Moore v. Centralized Manage Srv ( 2021 )

Case: 20-30332 Document: 00515733654 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/04/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 4, 2021
No. 20-30332
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Justin Moore,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Centralized Management Services, L.L.C.; Episode
Solutions, L.L.C.,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:19-cv-01592
Before Stewart, Higginson, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
A discharged employee sued his former employer alleging
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court
granted the former employer’s motion for summary judgment. We
AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-30332
I.
Justin Moore began working for Centralized Management Services,
LLC and Episode Solutions, LLC in August 2017 (collectively, “CMS”). 1
CMS develops and manages payment structures for musculoskeletal care in
partnership with doctors and hospitals. Hoping to expand into the New
Orleans market, CMS hired Moore in a business-development role. Moore’s
responsibility was to foster relationships with physicians and hospitals in the
New Orleans area.
From nearly its inception, Moore’s employment at CMS was rife with
trouble. Angela Jones, Moore’s boss and CMS’s Vice President of Business
Development, became increasingly frustrated by his performance and began
keeping a list detailing Moore’s shortcomings. Jones memorialized her list
in an email Jones sent on September 22 to CMS’s HR consultant and Vail
Willis, the Chief Operating Officer of CMS. According to Jones, Moore
failed to complete assignments, respond to emails, communicate with his
supervisors and clients, or generally help CMS expand into the New Orleans
market.
The record shows that on September 21 and 22, Moore failed to
respond to emails from Jones and Willis. But Moore sent text messages on
September 22 to CMS’s HR consultant asking whether his disclosure of a
“health issue” would remain confidential. Despite his inquiry, Moore did
not disclose to HR what health issue he was experiencing.
The next day, Jones sent another email to Willis, recommending that
Moore be terminated:
1
CMS is a wholly-owned affiliate of Episode. Because the distinction is not
relevant here, we will not differentiate and refer to both as CMS.
2
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[Moore] basically did nothing last week.
I do not think [he] is a good fit for the role in New Orleans. We
need a team player that can balance a sprint and process to get
us to the end results we are looking for. [He] has shown no
effort in this market since the beginning of his employment.
You and I are both very understanding if indeed these were
family issues, but in an employment role you have to
communicate if you are not going to be available to attend work
meetings and deadlines.
[Moore’s] actions were exactly in line with insubordination
and should be reflective in a termination.
When Jones sent this email, she was not aware that Moore had
communicated with the HR consultant. In response to additional email
inquiries from Jones and Willis, Moore said that the week had presented “a
challenge.” Two days later, Willis sent Moore an email saying that it was
necessary that they coordinate a phone call to discuss Moore’s lack of
performance. Moore skipped the call.
On September 26, Moore disclosed to HR that he was an alcoholic,
had a relapse, and had checked himself into a facility. He then sent an email
to Jones and Willis disclosing the same. Moore underwent inpatient
treatment until October 27. Upon his return, Moore was terminated for poor
performance.
In February 2019, Moore filed this action against CMS, alleging a
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Moore asserted that he was
terminated because of a protected disability, i.e., alcoholism and his effort to
obtain treatment. CMS filed a motion for summary judgment contending
that Moore failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The
district court granted CMS’s motion, concluding: (1) Moore failed to show
that his alcoholism constitutes a disability under the ADA; (2) CMS could
(and did) terminate Moore for poor performance even if it was caused by his
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alcoholism; and (3) Moore failed to show that his supervisors regarded him
as disabled.
Moore then filed a motion for reconsideration, contending summary
judgment was improper because the ruling was based on outdated law, the
record contained genuine disputes of material fact, and the court failed to
consider two sources of previously unavailable evidence. The court denied
Moore’s motion, and this appeal followed. Before us, Moore challenges both
rulings.
II.
