Christopher Lewis v. FCC Beaumont ( 2020 )


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  •      Case: 19-40216       Document: 00515463993         Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/24/2020
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 19-40216
    FILED
    June 24, 2020
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    CHRISTOPHER DARNELL LEWIS,
    Petitioner - Appellant
    v.
    WARDEN FCC BEAUMONT,
    Respondent - Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:18-CV-285
    Before BARKSDALE, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Christopher Darnell Lewis, federal prisoner # 11958-062 and appearing
    pro se, challenges the denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     petition, in which he
    requested, inter alia, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) designate, nunc pro tunc,
    state prison as his first place of confinement for his federal sentence of, inter
    alia, 180-months’ imprisonment for Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
    . Lewis contends the district court committed reversible error in
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-40216      Document: 00515463993     Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/24/2020
    No. 19-40216
    failing: to rule independently on the merits of his petition; and to determine
    his federal sentence should have been served first because it was imposed first.
    Lewis was arrested by state authorities on 29 February 2012 for failing
    to appear in two state-criminal matters.         He was transferred to federal
    authorities on 19 March 2012, pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad
    prosequendum. After receiving his federal sentence on 23 April 2013, he was
    returned to state authorities; the federal judgment was filed as a detainer.
    Lewis then pleaded guilty in state court to second-degree burglary and
    was sentenced to, inter alia, 10-years’ imprisonment on 30 April 2013. The
    state court ordered the sentence to “run concurrently” with Lewis’ federal
    sentence. Lewis also received one-year sentences in three other state criminal
    proceedings. Those sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each
    other and with the 10-year sentence for second-degree burglary.
    Prior to his release from state custody in 2017, Lewis requested that his
    federal sentence be served concurrently with his state sentence, which would
    require that the BOP designate the state institution nunc pro tunc as the place
    for service of his federal sentence.        Accordingly, the BOP contacted the
    sentencing federal court to determine its position on a retroactive designation.
    In its correspondence to the court, the BOP explained that, “[i]f, after 60 days,
    a response has not been received from the [c]ourt, the [BOP] will complete its
    review and make a decision regarding this case”.
    The sentencing court did not provide a response; therefore, after
    reviewing Lewis’ case and considering the relevant factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b) (listing factors for consideration in designating place of prisoner’s
    imprisonment), the BOP determined that a retroactive concurrent designation
    was not appropriate. The BOP informed Lewis of its decision on 31 December
    2015.
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    No. 19-40216
    Lewis completed his state sentence on 24 February 2017 and was
    transferred to federal custody to begin serving his 180-month sentence.
    Thereafter, on 13 June 2018, Lewis filed a petition under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    ,
    challenging the BOP’s denial of his request for nunc pro tunc designation. In
    it, he contended he should receive credit toward his federal sentence for the
    time he spent in state custody, consistent with the state court’s judgment
    ordering that his state sentence for second-degree burglary “run concurrently”
    with his federal sentence.
    Challenges regarding “the extent to which [a] sentence has been
    executed”, as opposed to “the legality of [a] conviction or the validity of [a]
    federal prison term imposed”, are cognizable “under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    ”. United
    States v. Gabor, 
    905 F.2d 76
    , 77–78 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “Under
    § 2241, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and
    conclusions of law de novo.” Christopher v. Miles, 
    342 F.3d 378
    , 381 (5th Cir.
    2003).
    Upon Lewis’ filing his § 2241 petition, the matter was referred to a
    magistrate judge (MJ), who issued a report recommending the petition be
    denied. The MJ concluded the BOP had acted within its discretion in refusing
    Lewis’ request for nunc pro tunc designation, given: the state court’s order for
    concurrent sentencing was not binding on the BOP; the sentencing federal
    district court’s judgment did not specify whether Lewis’ federal sentence would
    run consecutively or concurrently with his state sentence for second-degree
    burglary; and the federal sentencing court did not communicate to the BOP it
    intended Lewis’ federal sentence to run concurrently with his state sentence.
