Kuantau Reeder v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 17-30351     Document: 00515609198          Page: 1     Date Filed: 10/20/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 20, 2020
    No. 17-30351
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Kuantau Reeder,
    Petitioner—Appellant,
    versus
    Darrel Vannoy, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary,
    Respondent—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:13-CV-6493
    Before King, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:
    Petitioner-appellant Kuantau Reeder was convicted by a Louisiana
    jury of second-degree murder in connection with the death of Mark Broxton.
    State v. Reeder, 
    698 So. 2d 56
    , 57 (La. Ct. App. 1997). After being denied
    postconviction relief by the state courts, Reeder filed a petition for writ of
    habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . Reeder argues under Brady v.
    Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963), that the prosecution unlawfully withheld
    impeachment evidence concerning eyewitness Earl Price’s prior federal
    conviction for lying on a firearms application. The district court denied
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    No. 17-30351
    Reeder’s petition. We granted a certificate of appealability and now we
    AFFIRM.
    I.
    A. Factual Background & Conviction
    On April 13, 1993, Mark Broxton was shot multiple times while
    standing outside a grocery store. Reeder, 698 So. 2d at 57. Law enforcement
    determined that Earl Price and Norma Varist witnessed the shooting. Id. at
    58.1 Price subsequently identified Reeder as the shooter in a photo lineup. Id.
    Reeder was indicted for the second-degree murder of Broxton on October 7,
    1993. Id. at 57. Reeder’s first trial resulted in a hung jury, but he was
    convicted in his second trial and sentenced to life without parole. Id.
    Price was the only eyewitness to the shooting who testified at Reeder’s
    trial.2 Price stated that, from across the street, he saw Broxton talking on the
    phone outside the grocery store. He testified that a black Camaro pulled up
    next to Broxton, and a passenger wearing a “blue-and-red looking
    windbreaker” exited the car and approached Broxton. Price identified this
    man as Reeder.
    Price said he witnessed an argument between Broxton and Reeder,
    which culminated in Reeder shooting Broxton. Price then observed Broxton
    run into the store. Price testified that he also entered the store and saw
    Broxton at the cash register paying for a cold drink before collapsing on the
    1
    In reviewing Reeder’s conviction, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s
    opinion refers to “Earl Pierce” as an eyewitness to the shooting. See Reeder, 698 So. 2d at
    58. However, the trial transcript refers to “Earl Price.”
    2
    Varist refused to testify and was held in contempt of court.
    2
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    floor.3 Price claimed to have caught Broxton before he hit the floor and told
    people in the store to call the police. Price said he left the store and waited
    nearby after seeing police arrive.
    Once outside, Price said that he saw Reeder “come out from behind”
    the store with his windbreaker over his head, and that Reeder subsequently
    threw the windbreaker into a dumpster.4 Though Price described the
    windbreaker as blue and red, Sergeant Westley Morris said that another
    witness, Ella Fletcher, thought it was a “blue and black jacket.” A jacket was
    retrieved from a nearby dumpster the day of the shooting, but the trial
    transcript does not disclose the color.
    Reeder attempted to impeach Price during cross-examination in two
    ways. First, Reeder questioned Price about his criminal history. Price
    admitted that he had been convicted for “[a]ssault and battery, intent to kill
    with a .12-gauge shotgun,” but he falsely denied having other convictions.
    Second, Reeder identified inconsistencies between Price’s testimony and his
    earlier statements. For example, while Price testified at the second trial that
    Reeder arrived at the grocery store in a black Camaro with chrome wheels,
    Price admitted that (1) he had previously testified, at the first trial, that he
    did not remember how Reeder arrived at the grocery store and (2) his
    statement to the police, on the day of the shooting, did not mention that
    Reeder arrived in a car.
    3
    The store’s cashier testified that he did not remember seeing Price in the store
    and that, if he had been inside, he must have entered before Broxton because the door was
    locked after Broxton entered. Reeder, 698 So. 2d at 59.