A. Summary judgment on ADA claim
Moore first challenges summary judgment on his ADA claim. We
review a district court’s summary judgment de novo. EEOC v. LHC Grp.,
Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014). In doing so, we view the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and apply the same standards
as the district court. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
genuine dispute of material fact exists if the “evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against
an employee “on the basis of disability in regard to . . . discharge of
employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To make a prima facie case of
discriminatory termination, Moore must show: (1) he has a disability, or was
regarded as disabled; (2) he was qualified for the job; and (3) he was subject
to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability. Cannon v.
Jacobs Fields Servs. N.A., Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016). If he makes
this showing, a presumption of discrimination arises, which his employer can
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rebut with a “legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.” Id. If the employer does so, then the burden returns
to Moore to show that this reason was pretextual. Id.Here, the district court determined that Moore failed to establish the
first and third elements of a prima facie case for discriminatory termination—
i.e., that Moore’s alcoholism constituted a disability under the ADA and that
CMS terminated Moore on account of his alcoholism. We may affirm the
district court “for any reason supported by the record[.]” Clarkson v. White,
943 F.3d 988, 992 (5th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, “[w]e need not discuss each
step in the shifting evidentiary presentation” and may affirm if Moore failed
to meet his burden on any one of the elements in the burden-shifting
framework. Kitchen v. BASF, 952 F.3d 247, 253 (5th Cir. 2020) (affirming
dismissal of ADA claim because plaintiff “offered no evidence of a causal
connection between his discharge and his alcoholism”).
On appeal, most of Moore’s brief challenges the district court’s
determination that Moore failed to show that his alcoholism constitutes a
disability under the ADA. But, as stated supra, the district court also
concluded that CMS terminated Moore for poor performance (and not on
account of his alcoholism). Because we discern no error in the district court’s
determination in this regard, we need not address whether Moore’s
alcoholism constituted a disability under the ADA. Clarkson, 943 F.3d at 992.
Moore contends that the district court erred in concluding that CMS
terminated him for poor performance. According to Moore, the evidence
does not support this conclusion, and the district court merely cited an
argument from CMS’s memorandum in support of summary judgment. But
the record shows otherwise.
On September 22, CMS Vice President Jones, Moore’s immediate
supervisor, sent COO Willis and HR a list of issues that had arisen with
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Moore. This list included lack of communication, failure to respond to
emails, and failure to provide required reports. On September 23, Jones
recommended to Willis that Moore be terminated for his lack of effort and
insubordination. These communications occurred before Jones and Willis
were even aware of Moore’s alcoholism.
Moore, on the other hand, offered no evidence genuinely to dispute
that CMS terminated him for poor performance. To be clear, Moore’s mere
disagreement with CMS’s assessment of his performance is not enough. See
Benjamin v. Felder Servs., LLC, 753 F. App’x 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2018)
(“[E]ven an incorrect belief that an employee’s performance is inadequate
constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.” (quoting Little v.
Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991)). Beyond that, Moore failed
to present any evidence that CMS terminated him because of his alcoholism.
In other words, the record is devoid of any evidence that Moore’s “discharge
was based on any discriminatory animus against him as an alcoholic.”
Kitchen, 952 F.3d at 253. Because Moore has not met the third element
required to state a prima facie case of discriminatory termination, his ADA
claim cannot pass muster. Cannon, 813 F.3d at 590.
Assuming arguendo that Moore substantiated a prima facie case of
discriminatory termination, CMS still provided a “legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action”—poor
performance. Cannon, 813 F.3d at 590. Indeed, “[t]erminating an employee
whose performance is unsatisfactory according to management’s business
judgment is legitimate and nondiscriminatory as a matter of law.” LHC Grp.,
Inc., 773 F.3d at 701–02. And “[t]he ADA explicitly allows an employer to
‘hold an employee who . . . is an alcoholic to the same . . . standards for . . .
job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even
if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the . . . alcoholism
of such employee.’” Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 115–
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16 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)). In response, Moore failed
to present any evidence to show that CMS’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for terminating him was pretextual. See Kitchen, 952 F.3d at 253
(explaining pretext is shown “through evidence of disparate treatment or by
showing [the employer’s] explanation was false or unbelievable”). For this
reason as well, summary judgment as to Moore’s ADA claim was proper.
