Dora Boudreaux v. United States Flood Control Corporation ( 2010 )


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  •      Case: 10-30288     Document: 00511198191          Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/09/2010
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 9, 2010
    No. 10-30288                           Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                              Clerk
    DORA A. BOUDREAUX, Trustee for Alzec J. Autin Revocable Living Trust,
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    U.S. FLOOD CONTROL CORPORATION,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:07-CV-3211
    Before KING, BENAVIDES, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    The trustee of the Alzec J. Autin Revocable Living Trust, Dora Boudreaux
    (“Boudreaux”), brought suit against U.S. Flood Control Corporation (“U.S.
    Flood”) in Louisiana state court, alleging trespass on land owned by the trust.
    Boudreaux alleged that U.S. Flood, through the actions of its local employee,
    Toby Champagne (“Champagne”), had, without consent, stored materials on the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-30288    Document: 00511198191       Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/09/2010
    No. 10-30288
    trust’s land. U.S. Flood removed the suit to the United States District Court for
    the Eastern District of Louisiana on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
    Following removal, U.S. Flood moved for summary judgment, claiming
    that it could not be held vicariously liable for Champagne’s actions because he
    was not acting within the course and scope of his employment. In response to
    this motion, Boudreaux sought leave to add Champagne as a defendant both in
    his capacity as an employee of U.S. Flood and in his individual capacity.
    The motions for leave to amend were referred to a magistrate judge who
    determined that Boudreaux had been unreasonably dilatory in seeking the
    amendments and denied the motions. Boudreaux appealed the ruling, arguing
    that she would be significantly injured if not permitted to add Champagne as a
    defendant.
    The district court agreed with Boudreaux, permitted amendment of her
    complaint, determined that the addition of Boudreaux defeated its subject
    matter jurisdiction, and remanded the suit to Louisiana state court. U.S. Flood
    appealed this order, noticing both the leave to amend and the remand orders.
    “Before we can proceed to the merits of this appeal, we must examine
    whether we have jurisdiction to do so. We have jurisdiction to determine our
    own jurisdiction.” Martin v. Halliburton, 
    601 F.3d 381
    , 386 (5th Cir. 2010)
    (citing Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 
    566 F.3d 164
    , 169 (5th
    Cir.2009)). Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (e), “[i]f after removal the plaintiff seeks to
    join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter
    jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action
    to the State court.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 1447
    (e). And under § 1447(d), “[a]n order
    remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable
    on appeal or otherwise . . . .” Id. § 1447(d).
    We have construed § 1447 as prohibiting review of orders remanding cases
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where lack of jurisdiction resulted from
    2
    Case: 10-30288   Document: 00511198191     Page: 3    Date Filed: 08/09/2010
    No. 10-30288
    joinder of non-diverse parties. See Doleac ex rel. Doleac v. Michalson, 
    264 F.3d 470
    , 493 (5th Cir. 2001) (dismissing appeal because “the amendment joining
    [nondiverse party] as a defendant was a separable order but did not come within
    the collateral order exception.   Therefore, § 1447(d) bars our review of the
    remand and also of the amendment itself. Such preclusion, based upon the
    dictates of § 1447(d), is not unconstitutional.”).      “We are bound by this
    precedent.” Martin, 
    601 F.3d at
    390 (citing United States v. Rose, 
    587 F.3d 695
    ,
    705 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)).
    APPEAL DISMISSED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-30288

Judges: King, Benavides, Elrod

Filed Date: 8/9/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024