no evidence
    disputing these affidavits but instead argues,
    without reference to authority, that “[w]ithout
    a bill of sale or any other document, the Court
    should find the title to the forklift remained in
    [Georgia Pacific].”
    This argument is without merit.
    Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
    included sworn affidavits stating that Leaf
    River owned the forklift. Once defendants
    presented this properly supported motion,
    Hartfield was required to “bring forward
    ‘significant probative evidence’ demonstrating
    the existence of a triable issue of fact.” In re
    Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 
    672 F.2d 436
    , 440 (5th Cir. 1982). Hartfield pro-
    duced no evidence disputing the ownership of
    the forklift, but only complained that the
    defendants had not provided evidence of own-
    ership in a form he preferred. This is not
    sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-60220

Filed Date: 9/24/2001

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021