United States v. Byrd ( 2021 )

Case: 20-20470 Document: 00515737032 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 8, 2021
No. 20-20470 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Joshua Robert Byrd,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:17-CR-163-1
Before Clement, Higginson, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Joshua Robert Byrd appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We
AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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I
On June 9, 2017, Byrd pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was
sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment and is currently in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at FCI Beaumont Medium, in Beaumont, Texas.
On June 18, 2020, after exhausting his administrative remedies, Byrd
filed an amended motion for compassionate release in the district court. He
argued that, in light of his personal health conditions, the COVID-19
pandemic poses a serious risk to his health so long as he remains incarcerated.
Specifically, Byrd alleged that he suffers from hypertension and
hyperlipidemia and claimed that these conditions heighten his risk of severe
illness or death if he contracts COVID-19. He also claimed that Lisinopril, a
medication he takes to manage his hypertension, increases his risk of
contracting a more serious case of COVID-19. Finally, he reported that in
2006 he suffered a gunshot wound that required a portion of his lung to be
removed, reducing his breathing capacity. Byrd is 34 years old.
On August 24, 2020, the district court denied Byrd’s motion.
Relevant here, the court concluded that Byrd did not establish
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction.
Byrd filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
“A court, on a motion by the BOP or by the defendant after exhausting
all BOP remedies, may reduce or modify a term of imprisonment, probation,
or supervised release after considering the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), if
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.’” United
States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 692-93 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)).
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A district court’s denial of a motion for compassionate release is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 693. A court abuses its discretion in
this context if it “bases its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Chapple, 847 F.3d
227, 229 (5th Cir. 2017)). Therefore, when reviewing a district court’s denial
of compassionate release, “we give deference to the district court’s decision
and note that reversal is not justified where ‘the appellate court might
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate.’” Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
III
Byrd claims the district court “(1) legally erred by misunderstanding
the breadth of its authority to grant [his] motion, (2) legally erred by
misunderstanding its authority to impose home confinement as a condition
of supervised release, and (3) based its decision on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence.” We take each argument in turn.
A
Byrd’s first argument is that the district court committed legal error
by treating the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement in U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13 as a binding definition of what constitutes an “extraordinary and
compelling circumstance” for purposes of his motion. He contends that
§ 1B1.13 is inapplicable to compassionate release motions brought by
defendants and that by erroneously treating its definitions as binding on the
court, the district court legally erred by not recognizing the full extent of its
authority to grant his motion. See also United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228,
236 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that § 1B1.13 is not “applicable” to
compassionate release motions brought by defendants).
We need not decide whether § 1B1.13 is applicable to compassionate
release motions brought by defendants. That is because the district court did
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not treat the definitions in § 1B1.13 as binding in denying Byrd’s motion. In a
footnote, the district court recognized that it was “debatable” whether
§ 1B1.13 was binding but concluded that, regardless, the Sentencing
Commission’s policy statement “continues to provide helpful guidance
concerning whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a
sentence reduction under § 3852(c)(1)(A).” It then proceeded to analyze
Byrd’s medical claims, including by comparing them to the considerations
set forth in § 1B1.13.
In other words, “there is no indication in the district court’s order that
it treated U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 as the dispositive boundary of what may be
judicially determined to be extraordinary and compelling reasons for a
sentence reduction for medical reasons.” United States v. Gonzales, 819 F.
App’x 283, 284 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (unpublished) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Rather, it “relied on its own judgment in denying
[Byrd’s] motion.” Id. Byrd’s argument is therefore unavailing.
B
Next, Byrd contends the district court legally erred by concluding that
it did not have the authority to order Byrd to serve his sentence in home
confinement as a condition of supervised release. But the district court did
not reach such a conclusion. The court only noted, in a footnote, that to the
extent Byrd sought a release to home confinement pursuant to 34 U.S.C.
§ 60541, that was a matter left to the discretion of the Attorney General in
accordance with the terms of § 60541. The court did not address whether
home confinement would be a suitable condition of supervised release as part
of a reduced sentence, presumably because it concluded Byrd was not eligible
for a reduced sentence. Thus, Byrd’s claim here fails.
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C
Finally, Byrd argues the district court abused its discretion by basing
its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Specifically,
he claims that the district court placed too much emphasis on his relatively
young age and failed to adequately consider the risks surrounding his
particular medical circumstances. We disagree.
While the district court cited Byrd’s young age as a factor in its
decision, it duly considered whether his medical conditions constituted
extraordinary and compelling reasons to justify a sentence reduction in light
of the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, the court addressed the cases cited
by Byrd where other courts had found that hypertension combined with other
factors constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant
compassionate release due to COVID-19. It concluded these cases were
distinguishable from Byrd’s situation and provided reasonable explanations
why. It further considered cases where courts had reached the opposite
conclusion—that hypertension and other complicating factors were not
extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying release. In addition to this
caselaw, the court reviewed Byrd’s medical records and final presentence
report. After completing this review, it concluded Byrd’s circumstances did
not rise to the level of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to grant the
sentence reduction he sought.
While Byrd disagrees with the conclusion the district court reached,
he has not demonstrated that the court’s assessment of the evidence was
clearly erroneous.1 We therefore conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Byrd’s motion for compassionate release.
1
Byrd also argues the district court committed clear error in its evaluation of the
§ 3553(a) factors. But the court only evaluated the § 3553(a) factors as an alternative basis
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IV
The district court’s decision denying Byrd’s motion for
compassionate release is AFFIRMED.
to its holding, assuming arguendo that Byrd has presented extraordinary and compelling
reasons supporting a sentence reduction. Since we conclude that the district court did not
err in the first instance, we need not address the district court’s alternative rationales.
Separately, Byrd argues that the court clearly erred by not considering his assertions that
he had a concrete employment plan if released and that he had a near-perfect disciplinary
record while in custody. But the district court did not need to reach these considerations
because it concluded that Byrd’s medical circumstances did not warrant a sentence
reduction.
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