United States v. Victoria Martinez ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 19-41048     Document: 00515584688         Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/30/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 30, 2020
    No. 19-41048
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Victoria Martinez, also known as Tori Townzen,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:18-CR-1336-2
    Before Jones, Barksdale, and Stewart, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Victoria Martinez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess, with intent
    to distribute, a synthetic cannabinoid mixture, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    , 846, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
    crime, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A)(i). Following a contested
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-41048      Document: 00515584688           Page: 2     Date Filed: 09/30/2020
    No. 19-41048
    sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Martinez, inter alia, to 220-months’
    imprisonment, a term below the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range.
    Martinez challenges the court’s application of sentencing enhancements
    under Guidelines §§ 2D1.1(b)(7),(12) for distributing a controlled substance
    through mass-marketing by means of an interactive computer service and for
    maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a
    controlled substance.
    Although post-Booker, the Guidelines are advisory only, the district
    court must avoid significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating
    the Guidelines sentencing range. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 46, 51
    (2007). If no such procedural error exists, a properly preserved objection to
    an ultimate sentence is reviewed for substantive reasonableness under an
    abuse-of-discretion standard. 
    Id. at 51
    ; United States v. Delgado-Martinez,
    
    564 F.3d 750
    , 751–53 (5th Cir. 2009). In that respect, for issues preserved in
    district court, its application of the Guidelines is reviewed de novo; its factual
    findings, only for clear error. E.g., United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 
    517 F.3d 751
    , 764 (5th Cir. 2008).
    A district court’s determinations that the mass-marketing and
    maintaining-a-drug-premises enhancements apply are factual findings
    reviewed for clear error. United States v. Guzman-Reyes, 
    853 F.3d 260
    , 263
    (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining
    premises); see United States v. Usman, 460 F. App’x 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2012)
    (“We review the district court’s factual findings with regard to the
    [Guideline § 2B1.1(b)(2)] mass-marketing enhancement for clear error
    . . . .”) (citing United States v. Mauskar, 
    557 F.3d 219
    , 232 (5th Cir. 2009)).
    “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous so long as it is plausible in light of
    the record as a whole.” Mauskar, 
    557 F.3d at 232
     (internal quotation marks
    and citations omitted).
    2
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    No. 19-41048
    When making factual findings for sentencing purposes, a district court
    may consider any relevant information that has “sufficient indicia of
    reliability to support its probable accuracy”. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). While
    Martinez arguably failed to preserve some of the issues she raises on appeal,
    we need not determine whether plain error review applies, because, assuming
    arguendo they were preserved, her claims still fail. See United States v.
    Suchowolski, 
    838 F.3d 530
    , 532 (5th Cir. 2016).
    The mass-marketing enhancement applies where “defendant, or a
    person for whose conduct the defendant is accountable under [Guideline]
    § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), distributed a controlled substance through
    mass-marketing by means of an interactive computer service”. U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1(b)(7). Where there is jointly undertaken criminal activity, relevant
    conduct includes:
    all acts and omissions of others that were—
    (i) within the scope of jointly undertaken
    criminal activity,
    (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
    (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with
    that criminal activity.
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
    Through the presentence investigation report and sentencing-hearing
    testimony, the Government presented evidence that Martinez had 3,100
    friends on Facebook, posted on Facebook that she had “bags” of synthetic
    cannabinoid available, and that one of Martinez’ co-conspirators advertised
    and sold synthetic cannabinoids through various Facebook groups dedicated
    to drug sales. Martinez failed to rebut the evidence as to her own conduct
    and the evidence showing that her co-conspirator’s acts were relevant
    conduct under Guideline § 1B1.3. See United States v. Parker, 
    133 F.3d 322
    ,
    3
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    No. 19-41048
    329 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Mere objections do not suffice as competent rebuttal
    evidence.”) (internal citation omitted). The district court did not, therefore,
    commit clear error in applying the mass-marketing enhancement.             See
    Mauskar, 
    557 F.3d at
    232–33.
    Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(12)’s enhancement applies if “defendant
    maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a
    controlled substance”. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12); see also Guzman-Reyes, 853
    at 263–64 (5th Cir. 2017). Martinez failed to rebut evidence showing she
    rented and maintained a locked room in another co-conspirator’s air-
    conditioning business and used it to manufacture synthetic cannabinoids.
    Under these facts, the district court’s application of the § 2D1.1(b)(12)
    enhancement was not clearly erroneous. See Guzman-Reyes, 853 F.3d at 263–
    65.
    AFFIRMED.
    4