Shaboyd Cannon v. So Univ Board of Supervisors, et ( 2020 )

Case: 19-30803 Document: 00515610571 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/21/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 21, 2020
No. 19-30803 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Shaboyd Pierre Cannon,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Southern University Board of Supervisors; Freddie
Pitcher, Jr.; John K. Pierre; Tony Clayton,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:17-CV-527
Before Haynes, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Shaboyd Cannon was dismissed as a student from Southern
University Law Center for failing to report two arrests on his admission
application. He sued the university’s Board of Supervisors, Tony Clayton, a
former board member, Freddie Pitcher, Jr., the former chancellor of the law
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 19-30803 Document: 00515610571 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/21/2020
No. 19-30803
school, and John Pierre, the current chancellor, alleging violations of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. 1 The
district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, reasoning that
Cannon abandoned his equal protection claim and the undisputed facts
showed he was afforded the requisite process. After judgment was entered,
Cannon filed a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) and a motion to enforce a settlement that the university
purportedly offered earlier in the litigation. The district court denied both
motions. Cannon timely appealed. Because we unanimously agree that oral
argument is unnecessary under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
34(a)(2)(C), Cannon’s motions for argument and a hearing are denied.
I
We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard
as the district court. Moon v. City of El Paso, 906 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2018).
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In applying that standard, we review
the same evidence as the district court; parties cannot expand the summary
judgment record on appeal. See Am. Family Life Assur. Co. of Columbus v.
Biles, 714 F.3d 887, 896 (5th Cir. 2013); Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953
F.2d 909, 915–16 (5th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases).
Cannon does not challenge the district court’s ruling on his equal
protection claim. On the due process claim, he argues only that Freddie
Pitcher’s deposition testimony raises a material dispute as to whether the
former chancellor was a biased decisionmaker. But Cannon never presented
1
Cannon also brought a breach of contract claim, which the district court dismissed
on sovereign immunity grounds. That ruling is not at issue on appeal.
2
Case: 19-30803 Document: 00515610571 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/21/2020
No. 19-30803
Pitcher’s deposition to the district court. In response to Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, Cannon submitted just three exhibits—two emails
and his own affidavit—all of which the district court found to be inadmissible
(a ruling unchallenged by Cannon). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Because
Pitcher’s deposition was not part of the summary judgment record before the
district court, we cannot consider it on appeal. And because Cannon offers
no other reason to reverse the summary judgment ruling, we affirm.
II
We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion.
Torres v. Livingston, 972 F.3d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 2020). “Under Rule 59(e),
amending a judgment is appropriate (1) where there has been an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) where the movant presents newly
discovered evidence that was previously unavailable; or (3) to correct a
manifest error of law or fact.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, Cannon again
relies on Pitcher’s deposition. But he does not contend that the deposition
was previously unavailable. Rather, his Rule 59(e) motion was an
impermissible attempt “to raise arguments which could, and should, have
been made before the judgment issued.” Celanese Corp. v. Martin K. Eby
Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.3d 529, 531 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying it.
III
We review the decision to enforce a settlement agreement for abuse
of discretion. See Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1994). But
here, there is no settlement agreement to enforce. We agree with the district
court that because “no settlement was agreed to prior to the entry of final
judgment in this case, there is no settlement offer to be accepted.”
Summary judgment is AFFIRMED; motions are DENIED.
3