Vantage Deepwater Company v. Petrobras Amer ( 2020 )


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  •      Case: 19-20435   Document: 00515492585     Page: 1   Date Filed: 07/16/2020
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 19-20435
    FILED
    July 16, 2020
    Lyle W. Cayce
    VANTAGE DEEPWATER COMPANY; VANTAGE DEEPWATER     Clerk
    DRILLING, INCORPORATED,
    Plaintiffs - Appellees
    v.
    PETROBRAS AMERICA, INCORPORATED; PETROBRAS VENEZUELA
    INVESTMENTS & SERVICES B.V.; PETROLEO BRASILEIRO S.A.-
    PETROBRAS,
    Defendants - Appellants
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    Before SOUTHWICK, COSTA, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    LESLIE H. SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judge:
    This is an appeal of a district court’s order confirming a $622 million
    arbitration award. The defendants argue that, because public policy precludes
    enforcing the award, it should have been vacated. The defendants also argue
    that the district court erred in denying the defendants’ discovery motions.
    We AFFIRM.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The parties in this case are oil and gas companies, incorporated and
    based in different countries.    Vantage Deepwater Company is a Cayman
    Islands company; Vantage Deepwater Drilling, Inc., is a Delaware corporation
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    with its principal place of business in Texas (collectively, “Vantage”). Vantage
    operates a fleet of oil rigs. Petrobras Venezuela Investments & Services B.V.
    is a Dutch company; Petrobras America Inc. is a Delaware corporation; and
    Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobras is a Brazilian company (the three
    collectively, “Petrobras”).
    In 2007, Petrobras had not listed Vantage as an approved drilling service
    contractor.    In exchange for help procuring drilling-services contracts,
    Vantage’s largest shareholder and board member Nobu Su, also known as
    Hsin-Chi-Su, agreed to pay approximately $30 million in bribes, distributed as
    kickbacks to three individuals: Jorge Zelada, Eduardo Musa, and Hamylton
    Pinheiro Padilha, Jr. By 2016, a Brazilian criminal investigation revealed the
    bribery was part of a larger scheme dubbed Lava Jato (Operation Carwash).
    Zelada, Musa, and Padilha were convicted of crimes arising from the scheme
    in Brazil. Su and Vantage’s former CEO, Paul Bragg, also were indicted in
    Brazil, but briefing states they have not returned to that country. Vantage
    told United States regulators in 2017 that it had discovered some evidence that
    its then-CEO Bragg and then–board member John O’Leary were at least
    willfully blind to Padilha and Su’s bribery.      In 2018, the United States
    Department of Justice entered a non-prosecution agreement with Petrobras
    relating to the fraud. The Justice Department stated that multiple Petrobras
    individuals had received bribes to assist Vantage in winning the drilling
    contract with Petrobras.
    In 2009, Vantage Deepwater Company and Petrobras Venezuela
    executed the Agreement for the Provision of Drilling Services (“DSA”). Under
    the DSA, Vantage would perform offshore drilling services for Petrobras for an
    eight-year term. Also in 2009, Petróleo Brasileiro executed a Form of Payment
    and Performance Guaranty, in which it “unconditionally, absolutely and
    irrevocably guarantee[d]” Petrobras Venezuela’s obligations under the DSA.
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    To fulfill Vantage’s obligations, Vantage’s parent company purchased an ultra–
    deepwater oil rig called the Titanium Explorer for over $948 million. The
    DSA’s eight-year term began in December 2012.
    In August 2013, a Brazilian magazine published an article claiming that
    a Vantage shareholder had paid $14.5 million to João Augusto Henriques, a
    lobbyist for the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, to secure a drilling
    contract with Petrobras. Petrobras then conducted an internal investigation
    into the allegations. The investigatory report recorded attempts to interview
    Henriques, but in the end, the report could not “prove the veracity” of the
    bribery allegations. The report acknowledged, however, that “Petrobras’s good
    practices ceased to be observed” and that there were “deficiencies in the process
    of contracting.”   The report suggested submitting the report to Brazilian
    prosecutors. The report also found that the DSA was “at market value.” A few
    months later, the parties executed the Second Novation and Third
    Amendment, in which they reaffirmed that the DSA was binding.
    About two years into the DSA’s term, in October 2014, Vantage and
    Petrobras executed the Third Novation and Amendment Agreement. It was
    this agreement that included an arbitration clause, which provided that any
    disputes arising out of the DSA as amended by the Third Novation would be
    “exclusively and finally resolve[d]” through arbitration conducted by the
    International Center for Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration
    Association (“AAA”) in Houston, Texas. Vantage and Petrobras agreed that
    the arbitrators would have the “power to rule on objections concerning
    jurisdiction, including the existence or validity of [the] arbitration clause and
    existence or the validity of” the DSA. The Third Novation also stated that
    “[t]he parties waive irrevocably their right to any form of appeal, review or
    recourse to any court or other judicial authority, to the extent that such waiver
    may be validly made.”