    4
    Though Price testified that he left the store after police arrived, he also stated that
    he saw Reeder leave the scene before police arrived. See Reeder, 698 So. 2d at 58.
    3
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    Reeder was convicted on July 13, 1995. Reeder appealed his
    conviction, and the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the
    conviction. See Reeder, 698 So. 2d at 63.
    B. State Postconviction Relief
    Reeder filed his first state-court petition for postconviction relief in
    2000. That petition was denied in 2003—as were Reeder’s writ applications
    to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and Louisiana Supreme
    Court.
    Reeder filed a second petition for postconviction relief in 2009,
    asserting that the prosecution unlawfully withheld impeachment evidence
    related to Price’s criminal history and failed to correct his perjured
    testimony. In response to a pretrial motion requesting the criminal histories
    of the prosecution’s witnesses, the State had only disclosed Price’s state
    convictions: a 1968 assault and battery conviction in Mississippi, a 1975
    armed robbery conviction in Mississippi, a 1977 conviction in Alabama for
    being a felon with a firearm, and a 1982 burglary conviction in Mississippi.
    However, the State did not disclose Price’s 1973 federal convictions for lying
    on a firearms application and for being a convicted felon in possession of a
    firearm. The State also failed to correct Price’s testimony during the trial that
    he had only been convicted of the assault and battery.
    The state district court denied Reeder’s motion for postconviction
    relief and determined that he “fail[ed] to meet those standards as set out [in
    Brady v. Maryland] to overturn the verdict.” The Louisiana Fourth Circuit
    Court of Appeal agreed and denied Reeder’s application for postconviction
    relief. That court held that the nondisclosure of the conviction for lying on a
    firearms application did not “render[] the jury’s verdict suspect.” The court
    reasoned that, while the prosecution did not attempt to correct Price’s
    testimony regarding his prior convictions, Reeder failed to impeach Price
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    despite knowledge that Price had “other out-of-state convictions.” Lastly,
    since the jury knew of Price’s prior conviction for assault and battery with
    intent to kill, “the omission of the rest of his prior convictions” did not
    “undermine[] confidence in the jury’s verdict.” The Louisiana Supreme
    Court denied Reeder’s application for postconviction relief but did not state
    its reasons. State v. Reeder, 
    107 So. 3d 623
     (La. 2013).
    C. Federal Habeas Petition
    In 2013, Reeder filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    Louisiana. Reeder argued that the prosecution had violated Brady by
    withholding evidence that Price had a federal conviction for lying on a
    firearms application, and had violated Napue v. Illinois, 
    360 U.S. 264
     (1959),
    by failing to correct Price’s false testimony regarding his prior criminal
    history.
    The district court found that Reeder’s Napue claim was time-barred
    under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The
    district court further concluded that, under AEDPA, the Louisiana Fourth
    Circuit Court of Appeal was not unreasonable when it determined that
    Reeder’s Brady claim lacked merit. The district court reasoned that the
    undisclosed conviction was cumulative of Price’s other convictions and prior
    inconsistent statements and that Price’s testimony was corroborated by other
    evidence that tied Reeder to the crime. Reeder now appeals the rejection of
    his Brady claim.
    II.
    “In a habeas corpus appeal, we review the district court’s findings of
    fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, applying the same
    standards to the state court’s decision as did the district court.” Jenkins v.
    5
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    30351 Hall, 910
     F.3d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
    140 S. Ct. 65
     (2019)
    (quoting Lewis v. Thaler, 
    701 F.3d 783
    , 787 (5th Cir. 2012)).
    Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d), a federal court cannot grant relief unless
    the state adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
    an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
    determined by the Supreme Court,” or “resulted in a decision that was based
    on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
    presented in the State court proceeding.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1)-(2).5 A
    state court decision is deemed “contrary to” clearly established federal law
    “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth
    in [Supreme Court] cases or if the state court confronts a set of facts that are
    materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and
    nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.”
    Jenkins, 910 F.3d at 832 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 
    538 U.S. 63
    , 73 (2003)).
