William Bell v. Thomas Bergami ( 2020 )


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  •      Case: 19-50410      Document: 00515395487         Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/27/2020
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 19-50410                             April 27, 2020
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    WILLIAM RICHARD BELL,
    Petitioner-Appellant
    v.
    THOMAS E. BERGAMI, Warden, La Tuna Federal Correctional Institution,
    Respondent-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:19-CV-108
    Before DAVIS, SMITH, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    William Richard Bell, federal prisoner # 42762-298, appeals the district
    court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, challenging the denial by the
    Bureau of Prisons (BOP) of his early release following his completion of the
    residential portion of the Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP).                             Bell
    applied for the RDAP following his drug-trafficking conspiracy conviction with
    the understanding that prisoners who successfully completed treatment
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-50410    Document: 00515395487      Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/27/2020
    No. 19-50410
    became eligible for early release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
    However, he was denied release pursuant to a BOP rule, 28 C.F.R. § 550.55,
    which categorically excludes certain inmates from eligibility for early release
    under § 3621(e)(2)(B), including inmates whose offenses involved the using,
    carrying, or possessing a firearm or dangerous weapon.
    We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
    conclusions de novo. Jeffers v. Chandler, 
    253 F.3d 827
    , 830 (5th Cir. 2001).
    Bell renews his assertion the BOP has impermissibly used a sentencing factor
    to recharacterize the statutory elements of his offense in order to disqualify
    him from RDAP early release, in violation of § 3621(e)(2)(B) and his due process
    rights. The BOP has the sole discretion to determine prisoner eligibility for
    the RDAP. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), (e); Richardson v. Joslin, 
    501 F.3d 415
    ,
    417 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007). “The grant of discretion to the BOP in § 3621(e)(2)(B)
    indicates that no entitlement and, hence, no liberty interest, was created.”
    
    Richardson, 501 F.3d at 420
    . Consequently, Bell’s argument that the BOP’s
    determination that he is ineligible for early RDAP release violates his
    statutory and due process rights is meritless. See
    id. Inasmuch as
    Bell relies on a Ninth Circuit case, Arlington v. Daniels,
    
    516 F.3d 1106
    (9th Cir. 2006), for the proposition that the categorical exclusion
    of certain offenders is arbitrary and capricious and that the BOP regulation is
    invalid, his reliance is misplaced. That case dealt with a previous regulation,
    28 C.F.R. § 550.58; the new regulation, § 550.55, which was the basis for the
    BOP’s decision in the instant case, has been upheld by both the Ninth Circuit
    and this court. Peck v. Thomas, 
    697 F.3d 767
    , 776, 771-72 (9th Cir. 2012);
    Handley v. Chapman, 
    587 F.3d 273
    , 280-83 (5th Cir. 2009).
    He also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the BOP’s
    recharacterization of the elements of his offense violates United States v.
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    No. 19-50410
    Davis, 
    139 S. Ct. 2319
    (2019). However, we will not consider the newly raised
    argument. See Page v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 
    651 F.2d 1083
    , 1087 (5th Cir.
    Unit A July 1981). Likewise, to the extent that Bell’s brief can be very liberally
    construed as attempting to raise new claims that trial counsel was ineffective
    in his underlying criminal proceedings, the claims will not be considered both
    because they were not raised below, see
    id., and because
    such claims are
    properly raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion rather than a § 2241 petition, see
    Tolliver v. Dobre, 
    211 F.3d 876
    , 877 (5th Cir. 2000).
    Bell’s disagreement with the BOP’s application of its own rules and
    regulations fails to state a cognizable constitutional claim.       See Jackson
    v. Cain, 
    864 F.2d 1235
    , 1251 (5th Cir. 1989); see also § 2241(c). Thus, Bell has
    not demonstrated any error in the district court’s judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
    3