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    The DSA prohibited terminating the contract for convenience but
    allowed termination if Vantage materially breached or failed to provide its
    services. In August 2015, several years before the end of the DSA’s term,
    Petrobras terminated the DSA. Immediately thereafter, Vantage demanded
    arbitration pursuant to the Third Novation, claiming over $450 million in
    expectancy damages and over $800 million in reliance damages. The asserted
    expectancy damages were based on lost profit calculations, and the asserted
    reliance damages were primarily based on Vantage’s incurring debt to acquire
    the Titanium Explorer.
    Petrobras responded by arguing it had terminated the DSA for
    operational reasons because Vantage materially breached the contract.
    Petrobras also argued that the DSA was procured through bribery and
    corruption, making the agreement invalid. Petrobras claims it first had actual
    knowledge of the bribery only in 2015, after Padilha pled guilty to his role in
    the scheme in a Brazilian court. Vantage claims that Petrobras actually had
    knowledge after the magazine article was published in 2013, and that
    Petrobras ratified the DSA when it agreed to the Third Novation.
    Throughout 2016, the parties and the arbitration tribunal, once it was
    selected, addressed a variety of procedural issues. The tribunal consisted of
    three arbitrators. After Vantage’s first pick, David Keltner, was removed due
    to a conflict of interest, Vantage appointed Charles N. Brower, who is a judge
    on the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, an international arbitral tribunal.
    Petrobras appointed Mr. James Gaitis.         Keltner and Gaitis selected as
    chairman Professor William Park of Boston University.
    The tribunal held evidentiary hearings between May 16 and June 1,
    2017. On June 7, Petrobras moved the AAA to disqualify and remove Judge
    Brower. Petrobras gave four reasons to support its motion. First, Petrobras
    asserted that Brower appeared partial because he “continuously made
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    inappropriate, off-the-record comments under his breath while [Petrobras’s]
    witnesses were being cross-examined, and while [Petrobras’s] counsel cross-
    examined [Vantage’s] witnesses.” Second, Petrobras asserted that Brower
    continually and “improperly advocated” for Vantage including by cross-
    examining one of Petrobras’s fact witnesses for nearly two hours.           Third,
    Petrobras asserted that during the hearing Brower incorrectly summarized the
    direct evidence of bribery, which must have been because he was either
    “intentionally ignoring other evidence” or “intentionally misstating the
    evidence related to bribery and corruption.” Last, Petrobras asserted that
    Brower frequently dozed off during the hearing, indicating that he could not
    diligently perform his duties.
    The AAA spent some time investigating the assertions of bias. Chairman
    Park’s billing statement, for example, showed he communicated with the AAA
    for about five and a half hours. The AAA denied the motion in a sentence.
    The final award was issued on June 29, 2018.             A majority of the
    arbitrators — Chairman Park and Judge Brower — awarded Vantage over
    $620 million. Gaitis wrote a one-paragraph dissent that claimed unfairness in
    the proceedings:
    I object to, and I dissent from, the tribunal majority’s Final Award.
    This Objection and Dissent is based not only on my differing
    conclusions regarding the merits of the parties’ dispute, but also
    on my belief and conclusion that the prehearing, hearing, and
    posthearing processes that led to the issuance of the Final Award
    have denied [Petrobras] in this proceeding the fundamental
    fairness and due process protections meant to be provided to
    arbitrating parties by Sections 10(a)(1), 10(a)(2), 10(a)(3), 10(a)(4),
    and Chapters 2 and 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1,
    et seq.
    In July 2018, Vantage filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award
    in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
    Petrobras opposed confirmation and moved the district court to vacate the
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    award. To support its motion for vacatur, Petrobras sought leave to depose
    Gaitis. Petrobras claimed that the additional testimony would provide a more
    complete record on which the district court could evaluate the arbitral award.
    After a hearing in December 2018, the district court denied the motion to
    subpoena Gaitis. Two months later, Petrobras moved for leave to serve a
    subpoena on the AAA. Petrobras sought the AAA’s documents in connection
    with the challenges to Brower in the arbitration. The district court also denied
    that motion.
    In May 2019, the district court denied the motion to vacate and granted
    Vantage’s petition to confirm the award. The court entered final judgment and
    ordered Petrobras to pay $733,968,000 (the arbitration award plus interest),
    and post-judgment interest. Petrobras appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    This case implicates Chapter 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9
    U.S.C. §§ 301–307, which governs nondomestic arbitration awards subject to
    the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of
    January 30, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 90-1027, reprinted following Pub. L. 101-369,
    104 Stat. 448 (1990) (the “Panama Convention”). The FAA requires that a
    court confirm an arbitration award unless there is a ground for refusing to
    enforce the award as specified in the Panama Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 207; see
    id. § 302
    (applying Section 207 to cases governed by Panama Convention). The
    Supreme Court has recognized an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral
    dispute resolution.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
    
    473 U.S. 614
    , 631 (1985). “A court may not review the merits of an [arbitration]
    award — it must accept the facts found by the arbitrator and the arbitrator’s
    interpretation of the contract and applicable law.” Manville Forest Prods.
    Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 
    831 F.2d 72
    , 74 (5th Cir. 1987).
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    We review the district court’s legal determinations de novo and findings
    of fact for clear error. Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 
    254 F.3d 588
    , 592 (5th
    Cir. 2001).    Review of the underlying arbitral award is “exceedingly
    deferential,” though. Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations
    Co., 
    687 F.3d 671
    , 674 (5th Cir. 2012).       Although we “grant arbitrators
    considerable leeway when reviewing most arbitration decisions,” we do not
    “give extra leeway to district courts that uphold arbitrators.” First Options of
    Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 
    514 U.S. 938
    , 948 (1995).
    Petrobras argues that public policy precluded confirming the arbitration
    award. Petrobras also argues that the district court’s denial of its discovery
    motions led the court to base its confirmation order and denial of vacatur on
    an incomplete record. Vacatur is warranted, Petrobras contends, because the
    arbitrators failed to issue a “reasoned award” as to Petróleo Brasileiro. In
    addition to responding to Petrobras’s arguments, Vantage argues that
    Petrobras waived its right to appeal. We will start by addressing the appeal
    waiver. Because in the end we do not need to decide that question, we then
    turn to Petrobras’s claims of error.
    I.    Appeal waiver
    A valid appeal waiver does not deprive the court of jurisdiction;
    accordingly, if affirming the judgment is a clearer resolution than deciding the
    validity of the appeal waiver, we can affirm. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 
    934 F.3d 434
    , 441 (5th Cir. 2019). The waiver appears in the Third Novation: “The
    Parties waive irrevocably their right to any form of appeal, review or recourse
    to any court or other judicial authority, to the extent that such waiver may be
    validly made.” Courts “rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to
    their terms.” American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 
    570 U.S. 228
    , 233
    (2013). Contractual clauses must be “clear and unequivocal,” though, in order
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    to waive a right. Ensco Int’l, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
    579 F.3d 442
    , 443 (5th Cir. 2009) (waiving the right to removal)
    Vantage reasons that because federal and Texas law enforce appeal
    waivers, we should enforce the appeal waiver here. See id.; Bennett v. Comm’n
    for Lawyer Discipline, 
    489 S.W.3d 58
    , 69 n.1 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.]
    2016, no pet.). To be clear, Vantage does not argue on appeal that the Third
    Novation barred the district court’s review of the award, only that appellate
    review of the district court’s judgment is barred. Petrobras replies that it could
    not waive its right to appeal under the Panama Convention or the FAA and
    that there was no clear and unequivocal indication of waiver.
    The parties cite competing persuasive authorities from other circuits.
    The Ninth Circuit held that “the statutory grounds for vacatur in the FAA may
    not be waived or eliminated by contract.” In re Wal-Mart Wage & Hour Emp.
    Practices Litig., 
    737 F.3d 1262
    , 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). The court was rejecting
    a waiver clause that would have precluded all federal-court review.
    Id. at 1266
    n.3. Because parties may not contract for expanded judicial review, see Hall
    
    St., 552 U.S. at 578
    , the Ninth Circuit reasoned that private agreements
    eliminating judicial review of arbitration awards also are not enforceable. Wal-
    
    Mart, 737 F.3d at 1267
    .
    The Second Circuit stated that those “seeking to enforce arbitration
    awards through federal-court confirmation judgments may not divest the
    courts of their statutory and common-law authority to review both the
    substance of the awards and the arbitral process for compliance with § 10(a).”
    Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 
    343 F.3d 57
    , 66 (2d Cir. 2003), overruled on other
    grounds by Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 
    552 U.S. 576
    (2008).
    The Tenth Circuit enforced the following contractual provision that it
    considered to waive appellate review only: “Judgment upon the award
    rendered by the arbitrator shall be final and nonappealable and may be
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    entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.” MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick,
    
    427 F.3d 821
    , 827 (10th Cir. 2005). The court concluded “that contractual
    provisions limiting the right to appeal from a district court’s judgment
    confirming or vacating an arbitration award are permissible, so long as the
    intent to do so is clear and unequivocal.”
    Id. at 830.
           Vantage argues that MACTEC supplies the applicable rule while
    Petrobras calls that rule “legally doubtful.” Petrobras instead would have us
    extend Wal-Mart to waivers of appellate review as well. Petrobras further
    contends that parties cannot contractually deprive this court of its authority to
    review arbitration awards.