    “It is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent ‘if the state
    court identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the] Court’s cases but
    unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.’”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Salts v. Epps, 
    676 F.3d 468
    , 473–74 (5th Cir. 2012)). Finally, the
    “state court’s findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness”
    that may be overcome only by “clear and convincing evidence.” Leal v.
    Dretke, 
    428 F.3d 543
    , 548 (5th Cir. 2005).
    When analyzing a state court’s decision under § 2254(d)(1), we
    consider “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
    5
    This analysis is applied to the “last related state-court decision” that provides a
    “relevant rationale.” Wilson v. Sellers, 
    138 S. Ct. 1188
    , 1192 (2018). In this case, because
    the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Reeder’s appeal without explanation, the relevant
    decision is the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision. See Reeder, 
    107 So. 3d at 623
    .
    6
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    Court of the United States.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1). Although we may not
    use this circuit’s precedent to “refine or sharpen a general principle of
    Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that [the Supreme]
    Court has not announced,” we may “look to circuit precedent to ascertain
    whether [we have] already held that the particular point in issue is clearly
    established by Supreme Court precedent.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 
    569 U.S. 58
    ,
    64 (2013) (per curiam).
    The Supreme Court has made clear that “[a] state court’s
    determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long
    as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s
    decision.” Woods v. Etherton, 
    136 S. Ct. 1149
    , 1151 (2016) (citations omitted).
    Accordingly, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because
    that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-
    court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or
    incorrectly.” McAfee v. Thaler, 
    630 F.3d 383
    , 393 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting
    Williams v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 362
    , 411 (2000)). A federal habeas court should
    “train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—why
    state courts rejected a state prisoner’s federal claims” and “give appropriate
    deference to that decision.” Wilson, 
    138 S. Ct. at
    1191–92 (citations omitted).
    Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed that we are to “determine what
    arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state
    court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 
    562 U.S. 86
    , 102 (2011).
    III.
    Reeder contends that the state court’s ruling involved an
    unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Specifically, he
    argues that Price’s undisclosed federal conviction for lying on a firearms
    application was material under Brady. Reeder also argues that the state
    court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
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    light of the evidence presented. We consider each of Reeder’s arguments in
    turn.
    A. State Court’s Application of Clearly Established Federal Law
    “To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show: (1) the
    evidence at issue was favorable to the accused, either because it was
    exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the
    prosecution; and (3) the evidence was material.” United States v. Glenn, 
    935 F.3d 313
    , 319 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). In this case, the parties only
    dispute prong three of this analysis—materiality.
    “Suppressed evidence is material ‘if there is a reasonable probability
    that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
    proceeding would have been different.’” Murphy v. Davis, 
    901 F.3d 578
    , 597
    (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
    139 S. Ct. 1263
     (2019) (quoting United States v.
    Bagley, 
    473 U.S. 667
    , 685 (1985)). “‘A reasonable probability of a different
    result’ is one in which the suppressed evidence ‘undermines confidence in
    the outcome of the trial.’” Turner v. United States, 
    137 S. Ct. 1885
    , 1893
    (2017) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 
    514 U.S. 419
    , 434 (1995)); see also Kyles, 
    514 U.S. at 434
     (holding that a petitioner need not show that he “would more
    likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence”).
    In seeking relief under § 2254(d)(1), Reeder argues that the
    undisclosed conviction was material because it undermined the credibility of
    the State’s sole eyewitness. Relying on the Supreme Court’s applications of
    Brady in Smith v. Cain, 
    565 U.S. 73
     (2012) and Wearry v. Cain, 
    136 S. Ct. 1002
     (2016), Reeder contends that such impeachment evidence is more
    significant when the State’s case rests primarily on a single witness. Reeder
    also contests the district court’s conclusion that the undisclosed conviction
    was immaterial because Price’s testimony was corroborated and because the
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    conviction was cumulative of other evidence. We consider each of these
    arguments in turn and reject each.