    After stating that no objections had been filed, the district court adopted
    the MJ’s report and denied Lewis’ § 2241 petition. This appeal followed.
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    “Where a federal sentence was imposed before a state sentence, the BOP
    may indirectly award credit for time served in state prison by designating nunc
    pro tunc the state prison as the place in which the prisoner serves a portion of
    his federal sentence.” Pierce v. Holder, 
    614 F.3d 158
    , 160 (5th Cir. 2010)
    (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In making its determination, the BOP
    fulfills its obligation to consider petitioner’s request by submitting the request
    to the [federal] sentencing court, which may communicate any intent for the
    sentence to run either concurrently or consecutively to any state sentence
    imposed, and, thereafter, considering the relevant 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b)
    statutory factors. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b); Hunter v. Tamez, 
    622 F.3d 427
    , 429
    & n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also Rodriguez v. Pitzer, 76 F.
    App’x 519, 520 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
    As discussed, when Lewis’ federal sentence was imposed in 2013, he was
    under primary jurisdiction of state authorities in Oklahoma. After pleading
    guilty to Hobbs Act robbery in federal court, Lewis was returned to state
    authorities. He then pleaded guilty in state court to second-degree burglary
    and was sentenced to 10-years’ imprisonment, which the state court ordered to
    “run concurrently” with Lewis’ federal sentence. Lewis then began serving his
    state sentence in state custody.
    Prior to his release from state custody in 2017, Lewis requested that his
    federal sentence be served concurrently with his state sentence, which would
    require that the BOP designate the state institution nunc pro tunc as the place
    for service of his federal sentence. Although the BOP contacted the federal
    sentencing court to determine its position on a retroactive designation in
    Lewis’ case, the sentencing court did not respond. Thereafter, in reviewing
    Lewis’ case and considering the relevant 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b) factors, the BOP
    determined a retroactive, concurrent designation was not appropriate.
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    Lewis first contends: the sentencing court’s “non-response” to the BOP’s
    inquiry is insufficient to support the BOP’s denial of his request for nunc pro
    tunc designation; and the district court, therefore, erred in relying on the
    sentencing court’s “non-response” in denying his 
    18 U.S.C. § 2241
     petition
    without “independently rul[ing] on the merits of the case”. This contention
    lacks merit.
    As an initial matter, Lewis cites no authority requiring the district court
    to “independently rule on the merits of [his] case”. In any event, although the
    district court considered the sentencing court’s “non-response” to the BOP, it
    also undertook a full analysis of Lewis’ 
    18 U.S.C. § 2241
     petition.
    In considering Lewis’ petition, the district court explained that “the time
    [Lewis] spent in custody from his arrest by state authorities until the date he
    was taken into federal custody [in 2017] was credited toward his state
    sentence[] ”. The court determined he was, therefore, “not entitled to have the
    time credited toward his federal sentence” under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3585
    (b) (stating
    “defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment
    for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence
    commences . . . that has not been credited against another sentence” (emphasis
    added)).    Additionally, the court acknowledged 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    (a)’s
    presumption that “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times
    run consecutively unless the federal court orders that the terms are to run
    concurrently”.   Further, the court acknowledged that “[t]he decision . . .
    whether to grant . . . a [retroactive] designation is within the discretion of the
    BOP”; and, as stated, the BOP considered Lewis’ request in the light of the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b) factors before exercising its discretion in denying it.
    Lewis also contends the district court failed to consider his assertion that
    his federal sentence should have been served first because, when in 2012 he
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    was transferred from the state to federal authorities for conviction and
    imposition of his federal sentence in 2013, he had not yet been convicted on the
    state charge and was not serving a state sentence.            Contrary to Lewis’
    contention, the district court considered this claim but determined it was
    without merit given our court’s decision in Causey v. Civiletti, 
    621 F.2d 691
    ,
    693–94 (5th Cir. 1980), where our court rejected the “first in time, first to serve”
    claim that Lewis now makes on appeal.
    AFFIRMED.
    6