    The parties agree that if the waiver clause barred all federal court review
    — namely, the ability to oppose confirmation and move for vacatur in district
    court — then the waiver would not be enforceable. The waiver provision in the
    DSA, unlike the one in MACTEC, states that the waiver applies only to the
    extent legally permissible. 
    MACTEC, 427 F.3d at 829
    . This does not make the
    waiver equivocal. The “to the extent” clause preserves valid applications of the
    appeal waiver, even if other applications of the clause are invalid.
    Wal-Mart neither contradicted nor endorsed MACTEC; the two cases
    dealt with different issues. 
    Wal-Mart, 737 F.3d at 1266
    n.3. We are inclined
    to think the Tenth Circuit’s approach is persuasive. Still, if the district court’s
    judgment is affirmable on the merits, we do not need to discern the law for this
    circuit on such appeal waivers. We therefore will now examine the merits.
    II.    Motion to confirm
    Article V(2)(b) of the Panama Convention allows a country to refuse to
    recognize or execute an arbitration decision under the Convention if “the
    recognition or execution of the decision would be contrary to the public policy”
    of that country. The party asserting the public policy defense bears the burden
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    of proving United States public policy would be violated by enforcing the
    award. Asignacion v. Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG,
    
    783 F.3d 1010
    , 1016–17 (5th Cir. 2015). “The public policy defense is to be
    ‘construed narrowly to be applied only where enforcement would violate the
    forum state’s most basic notions of morality and justice.’” Karaha Bodas Co.
    v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Karaha Bodas
    II), 
    364 F.3d 274
    , 306 (5th Cir. 2004). Further, a public policy rendering a
    contract unenforceable “must be ‘explicit,’ ‘well defined,’ and ‘dominant.’ It
    must be ‘ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
    general considerations of supposed public interests.’” East Associated Coal
    Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 
    531 U.S. 57
    , 62 (2000) (quoting
    W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 
    461 U.S. 757
    , 766 (1983)). The public
    policy defense under the Panama Convention is “substantively identical” to the
    one set forth in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
    Arbitral Awards, commonly called the “New York Convention.”            See, e.g.,
    TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 
    487 F.3d 928
    , 933 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
    Petrobras argues that enforcing the arbitration award violates United
    States public policy because the award requires Petrobras to pay damages
    based on a contract illegally procured through bribery. Even if this country’s
    public policy would bar enforcement of such contracts, the district court relied
    on the arbitrators’ findings, first, that Petrobras had not proved Vantage was
    guilty of bribery and, second, that Petrobras “knowingly ratified the DSA.”
    Accepting those fact findings, the district court then considered whether public
    policy would bar enforcing a bribery-procured but ratified contract. The court
    accepted another district court’s rejection of a public policy defense if both
    parties engaged in the same fraudulent misconduct. See Tamimi Glob. Co. v.
    Kellogg Brown & Root L.L.C., No. CIV.A. H-11-0585, 
    2011 WL 1157634
    , at *3
    (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2011). Because both Vantage and Petrobras allegedly
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    engaged in misconduct, and the contract was later ratified, the district court
    concluded there was no public policy impediment to enforcement.
    A.    How much deference
    The first question on this issue is whether the district court erroneously
    deferred to the arbitrators’ ratification finding. Petrobras asserts that the
    district court mistakenly deferred to the arbitrators’ public policy conclusions
    rather than reviewing those conclusions de novo. Petrobras does not dispute
    that if ratification occurred, then enforcing the arbitration award does not
    violate public policy; rather, Petrobras argues that the arbitrators’ findings do
    not amount to legal ratification.
    “Under the New York Convention, the rulings of the Tribunal
    interpreting the parties’ contract are entitled to deference.” Karaha Bodas 
    II, 364 F.3d at 290
    . “The court may not refuse to enforce an arbitral award solely
    on the ground that the arbitrator may have made a mistake of law or fact.”
    Id. at 288.
    This is because “[t]he parties did not bargain for the facts to be found
    by a court, but by an arbitrator . . . . Nor does the fact that it is inquiring into
    a possible violation of public policy excuse a court for doing the arbitrator’s
    task.” United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 
    484 U.S. 29
    , 45 (1987).
    Petrobas relies on one of this court’s opinions to support that the district
    court should have considered the public policy issue de novo. See Gulf Coast
    Industries Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 
    991 F.2d 244
    , 248 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993).
    The case involved a dispute about whether an employee was discharged for
    just cause.
    Id. at 247.
    We stated that a court “enjoy[s] more latitude in
    reviewing the arbitrator’s decision” when public policy violations are alleged.
    Id. at 249.
    A court defers to an arbitrator’s findings of fact “but review[s] his
    conclusions de novo,” because “[c]ourts are the ultimate arbiters of public
    policy, not arbitrators.”