    First, Reeder’s comparisons to the Supreme Court decisions in Smith
    and Wearry are not persuasive. As the State pointed out at oral argument, the
    Wearry decision was not even issued by the Supreme Court until 2016—
    almost four years after the state court’s decision. As such, Wearry was not
    “clearly established” federal law at the time of the state court opinion. See
    Williams, 
    529 U.S. at 412
     (explaining that “clearly established Federal law”
    refers to Supreme Court decisions “as of the time of the relevant state-court
    decision.”).6 Regardless, Wearry is distinguishable from Reeder’s case. In
    contrast to Price’s seventeen-year-old conviction for lying on a firearms
    application, the multiple pieces of evidence withheld in Wearry addressed the
    key witnesses’ motives to lie and directly undermined their testimony.
    Wearry, 136 S. Ct. at 1006–1007.7
    Reeder’s reliance on Smith v. Cain fares no better, as it too is readily
    distinguishable. In Smith, the witness’s “undisclosed statements directly
    contradict[ed] his testimony.” Smith, 
    565 U.S. at 76
    . While the witness “told
    the jury that he had ‘[n]o doubt’ that [the defendant] was the gunman he
    stood ‘face to face’ with on the night of the crime,” undisclosed police files
    indicated that the witness had also stated “that he ‘could not ID anyone
    because [he] couldn’t see faces’ and ‘would not know them if [he] saw
    6
    Though this argument regarding Wearry was not raised by the State below or in
    its briefing on appeal, we have held that “a State’s lawyers cannot waive or forfeit
    § 2254(d)’s standard.” Langley v. Prince, 
    926 F.3d 145
    , 162 (5th Cir. 2019).
    7
    Reeder’s reliance on our decisions in LaCaze v. La. Corr. Inst. for Women, 
    645 F.3d 728
     (5th Cir. 2011), and Tassin v. Cain, 
    517 F.3d 770
     (5th Cir. 2008), is unavailing for
    the same reason. In contrast to Reeder’s case, the undisclosed evidence in LaCaze and
    Tassin revealed assurances given to a witness and agreements entered into by the
    prosecution with a witness. See LaCaze, 
    645 F.3d at
    735–36; Tassin, 
    517 F.3d at
    779–80.
    9
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    them.’” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted). By contrast, the undisclosed evidence of
    Price’s conviction for lying does not “directly contradict” or undermine his
    assertions at trial. 
    Id.
    Certainly, undisclosed impeachment evidence is more likely to be
    considered material where the prosecution’s case relies primarily on a single
    witness. See id.; see also Giglio v. United States, 
    405 U.S. 150
    , 154 (1972)
    (“When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt
    or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility” could justify
    a new trial under Brady) (quoting Napue, 
    360 U.S. at 269
    ). However, unlike
    the testimony of the witness in Smith, Price’s testimony was not the “only
    evidence linking [the defendant] to the crime.” 
    Id.
     Indeed, Price’s testimony
    identifying Reeder as the shooter was corroborated by other witness
    accounts. Specifically, Sergeant Morris testified that both Price and Varist
    identified Reeder as the shooter. Broxton’s mother, Mary Menina, also
    testified that, based on information received from Varist, she believed that
    Reeder was the shooter. Although some of this corroborating testimony may
    have qualified as hearsay, no such objections were made at trial. As the Court
    explained in Smith, undisclosed evidence “may not be material if the State’s
    other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.” Smith,
    
    565 U.S. at 76
    ; see also Rocha v. Thaler, 
    619 F.3d 387
    , 396 (5th Cir. 2010)
    (holding that undisclosed impeachment evidence is not material if the
    witness’ testimony is strongly corroborated). At the very least, “fairminded
    jurists could disagree” as to whether Price’s testimony was sufficiently
    corroborated to sustain confidence in the verdict. Woods, 
    136 S. Ct. at 1151
    .
    Finally, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Price’s
    undisclosed conviction was cumulative of other evidence disclosed to the
    defense—including the assault and battery conviction that was revealed to
    the jury during Price’s cross-examination. “Undisclosed evidence that is
    merely cumulative of other evidence” is not likely to be considered material.
