William Burch v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 19-11175     Document: 00515568148          Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/17/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 19-11175                         September 17, 2020
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    William Paul Burch,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
    Defendant—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:19-CV-645
    Before Stewart, Graves, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Proceeding pro se, William Paul Burch filed a civil action in state court
    against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JPMorgan), seeking to quiet title on
    real property located at 2531 Gerry Way in Lancaster, Texas. JPMorgan
    removed the action, asserting that there was federal jurisdiction based on
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-11175      Document: 00515568148           Page: 2    Date Filed: 09/17/2020
    No. 19-11175
    diversity of citizenship and alleging that the amount-in-controversy
    requirement was satisfied because the appraised market value of the property
    was $105,290. The district court denied Burch’s motion to remand, and it
    dismissed the action for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
    The district court denied Burch’s motion to proceed in forma
    pauperis (IFP) on appeal and certified that the appeal was not taken in good
    faith. By moving for IFP status in this court, Burch is challenging the district
    court’s certification. See Baugh v. Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997).
    Burch argues that his case does not satisfy the amount-in-controversy
    requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).          He asserts that the amount in
    controversy is the amount of the mortgage lien that he sought to have
    released; this amount, he contends, was only $33,765. He arguess that,
    because there was no federal jurisdiction, the district court’s judgment is
    void, and the matter should be remanded to state court.
    The federal diversity statute provides, in pertinent part, that “district
    courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
    controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
    costs, and is between—(1) citizens of different States.” § 1332(a)(1). The
    federal removal statute allows defendants to remove an action to federal court
    if the federal district court would have original jurisdiction based on diversity
    of citizenship and no defendant “is a citizen of the State in which such action
    is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 
    385 F.3d 568
    , 572 (5th Cir. 2004).
    “[W]hen a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the
    defendant’s amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not
    contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court.” Dart Cherokee Basin
    Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 
    574 U.S. 81
    , 87 (2014). “[A] defendant’s
    2
    Case: 19-11175      Document: 00515568148            Page: 3    Date Filed: 09/17/2020
    No. 19-11175
    notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in
    controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Evidence establishing the
    amount is required by [28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B)] only when the plaintiff
    contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s allegation.”
    Id. at 89.
              We have recognized “the principle that when the validity of a contract
    or a right to property is called into question in its entirety, the value of the
    property controls the amount in controversy.” Waller v. Prof’l Ins. Corp., 
    296 F.2d 545
    , 547-48 (5th Cir. 1961). Here, because Burch did not contest
    JPMorgan’s plausible allegation as to the amount in controversy based on the
    value of the property, and the district court did not question it, JPMorgan
    was not required to submit evidence to establish the amount in controversy.
    See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., 
    LLC, 574 U.S. at 87
    , 89. Thus, Burch
    has not shown that his jurisdictional challenge involves a nonfrivolous issue.
    Burch has not addressed the merits of his claims or otherwise
    challenged the propriety of the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
    When an appellant fails to identify any error in the district court’s analysis, it
    is the same as if the appellant had not appealed that issue. Brinkmann
    v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Thus,
    Burch has abandoned any challenge to the propriety of the district court’s
    Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See
    id. Given the foregoing,
    Burch has failed to show that “the appeal
    involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).”
    Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks
    and citations omitted). Accordingly, his IFP motions are DENIED, and his
    appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See id.; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
    3