Sherman Fields ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 20-50351     Document: 00515614069          Page: 1    Date Filed: 10/23/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 20-50351                    October 23, 2020
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    In re: Sherman Lamont Fields,
    Movant.
    Motion for an order authorizing
    the United States District Court for the
    Western District of Texas to consider
    a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
    Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Sherman Lamont Fields, who was sentenced to death, moves for
    authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in which he intends
    to challenge three convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).            We may
    authorize such a motion only if Fields’s claims rely on “newly discovered
    evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would
    be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
    factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense” or “a new rule
    of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
    Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-50351      Document: 00515614069           Page: 2     Date Filed: 10/23/2020
    No. 20-50351
    Fields invokes the latter ground. He argues that, in light of United
    States v. Davis, 
    139 S. Ct. 2319
    , 2336 (2019), he was erroneously convicted
    and sentenced under section 924(c) based on predicate offenses that are not
    “crimes of violence.”
    Id. at 2336.
    And he contends that Davis has been made
    retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.              The
    government agrees that Supreme Court precedent makes Davis retroactive
    to cases on collateral review. See Welch v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 1257
    , 1268
    (2016) (holding that rulings that “alter[] the range of conduct . . . that the law
    punishes” are substantive and have “retroactive effect in cases on collateral
    review” (quotation omitted)); Tyler v. Cain, 
    533 U.S. 656
    , 666 (2001) (stating
    that multiple cases taken together can “render a new rule retroactive” if logic
    so dictates); see also In re Sparks, 
    657 F.3d 258
    , 262 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying
    Tyler to find that the combined effect of previous Supreme Court cases taken
    together rendered a new rule retroactive “as a matter of logical necessity”).
    Indeed, we have authorized a number of successive petitions based on Davis.
    See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 799 F. App’x 308, 308–09 (5th Cir. 2020)
    (per curiam); In re Bocanegra, No. 20-10311 (5th Cir. June 2, 2020) (per
    curiam); In re Woods, No. 19-30731 (5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2019) (per curiam).
    While agreeing that Davis can serve as the basis for a successive
    motion, the parties disagree about how many of Fields’s convictions are
    affected by Davis. We agree with the government that two of them are.
    Those two section 924(c) convictions stem from the predicate “crimes of
    violence” of conspiracy to escape and/or escape from federal custody. Fields
    has made a prima facie showing that neither is a crime of violence after Davis.
    See United States v. Robinson, 783 F. App’x 401, 402–03 (5th Cir. 2019)
    (holding that conspiring to escape from federal custody is not a crime of
    violence after Davis) (per curiam); United States v. Taylor, 
    933 F.2d 307
    , 309
    (5th Cir. 1991) (listing elements of escape offense).
    2
    Case: 20-50351       Document: 00515614069         Page: 3   Date Filed: 10/23/2020
    No. 20-50351
    Fields’s third challenged section 924(c) conviction, is based on a
    predicate offense of carjacking. Carjacking remains a crime of violence post-
    Davis, as it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
    physical force.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A); United Sates v. Jones, 
    854 F.3d 737
    , 740 (5th Cir. 2017). Thus Fields has not demonstrated that the district
    court need review this conviction in light of Davis.
    Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Fields’s motion for
    authorization is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Our
    grant of authorization is tentative, however, in that the district court must
    dismiss the motion without reaching its merits if the court determines that
    Fields has failed to satisfy the requirements of section 2255(h). See 28 U.S.C.
    § 2244(b)(4); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 
    243 F.3d 893
    , 897–99 (5th Cir.
    2001).
    3