United States v. Derrick Johnson ( 2020 )

Case: 18-11602 Document: 00515514100 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/04/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 4, 2020
No. 18-11602 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Derrick Adrian Johnson,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
Northern District of Texas, Dallas
USDC No. 3:16-CR-349-1
Before STEWART, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Derrick Adrian Johnson appeals his jury trial conviction and sentence
for bank robbery. For the following reasons, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should
not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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I. Facts & Procedural History
In August 2016, Johnson was charged with bank robbery, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Prior to trial, he filed an opposed motion seeking funds
to retain a psychiatrist to evaluate whether he was insane at the time of the
offense. He also filed a notice of intent to assert an insanity defense. While
Johnson’s request for funding was pending, the Government moved for a
pretrial psychiatric or psychological examination. The district court granted
the Government’s motion and Johnson was transferred to a Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) facility and examined by a BOP psychologist, Dr. Tennille
Warren-Phillips. After examining Johnson, Dr. Warren-Phillips concluded
“[i]t is my opinion Mr. Johnson was criminally responsible for his alleged
actions during the time period in question. I do not believe that he, as a result
of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and
quality or wrongfulness of his acts.”
The magistrate judge (MJ) then denied Johnson’s pending requests
for funds to retain two specific expert witnesses, Dr. Tim F. Branaman, a
psychologist, and Jeff Fletcher, a licensed professional counselor.1 The MJ
acknowledged that Johnson was indigent but determined that he had not
established that the services of a psychologist were necessary for his defense.
Johnson exercised his right to testify at trial and generally asserted that
he could not remember what happened on the day of the bank robbery and
that he was “not in [his] right mindset” that day. During his initial
examination, defense counsel asked Johnson whether he had met with any
mental health providers other than Dr. Warren-Phillips, and Johnson
1
Johnson withdrew his initial request for funds to retain a psychiatrist but did
not withdraw his subsequent ex parte requests for funds to retain Dr. Branaman and
Fletcher.
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responded that he met with Fletcher and Dr. Branaman for the purpose of
evaluating his mental state at the time of the robbery. Counsel then
questioned Johnson about the outcome of those meetings, and the
Government objected that the questions called for hearsay and that the
information divulged in those meetings had not been disclosed to the
Government.
Defense counsel then asked Johnson why the counselors were not
testifying and Johnson stated that he could not afford them. Then, on cross-
examination, the prosecutor asked Johnson, without referencing any
particular individual, whether he had the power to “subpoena witnesses to
come up here and testify [on his] behalf,” and Johnson replied, “[t]hat’s
correct.” Defense counsel followed up on redirect, eliciting testimony that
some witnesses cost money, that some witnesses may not show up in court
even though they are subpoenaed, and that subpoenas were issued by the
court in Johnson’s case. The following colloquy took place on re-cross
examination:
Q. Mr. Johnson, you keep saying that you don’t
have money and that’s why you don’t have any
witnesses here. You understand that if somebody
violates a federal subpoena, the Marshals can go
out and find them; the Court can issue a bench
warrant. Correct?
A. That’s my first time hearing that.
Q. You don’t have any understanding of what the
consequences are if you violate a federal
subpoena?
A. I’ve never been subpoenaed or issued a
subpoena, so no, I don’t.
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Q. You understand that there is a process in place
for you to actually petition the Court for money
to pay witnesses that cost money. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And, in fact, you have petitioned the Court for
money and you were denied that money.
Correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. The Court made the determination not to give
you that money. Is that right?
A. In contravention of the law, yes.
Q. That’s what you say, but the Court has
decided that you are not going to have money to
pay whoever you wanted to pay. Is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
[Q]: No further questions.
In closing, counsel for Johnson challenged only whether he had the
mental state necessary to commit the bank robbery and argued that he could
not present testimony from mental health experts because he could not afford
them. In rebuttal, the Government emphasized that Johnson would have
issued subpoenas for his mental health experts had there been any validity to
his mental health defense. The district court then advised the jury that (1)
the questions, statements, objections, and arguments of the attorneys were
not evidence and (2) jurors should not assume that the court had any opinion
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on the issues based on the court’s actions and statements, and should
disregard them. The jury found Johnson guilty as charged.
The presentence report (PSR) assigned Johnson a two-level
enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 on the
grounds that he committed perjury during his trial testimony by falsely
stating that he could not remember the circumstances of the instant bank
robbery. Specifically, the PSR provided that:
[T]he defendant testified he could not recall the
events of the instant offense. The government
noted the defendant confessed to the events of
the instant offense to law enforcement officials
immediately following his arrest on July 9, 2016.
The defendant also recounted the events, in
detail, when he met with Dr. Tennille Warren-
Phillips during multiple sessions for a Criminal
Responsibility Report. Dr. Warren-Phillips
indicated the defendant never expressed any
problems recalling the instant offense during
those sessions.
See PSR, Paragraph 16; ROA 675. Johnson objected, arguing that he never
claimed not to remember the major facts of the instant offense and whether
he testified truthfully regarding his recall should not be predicated on the
report of Dr. Warren-Phillips because she did not testify at trial.
Johnson proceeded pro se at the sentencing hearing and adopted the
objections to the PSR filed by counsel and re-urged them orally. The district
court overruled Johnson’s objections to the § 3C1.1 enhancement and
adopted the PSR which provided for a guidelines range of 92-115 months.
Because it found a guidelines sentence inadequate, the district court varied
upward and imposed a sentence of 132 months, observing that the 115-month
sentence imposed for a prior similar bank robbery that Johnson had
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committed in 2007 had not deterred him from committing a similar crime.
Johnson filed this appeal.
II. Discussion
Johnson presents two issues for this court’s review on appeal. First,
he argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that prejudiced his
defense by commenting on his failure to subpoena Fletcher and Dr.