    Id. at 248
    n.5, 249. The Supreme Court has similarly
    stated that “the question of public policy is ultimately one for resolution by the
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    courts.” W.R. Grace & 
    Co., 461 U.S. at 766
    . Still, courts must “tak[e] the facts
    as found by the arbitrator.” Gulf 
    Coast, 991 F.2d at 249
    . The Gulf Coast
    arbitration award would have reinstated an employee to a position working
    with dangerous equipment.
    Id. at 250,
    255. Though it was clear that an
    employee’s use of a controlled substance violated public policy, the problem
    with the arbitration award was elsewhere. Public policy prohibited reinstating
    a worker who posed a safety hazard.
    Id. at 250,
    255.   We set aside the
    reinstatement of the worker under de novo review of public policy.
    Id. at 257.
          Petrobras is not seeking our review of whether the final award violated
    public policy. Instead, Petrobras wants us to decide whether the underlying
    contract violated public policy. Petrobras questions whether any ratification
    occurred that would obviate any public policy problem in the DSA. We agree
    with the district court that “[t]he public policy exception cannot be used to
    simply question the merits of the underlying award.” Hardy Expl. & Prod.,
    (India), Inc. v. Gov’t of India, Ministry of Petroleum & Nat. Gas, 
    314 F. Supp. 3d
    95, 109 (D.D.C. 2018).
    The Second Circuit applied this principle in Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v.
    Maiellano Tours, Inc., 
    156 F.3d 310
    (2d Cir. 1998). We have cited Europcar
    favorably for the proposition that a reviewing court should not reconsider an
    arbitrator’s findings. Karaha Bodas 
    II, 364 F.3d at 288
    n.2. In Europcar, the
    appellant argued enforcing an arbitration award would violate public policy
    where the award was based on an allegedly forged 
    agreement. 156 F.3d at 315
    .
    The Second Circuit distinguished between fraud that may lead to application
    of the public policy exception under the Convention and fraud that would not:
    [The defendant-appellant] has apparently confused the issue of a
    fraudulently obtained arbitration agreement or award, which
    might violate public policy and therefore preclude enforcement,
    with the issue of whether the underlying contract that is subject of
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    the arbitrated dispute was forged or fraudulently induced — a
    matter to be determined exclusively by the arbitrators.
    Id. (citations omitted).
      The Europcar court observed that the appellant did
    not dispute the validity of the supplemental arbitration agreement.
    Id. Further, the
    appellant could not “seek to relitigate” the arbitrators’
    determination of whether the parties’ underlying agreement was forged —
    even if the arbitrators had made an error of law or fact.
    Id. at 315–16.
    “[W]hether the underlying contract that is the subject of the arbitrated dispute
    was forged or fraudulently induced” was a question for the arbitrators and was
    not the basis of a public policy defense.
    Id. Therefore, enforcing
    the arbitration
    award did not violate public policy.
    Id. at 316.
          Like the underlying conduct in Gulf Coast, the underlying conduct here,
    bribery, does violate public policy. 
    See 991 F.2d at 250
    . Unlike in Gulf Coast,
    though, enforcing the arbitration award does not create a situation contrary to
    public policy, such as putting anyone’s safety at risk. The arbitrators found
    Petrobras ratified the DSA. When we defer to that finding, the legal conclusion
    follows that the DSA, and the arbitration award, did not violate public policy.
    Further, as in Europcar, the arbitration agreement here is external to
    the underlying contract and the arbitration agreement’s validity is not
    
    disputed. 156 F.3d at 315
    . Also, both in Europcar and here, the arbitrators
    had the power to rule on the underlying contract’s validity.
    Id. The arbitration
    clause in the Third Novation provided that the arbitrators would have power
    to rule on the existence and validity of the DSA. Whether a contract should be
    voided because of bribery is a question about the validity of the DSA. The
    tribunal answered that question when it found that Petrobras ratified the DSA
    and thus waived bribery objections. The arbitrators also found that Petrobras
    had not established that “Vantage knew of or participated in any bribery.”
    These findings were within the tribunal’s authority to rule on the DSA’s
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    validity. As such, the validity of the DSA was rightly a question for the
    arbitrators rather than the district court.
    Petrobras also argues that the district court and the arbitrators relied
    on a flawed definition of ratification. Even if that is so, mistakes of law or fact
    are not grounds for denying confirmation. Karaha Bodas 
    II, 364 F.3d at 288
    .
    We conclude that the district court did not engage in inappropriate
    deference to the arbitrator’s decision.
