United States v. Myrna Quarles ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 20-30062     Document: 00515599571         Page: 1     Date Filed: 10/13/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 20-30062                          October 13, 2020
    Summary Calendar                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Myrna Thomas Quarles,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 5:19-CR-167-1
    Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Dennis and Ho, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Myrna Thomas Quarles appeals her within-guidelines-range sentence
    of 71 months of imprisonment for theft of government property. She
    contends that the district court erred by (1) applying a two-level
    enhancement for using a sophisticated means to commit or conceal the
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-30062        Document: 00515599571           Page: 2    Date Filed: 10/13/2020
    No. 20-30062
    offense, (2) applying a two-level enhancement for being an organizer, leader,
    supervisor, or manager of the criminal activity; (3) applying a two-level
    enhancement for abusing a position of private trust; (4) double counting the
    aggravating-role and abuse-of-trust enhancements; and (5) relying on facts
    contained in the presentence report (PSR) that lacked sufficient indicia of
    reliability. We affirm.
    As a threshold matter, the district court did not clearly or obviously
    err by relying on the facts contained in the PSR because those facts were
    based on the probation officer’s conversations with the investigating case
    agent. See United States v. Vela, 
    927 F.2d 197
    , 201 (5th Cir. 1991); see generally
    Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009); United States v. Warren,
    
    720 F.3d 321
    , 332 (5th Cir. 2013).
    The district court did not clearly err in finding that Quarles’s use of
    her personal credit union account to launder the ill-gotten proceeds of her
    theft   scheme      constituted    sophisticated     means.       See    U.S.S.G.
    § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C); United States v. Valdez, 
    726 F.3d 684
    , 692 (5th Cir. 2013).
    We have affirmed the application of § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) in materially similar
    circumstances. See United States v. Clements, 
    73 F.3d 1330
    , 1340 (5th Cir.
    1996). Quarles’s argument amounts to a mere disagreement with the district
    court’s finding.
    Nor did the district court clearly err in finding that Quarles was at least
    a supervisor or manager of the criminal activity. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c);
    United States v. Ochoa-Gomez, 
    777 F.3d 278
    , 281-82 (5th Cir. 2015); United
    States v. Le, 
    512 F.3d 128
    , 134 (5th Cir. 2007). The court could infer from
    the available facts that Quarles—the director of Greater Horizons and board
    member of Webster United Federal Credit Union—devised the theft
    scheme, applied for Greater Horizons to take part in the program in question,
    and submitted the fraudulent reimbursement claims; that three Webster
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    No. 20-30062
    employees who helped conceal Quarles’s theft by laundering the ill-gotten
    gains did so at Quarles’s behest, in furtherance of Quarles’s fraudulent
    scheme, and within the scope of that scheme; that the actions of the Webster
    employees were reasonably foreseeable in connection with the theft scheme;
    and that Quarles profited far more than any other participant from the
    scheme. See United States v. Ismoila, 
    100 F.3d 380
    , 394 (5th Cir. 1996);
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). We have affirmed the application of § 3B1.1(c) in
    materially similar circumstances. See United States v. St. Junius, 
    739 F.3d 193
    , 208 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Reagan, 
    725 F.3d 471
    , 494 (5th Cir.
    2013).
    Quarles also fails to show clear error in the district court’s finding that
    she abused a position of private trust in a way that significantly facilitated the
    commission or concealment of the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3; United
    States v. Miller, 
    906 F.3d 373
    , 376-77 (5th Cir. 2018). The record permits a
    plausible finding that Quarles occupied a position of trust with Greater
    Horizons as its director and that she used that position to significantly
    facilitate the theft of government property by submitting fraudulent
    reimbursement forms. See United States v. Coleman, 
    609 F.3d 699
    , 708 (5th
    Cir. 2010). Thus, “[w]ithout [Quarles], it would have been extraordinarily
    difficult, if not impossible, for [Greater Horizons] to accomplish its criminal
    pursuits.” St. 
    Junius, 739 F.3d at 209
    .
    Lastly, Quarles shows no error, plain or otherwise, in the district
    court’s dual application of the § 3B1.1(c) and § 3B1.3 enhancements. See
    
    Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
    ; 
    Warren, 720 F.3d at 332
    . Neither Guideline
    expressly prohibits double counting. See United States v. Jimenez-Elvirez, 
    862 F.3d 527
    , 541 (5th Cir. 2017). In fact, § 3B1.3 expressly permits dual
    application with § 3B1.1 where, as here, the § 3B1.3 adjustment “is based
    upon an abuse of a position of trust.” § 3B1.3.
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    The judgment is AFFIRMED.
    4