United States v. Corey Jefferson ( 2020 )

Case: 20-50405 Document: 00515593846 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/07/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
___________ FILED
October 7, 2020
No. 20-50405 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
___________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Corey Damont Jefferson,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 6:16-CR-317-1
______________________________
Before Stewart, Graves, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Corey Damont Jefferson, federal prisoner # 83703-380, seeks to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal of the denial of his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We construe
Jefferson’s IFP motion as a challenge to the district court’s certification that
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-50405
his appeal was not taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Baugh v.
Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into the good faith of
the appeal “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on
their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215,
220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
On the motion of either the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
or a prisoner, § 3582(c)(1)(A) permits a court to reduce the prisoner’s term
in prison after considering the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, if, inter
alia, the court finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such
a reduction” and “that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Following the First Step Act of 2018, a prisoner may raise a § 3582(c)(1)(A)
motion if he has exhausted his administrative rights to appeal the BOP’s
failure to bring such a motion or has waited 30 days after the warden’s receipt
of the request, whichever is earlier. Id.; see First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L.
115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. Jefferson alleged that he exhausted
his administrative remedies before filing his § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion.
Although the district court did not address exhaustion, this court has held
that exhaustion is not jurisdictional although it is mandatory. See United
States v. Franco, ___ F.3d ___, No. 20-60473, 2020 WL 5249369, at *1 (5th
Cir. Sept. 3, 2020). Accordingly, and because the case is easily resolved on
the merits, we need not determine whether the case should have been
dismissed on procedural grounds. Cf. United States v. Gonzalez, No. 19-
50305, 2020 WL 5352078, at *1 n.1 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2020) (unpublished).
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to deny
compassionate release despite a prisoner’s eligibility. United States v.
Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2020); see also U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(1)(A), p.s. We have not addressed the standard of review in a case
where, as in this matter, the district court found the prisoner ineligible.
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No. 20-50405
However, the district court additionally denied relief on basis of the § 3553(a)
factors, implicitly presuming eligibility, as in Chambliss. In denying
Jefferson’s motion, the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors of the
nature and circumstances of the offense, Jefferson’s history and
characteristics, the need to provide just punishment for the offense, and the
need to deter criminal conduct. Jefferson has failed to show that the district
court’s analysis arose from an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment
of the evidence. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 694. Although, as in Chambliss,
Jefferson may disagree with how the district court balanced the § 3553(a)
factors, his disagreement provides an insufficient ground for reversal. See id.
Jefferson also seeks a certificate of appealability to challenge the
district court’s denial of his § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion. Because a certificate of
appealability is not required to appeal the denial of a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion,
we DENY the motion as unnecessary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
Jefferson’s arguments for appeal are not without arguable legal merit,
although they ultimately fail to persuade, and he meets the financial eligibility
requirements. See § 1915(a)(1); Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335
U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948); Howard, 707 F.2d at 220. We therefore GRANT
his motion to proceed IFP on appeal. Nonetheless, because Jefferson has also
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion after weighing the § 3553(a) factors, we AFFIRM
the decision of the district court.
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