    B.    “Mutual misconduct”
    Petrobras also takes issue with what it perceives as the district court’s
    ultimate conclusion that “[i]t does not violate public policy to enforce an
    arbitration award against parties who were alleged to have mutually engaged
    in mutual misconduct during the formation of a contract, particularly when
    that contract was later ratified.” Petrobras disputes that Petrobras engaged
    in misconduct in the contracting process and that mutual misconduct does not
    override public policy defenses. Mutual misconduct was not the basis of the
    district court’s confirmation order, though.      The district court accurately
    defined ratification, recognized the arbitrators’ ratification finding, and thus
    concluded that “Petrobras has not met its burden of showing that the
    Tribunal’s contract interpretation violates some explicit public policy.” The
    court continued:
    Petrobras’s attempt to relitigate the merits of its contract dispute
    and the general appeal to public policy against paying and
    accepting bribes to form contracts does not meet the high burden
    of showing that enforcement of the actual arbitration decision in
    this case would violate the most basic notions of morality and
    justice.
    The district court did not base its decision just on “mutual misconduct.” We
    also need not concern ourselves with the precise reasoning by the district court,
    because we review de novo whether the award should have been confirmed.
    14
    Case: 19-20435   Document: 00515492585      Page: 15   Date Filed: 07/16/2020
    No. 19-20435
    
    Asignacion, 783 F.3d at 1014
    –15.           There was no public policy bar to
    confirmation.
    III.     Discovery motions
    District courts occasionally allow discovery in vacatur and confirmation
    proceedings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(6)(B). Previously we have endorsed a
    flexible inquiry for district courts to use when assessing discovery requests in
    the context of such proceedings: “the court must weigh the asserted need for
    hitherto undisclosed information and assess the impact of granting such
    discovery on the arbitral process.” Karaha Bodas 
    II, 364 F.3d at 305
    (quoting
    Lummus Glob. Amazonas S.A. v. Aguaytia Energy del Peru S.R. Ltda., 256 F.
    Supp. 2d 594, 626 (S.D. Tex. 2002)). The court should focus on “specific issues
    raised by the party challenging the award and the degree to which those issues
    implicated factual questions that cannot be reliably resolved without some
    further disclosure.”
    Id. “The party
    seeking discovery bears the burden of
    showing its necessity.” Freeman v. United States, 
    556 F.3d 326
    , 341 (5th Cir.
    2009). Moreover, “[t]he loser in arbitration cannot freeze the confirmation
    proceedings in their tracks and indefinitely postpone judgment by merely
    requesting discovery.” Imperial Ethiopian Gov’t v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 
    535 F.2d 334
    , 337 (5th Cir. 1976). We review a district court’s order denying
    discovery for an abuse of discretion.         JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.
    Datatreasury Corp., 
    936 F.3d 251
    , 255–56 (2019).
    Two refusals to subpoena witnesses are at issue. First, the district court
    disallowed a deposition of Gaitis, the dissenting arbitrator. Second, the court
    refused to authorize a subpoena on the AAA itself, regarding its investigation
    into the request to disqualify Judge Brower. We discuss both.
    A.    Motion for leave to depose Gaitis
    Petrobras asserts that discovery was necessary to resolve the question of
    the arbitrators’ bias and that “glaring red flags” in the record indicate evident
    15
    Case: 19-20435     Document: 00515492585      Page: 16    Date Filed: 07/16/2020
    No. 19-20435
    partiality and misconduct, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2), (3). Before identifying these red
    flags, we will address the parties’ agreement not to depose the arbitrators.
    When an organization’s arbitration rules are incorporated into the
    underlying agreement, those rules are treated the same as any other
    contractual provision. See C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizens Band Potawatomi
    Indian Tribe of Okla., 
    532 U.S. 411
    , 419 n.1 (2001). We seek to “give effect to
    the intent of the parties,” including to any contractual limitations. Stolt-
    Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
    559 U.S. 662
    , 684 (2010).
    Here, the arbitration clause in the Third Novation incorporates the
    AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules. Rule 52(e) of the AAA’s rules provides
    that “[p]arties to an arbitration under these rules may not call the arbitrator
    . . . as a witness in litigation or any other proceeding relating to the arbitration”
    and an arbitrator is “not competent to testify as [a] witness[] in such
    proceeding.” Vantage says this provision was enforceable, so the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in denying Petrobras’s motion. Petrobras does not
    raise any general contract defenses against enforcing Rule 52(e), but it asserts
    that enforcing the rule here would “eviscerate the integrity of the arbitral
    process.” This general policy concern does not persuade us that the district
    court erred in enforcing the incorporated terms of the contract.
    Further, even without Rule 52(e), Petrobras was not entitled to depose
    Gaitis. Petrobras points to the unusual and strong statement in the dissent:
    that the entire arbitration, “the prehearing, hearing, and posthearing
    processes,” denied Petrobras “fundamental fairness and due process
    protections.”    Petrobras also claims that several moments during the
    arbitration hearings substantiate the dissent’s assertion, such as when Judge
    Brower made comments that Petrobras perceived as hostile to Petrobras. For
    example, Judge Brower allegedly made off-the-record comments such as
    “already talked about” and “asked and answered.” We agree with the district
    16
    Case: 19-20435       Document: 00515492585    Page: 17   Date Filed: 07/16/2020
    No. 19-20435
    court’s view of these matters: “Although Petrobras may feel that the comments
    allegedly made by Judge Brower were abrasive, critical, or rude, these same
    comments can be viewed as Judge Brower’s efforts to move the proceeding
    along . . . .”