Branaman and on the district court’s pretrial denial of his motion for funds
to hire a mental health expert. Second, he argues that the district court
reversibly erred by applying the § 3C1.1 obstruction of justice enhancement.
We address each issue in turn.
Prosecutorial Misconduct
“A prosecutor is prohibited from commenting directly or indirectly
on a defendant’s failure to testify or produce evidence.” United States v.
Waguespack, 935 F.3d 322, 334 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.
Romero-Medrano, 899 F.3d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 2018)). However, “[i]mproper
prosecutorial comments constitute reversible error only where the
defendant’s right to a fair trial is substantially affected.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2009)). In reviewing a claim
of prosecutorial misconduct, this court employs a two-step analysis. United
States v. McCann, 613 F.3d 486, 494 (5th Cir. 2010). We first determine
whether the disputed remark was improper. Id. If so, we then decide
whether the remark affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Id.
When the defendant does not object to the disputed remark, as in this
case, we review for plain error only, which requires him to show error that is
clear and obvious and affects his substantial rights. United States v. Gracia,
522 F.3d 597, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2008). If the defendant makes such a
showing, we have the discretion to correct the error and should do so if it
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seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
We assume without deciding that Johnson can prove prongs one and
two of plain error as to the prosecutor’s remarks regarding his failure to
subpoena witnesses and the court’s pretrial denial of funds to hire a mental
health expert. We also agree with the Government, however, that his claim
falls short on prong three, substantial rights. More specifically, Johnson
cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that any purported error here
influenced the outcome of his trial. See United States v. Huntsberry, 956 F.3d
270, 283 (5th Cir. 2020) (“As a general rule, an error affects a defendant’s
substantial rights only if the error was prejudicial . . . . Error is prejudicial if
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have
been different but for the error.” (citations omitted)). The record reflects
that the Government presented adequate evidence at trial to support the
jury’s verdict of guilt, including but not limited to: stills of the videotaped
footage of Johnson committing the bank robbery, the robbery note, the fact
that he still had cash he had stolen from the bank on him when he was
arrested, that he admitted he robbed the bank to investigators and a mental
health counselor, and that he committed the robbery one day after he finished
serving a sentence for a prior bank robbery.
Given the voluminous evidence of Johnson’s guilt as presented at
trial, we agree with the Government that any purported error with respect to
the prosecutor’s comments as to Johnson’s failure to subpoena witnesses or
the district court’s pretrial denial of funds for a mental health expert could
not have affected the outcome of his proceedings. See United States v. Smith-
Bowman, 76 F.3d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he evidence as a whole before
the jury was sufficiently convincing of guilt as to overcome any error
committed by the government during its cross-examination of this one
defense witness.”).
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Sentencing Enhancement
Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level
enhancement if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect
to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction.” Perjury is one example of conduct to which this enhancement
applies. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(B). “[A] defendant commits perjury if he
provides ‘false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent
to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or
faulty memory.’” United States v. Smith, 804 F.3d 724, 737 (5th Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)); see § 3C1.1, cmt.
n.2.
Where error is preserved as it is here,2 we review the district court’s
“application or interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its
factual findings, such as a finding of obstruction of justice, for clear error.”
Smith, 804 F.3d at 737. A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is
“plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Id. (quoting United States v.
Juarez-Duarte, 513 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2008)).
2
The Government argues that review is for plain error only because Johnson
did not challenge the district court’s failure to make specific, independent findings
addressing each element of perjury in his objections before the district court. This
court, however, has deemed an objection preserved despite the party’s failure to use
“magic words.” United States v. Johnson, 267 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2001). Although
Johnson’s pro se objection to the obstruction enhancement may not have been as
articulate as that of an attorney, he argued at sentencing that he did not know exactly
how he provided false testimony and that he should not be punished for exercising his
right to testify at trial. Accordingly, we consider his objection sufficiently preserved.
See United States v. Neal, 578 F.3d 270, 272-73 (5th Cir. 2009).
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Johnson’s objection to the enhancement triggered a duty by the
district court to “review the evidence and make independent findings
necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an
attempt to do the same.” United States v. Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d 453, 469 (5th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95). When such an objection is
raised, the district court should address each element of perjury in a separate
and clear finding. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95. However, a district court is not
required to make an explicit finding of willfulness, see United States v. Miller,
607 F.3d 144, 152 (5th Cir. 2010), and “need not expressly find that the false
testimony concerned a material matter” where “materiality is obvious.”
Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d at 470 (internal quotation marks omitted). A finding of
obstruction “that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of
perjury” is sufficient. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95. Further, this court has held
that in making findings in support of § 3C1.1’s application, “it is sufficient
for the court to adopt adequate findings in a [PSR].” Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d at
470; see also United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 164 (5th Cir. 2009)
(holding that, because the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that
the PSR is inaccurate, in the absence of rebuttal evidence, the district court
may properly rely on the PSR).
Here, the district court adopted the adequate factual findings set forth
in the PSR, as it was permitted to do. See Perez-Soliz, 709 F.3d at 470. The
PSR in turn provided that Johnson committed perjury during his trial
testimony by falsely stating that he could not remember the circumstances of
the instant bank robbery. The PSR explained that Johnson’s testimony that
he could not recall the events of the current offense were contradicted by his
confession of the offense to law enforcement on July 9, 2016, as well as by his
meetings with Dr. Warren-Phillips wherein he recounted the events of the
offense in detail. Here, the “materiality is obvious” so the district court was
not required to make express findings that Johnson’s false testimony
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concerned a material matter. Id. Likewise, its reliance on the factual findings
set forth in the PSR in support of the enhancement was appropriate. The
district court did not reversibly err by applying a two-level enhancement for
obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
III. Conclusion
Johnson’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.
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