    10
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    Rocha, 619 F.3d at 396–97. Indeed, “[i]f the evidence provides only
    incremental impeachment value, it does not rise to the level of Brady
    materiality.” Murphy, 901 F.3d at 598 (quoting Miller v. Dretke, 
    431 F.3d 241
    ,
    251 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also Banks v. Dretke, 
    540 U.S. 668
    , 702 (2004)
    (finding that undisclosed impeachment evidence was not rendered “merely
    cumulative” where witness was impeached on issues unrelated to the
    undisclosed information). In this case, Price was impeached on not only his
    prior inconsistent testimony but also his criminal history. Though Price
    falsely denied having any other convictions beyond the assault and battery,
    the defense was aware of his other state convictions and failed to impeach
    that denial. For its part, the state court emphasized that the jury “knew Mr.
    Price had been convicted of assault and battery with the intent to kill” in
    holding that the “omission of the rest of his prior convictions” did not
    “undermine[] confidence in the jury’s verdict.” Reeder nonetheless argues
    that the undisclosed conviction for lying, as a crimen falsi, is “uniquely
    probative of untruthfulness” compared to his other convictions.
    Notwithstanding that distinction, a reasonable jurist could conclude that the
    undisclosed conviction was merely cumulative of the other convictions that
    were disclosed to the defense or was rendered cumulative by the revelation
    to the jury of at least one prior conviction.
    Based on the foregoing, we find that the state court’s determination
    did not “involve[] an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established
    Federal law.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1). As we have previously explained,
    “given that the Supreme Court has stated the Brady disclosure requirement
    at a high level of generality,” a state court has “substantial leeway” in
    deciding whether it is satisfied. Cobb v. Thaler, 
    682 F.3d 364
    , 379 (5th Cir.
    2012); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 
    541 U.S. 652
    , 664 (2004) (“The more
    general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-
    by-case determinations.”). In this case, we cannot say that the state court’s
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    application of Brady was unreasonable. See Harrington, 
    562 U.S. at 103
    (holding that, to warrant habeas relief, a state court’s ruling must be “so
    lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
    comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
    disagreement.”).
    B. State Court’s Determination of the Facts
    In attempting to argue under § 2254(d)(2) that the “state court
    decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” Reeder
    essentially reiterates his argument under § 2254(d)(1). Rather than challenge
    the state court’s factual findings, Reeder again contends that the state court
    unreasonably concluded “that the suppressed evidence of Price’s conviction
    for lying was not evidence that casts the jury verdict in a different light.”
    Reeder thus fails to advance an argument cognizable under § 2254(d)(2).8 See
    Buntion v. Quarterman, 
    524 F.3d 664
    , 671 (5th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing a
    state court’s “legal error” from the kind of “unreasonable factual
    determination” evaluated under § 2254(d)(2)). Indeed, Brady claims are
    properly considered under § 2254(d)(1) rather than § 2254(d)(2) because
    they “involve mixed questions of law and fact.” Floyd v. Vannoy, 
    894 F.3d 143
    , 161 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
    139 S. Ct. 573
     (2018).
    8
    At oral argument, Reeder raised a previously-unbriefed factual issue. Reeder
    argued that the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal erroneously found that evidence
    of Price’s federal conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm was disclosed prior
    to Reeder’s first trial. Reeder misreads the state court’s opinion on this issue. The court
    stated only that “the state knew about at least one of Earl Price’s federal convictions prior
    to the first trial” and reasoned that “Price’s admission at the first trial that he had at least
    one [federal conviction] put the defense on notice about that conviction.” Reeder has not
    provided “clear and convincing evidence” that this finding is erroneous. Leal, 
    428 F.3d at 548
    . Nor could he. In Reeder’s own briefing before the state court, he cited Price’s
    testimony from the first trial, in which Price admitted to having spent time in federal
    custody for having “a concealed weapon, a .38 special.”
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    We thus reject Reeder’s argument that the Louisiana Fourth Circuit
    Court of Appeal’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of
    the facts.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(2).
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
    court.
    13