    The examples of Judge Brower’s allegedly biased conduct at the hearings
    do not establish that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to
    allow Petrobras to depose Gaitis. We have not discovered any court of appeals
    decision holding that a district court abused its discretion in denying discovery
    from an arbitrator about the substance of the award. We see nothing in this
    record to cause us to be the first.
    B.        Motion to subpoena the AAA
    After the district court denied the motion for leave to subpoena Gaitis,
    Petrobras moved for leave to serve a subpoena on the AAA. Petrobras sought
    to discover documents from the AAA’s investigation into Judge Brower’s
    alleged bias.        That investigation occurred because Petrobras moved to
    disqualify Judge Brower after the merits hearing.
    First, we conclude that the AAA’s ultimate finding that Judge Brower
    was not biased is hardly a “red flag” indicating that discovery was needed.
    Likewise, the arbitral record did not show signs of partiality or misconduct that
    compelled the district court to delay the case in order for Petrobras to serve a
    subpoena on the AAA.
    It is relevant that there was no motion for this discovery against the AAA
    until all the parties had finished briefing the respective motions to confirm and
    vacate. It is true the deadlines for discovery and for new motions were still
    ahead. The discovery motion came, though, only a few weeks before the merits
    hearing on the motions to confirm and to vacate. Although Petrobras’s motion
    was not technically overdue, the district court reasonably considered that
    17
    Case: 19-20435      Document: 00515492585           Page: 18     Date Filed: 07/16/2020
    No. 19-20435
    additional discovery would cause further delay to the final resolution of the
    case. See Karaha Bodas 
    II, 364 F.3d at 304
    . 1
    Moreover, several circuits have held that arbitral immunity extends to
    organizations like the AAA. Olson v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 
    85 F.3d 381
    ,
    382 (8th Cir. 1996); New England Cleaning Servs. v. AAA, 
    199 F.3d 542
    , 545
    (1st Cir. 1999). In an unpublished decisions, a panel of this court found arbitral
    immunity for the AAA. Jason v. AAA, Inc., 62 F. App’x 557 (5th Cir. 2003).
    Regardless of the exact dimensions of arbitral immunity, Petrobras has
    not shown that the district court abused its discretion in denying the discovery
    motions.
    IV.     Motion to vacate
    The extent of judicial review of arbitral awards under the Panama
    Convention depends in part on where the award was made. Relevant in this
    case is that when the United States is the country of primary jurisdiction,
    meaning the country where the arbitration took place, our courts “have much
    broader discretion to set aside an award.” Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan
    Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Karaha Bodas I), 
    335 F.3d 357
    ,
    368 (5th Cir. 2003). The arbitration at issue here was held in Texas, so the
    district court could entertain Petrobras’s motion to vacate the award “in
    accordance with the country’s domestic arbitral law and its full panoply of
    express and implied grounds for relief.” Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian
    Nat’l Petroleum Corp., 
    512 F.3d 742
    , 746 (5th Cir. 2008).
    1 In an unpublished decision, this court considered the denial of discovery that was
    first requested after all the merits briefs were filed and after the agreed-to discovery deadline.
    Woods v. P.A.M. Transp. Inc.-L.U., 440 F. App’x 265, 268 (5th Cir. 2011). We emphasized
    that discovery cannot be used just to delay confirmation proceedings, “particularly
    considering the strong policy favoring expeditious enforcement of arbitration awards.”
    Id. That reasoning
    appears sound to us.
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    Case: 19-20435        Document: 00515492585          Page: 19     Date Filed: 07/16/2020
    No. 19-20435
    Petrobras moved to vacate the arbitration award based on Section
    10(a)(2), (3), and (4) of the FAA. 2 Under Section 10(a)(2), Petrobras argued
    Judge Brower’s alleged bias indicated partiality.                Under Section 10(a)(3),
    Petrobras argued the tribunal had failed to consider certain evidence. Last,
    under Section 10(a)(4), Petrobras argued that the award was not reasoned with
    respect to Petróleo Brasileiro. The district court disagreed on each point. On
    appeal, Petrobras argues that the district court should not have denied the
    vacatur motion with respect to subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) without first
    allowing discovery. We already held that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying the discovery motions, and Petrobras raises no other
    arguments in support of vacatur under Section 10(a)(2) and (3).