Moore did not show any genuine dispute of material fact as to at least
the third element of a prima facie ADA claim for discriminatory termination.
He likewise offered no evidence that CMS’s termination of Moore for poor
performance was pretextual. For each of these reasons, summary judgment
was warranted.
B. Moore’s motion to reconsider
Next, Moore challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for
reconsideration. 2 We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for
reconsideration for abuse of discretion. In re Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 926
F.3d 103, 128 (5th Cir. 2019). Moore contends that the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion by relying on Fifth Circuit caselaw that
predated 2008 amendments to the ADA; refusing to consider medical
records Moore had recently obtained, which he asserted established that his
alcoholism constituted a disability; and granting summary judgment while a
magistrate judge was reviewing in camera documents subject to a pending
motion to compel. Motions for reconsideration based on newly-discovered
evidence should not be granted unless: “(1) the facts discovered are of such
a nature that they would probably change the outcome; (2) the facts alleged
2
Moore titled his post-judgment motion as a “Motion for New Trial and/or
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.” Regardless of the motion’s title, the district court
was correct to review Moore’s motion as one to reconsider summary judgment under Rule
59(e). See Piazza’s Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 748 n.9 (5th Cir. 2006).
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are actually newly discovered and could not have been discovered earlier by
proper diligence; and (3) the facts are not merely cumulative or impeaching.”
Ferraro v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 796 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 2015).
As an initial matter, we do not express a view as to the first two points
of Moore’s motion for reconsideration. Although those arguments were
relevant to the district court’s determination of whether Moore showed that
his alcoholism constituted a disability, we decide this appeal without reaching
that issue. Accordingly, we need not address those portions of Moore’s
motion for reconsideration.
However, Moore’s third contention—that the district court abused
its discretion by granting summary judgment while a magistrate judge was
reviewing in camera documents subject to a pending motion to compel—
merits discussion. According to Moore, the district court erred in denying
his motion for reconsideration because these communications “could [have]
contain[ed] evidence” relevant to his claim.
Contrary to Moore’s contention, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion in determining that Moore failed diligently to pursue
avenues to make these communications available before the court entered
summary judgment. Indeed, despite making other discovery requests in
September 2019, Moore did not seek discovery of the subject email
communications until December 2019. CMS responded on January 22,
2020, but withheld certain privileged communications, including the
documents at issue. CMS provided its privilege log on January 29. Three
weeks elapsed before Moore filed a motion to compel discovery of those
communications on February 19, just two days before the close of discovery,
and nine days before the district court granted CMS’s motion for summary
judgment.
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Although Moore sought an expedited ruling from the magistrate judge
on his motion to compel, Moore never requested that the district court delay
ruling on summary judgment. And the district court later determined that
Moore failed to pursue ways to make the communications available before
summary judgment was rendered. The court explained that Moore’s
“conclusory speculation” about the content of the documents was not
enough to overcome his lack of diligence.
On appeal, Moore does not explain why the district court was wrong
in determining that Moore did not diligently seek the email communications.
Nor can we discern any error. Moore did not ask for these communications
in his September 2019 discovery requests, and instead waited until December
2019 to do so. Moore obtained the privilege log on January 29, but he waited
until February 19—two days before the close of discovery—to file his motion
to compel. Furthermore, he never asked the district court to delay ruling on
summary judgment during the pendency of the motion to compel. We are
reminded that the “district court had ‘broad discretion in all discovery
matters.’” Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 855 (5th Cir.
2000). Thus, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion
in ruling that Moore was not diligent and denying Moore’s motion for
reconsideration on that basis.
For these reasons, the district court properly dismissed Moore’s ADA
claim and did not err in denying his motion for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.
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