    What remains is Petrobras’s argument under Section 10(a)(4). That
    section provides for vacatur “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or
    so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
    subject matter submitted was not made.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). An argument for
    vacatur under Section 10(a)(4) must be balanced against the parties’
    agreement to have arbitrators interpret their agreement, which means that
    2 Although the FAA provides default rules, parties can contract to apply other rules.
    Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 
    489 U.S. 468
    , 474–75 (1989). Here, the dispute-
    resolution section of the Third Novation contains a choice-of-law provision selecting Texas
    law. Thus, one might ask whether Texas or federal vacatur standards apply. See BNSF Ry.
    Co. v. Alstom Transp., Inc., 
    777 F.3d 785
    , 790–91 (5th Cir. 2015). In one case, we found
    federal vacatur standards applied because the choice-of-law clause did not expressly
    reference California’s arbitration law. Cooper v. WestEnd Capital Mgmt., L.L.C., 
    832 F.3d 534
    , 544 (5th Cir. 2016). Here, though, the choice-of-law clause is specific to the “arbitration
    provisions” of the Third Novation. Although the clause does not name the Texas General
    Arbitration Act, the clause is expressly about arbitration, and the clause is in the section
    establishing how the parties may enforce an arbitration award. We are therefore not
    persuaded that the FAA’s vacatur standards are the right ones to apply in this case. Texas
    and federal vacatur standards do not significantly differ, though, compare 9 U.S.C. § 10, with
    TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 171.088, and the parties discuss only the federal vacatur standards.
    Because the relevant bases for vacatur exist in both federal and state law, we will consider
    the arguments under the FAA as presented by the parties.
    19
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    No. 19-20435
    “an arbitral decision even arguably construing or applying the contract must
    stand, regardless of a court’s views of its (de)merits.” Oxford Health Plans LLC
    v. Sutter, 
    569 U.S. 564
    , 569 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).             “[T]he
    substantive question of whether an arbitrator has exceeded his arbitration
    powers is a function of [our] highly deferential standard of review in such cases:
    an arbitrator has not exceeded his powers unless he has utterly contorted . . .
    the essence of the contract.” Timegate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive,
    L.L.C., 
    713 F.3d 797
    , 802–03 (5th Cir. 2013). In other words, the arbitrator
    exceeds his authority where he acts “contrary to an express contractual
    provision.” PoolRe Ins. Corp. v. Organizational Strategies, Inc., 
    783 F.3d 256
    ,
    265 (5th Cir. 2015). We resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration. Rain CII
    Carbon, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 
    674 F.3d 469
    , 472 (5th Cir. 2012).
    The Third Novation specified that the arbitrators were required to
    “render a reasoned award in writing.” In one recent opinion, we outlined a
    “reasoned award” continuum. YPF S.A. v. Apache Overseas, Inc., 
    924 F.3d 815
    ,
    820 (5th Cir. 2019). There is no specific definition of the term, but it requires
    “something short of findings and conclusions but more than a simple result.”
    Id. (quoting Sarofim
    v. Trust Co. of the W., 
    440 F.3d 213
    , 215 n.1 (5th Cir.
    2006)). In other words, we ask whether the arbitrators “issued more than a
    mere announcement.”
    Id. Petrobras argues
    that the arbitration award was not reasoned at least
    as it relates to Petróleo Brasileiro. That company is not a party to the DSA or
    its amendments but rather is party to the Form of Payment and Performance
    Guaranty. Thus, Petróleo Brasileiro contested the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.
    The guaranty says that the laws of England and Wales apply to disputes
    arising out of the document.       Under English law, Petrobas argued that
    Vantage’s claim against Petróleo Brasileiro was “premature because the
    Guaranty is a secondary suretyship obligation, not an independent first
    20
    Case: 19-20435    Document: 00515492585      Page: 21   Date Filed: 07/16/2020
    No. 19-20435
    demand instrument.” Vantage, though, argued that Petróleo Brasileiro was
    bound to all the provisions of the parties’ agreements, including the arbitration
    clause in the Third Novation. Vantage also argued that the guaranty’s choice-
    of-law clause was superseded by the Third Novation’s.
    On appeal, Petrobras argues that the arbitration award was not
    reasoned because it did not address the arguments that the guaranty did not
    create immediate liability for Petróleo Brasileiro. The arbitrators determined
    that because Petróleo Brasileiro was a “primary obligor under the DSA and the
    Guaranty,” Petróleo Brasileiro “remain[ed] responsible for breaches of [the
    DSA].” The arbitration award discusses whether Petróleo Brasileiro was a
    proper defendant, explaining the claimants’ position, the respondents’ position,
    and the tribunal’s own analysis. This is “more than a simple result.” 
    Sarofim, 440 F.3d at 215
    n.1. Or “[i]t is, at the very least, doubtful that the award is not
    more than a simple result.” Rain CII 
    Carbon, 674 F.3d at 474
    . Accordingly,
    vacatur as to Petróleo Brasileiro was not warranted.
    AFFIRMED.
    21