United States v. Coto-Mendoza ( 2021 )

Case: 20-10451 Document: 00515717555 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/25/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 25, 2021
No. 20-10451 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Francisco Coto-Mendoza,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CR-366
Before Haynes, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Haynes, Circuit Judge:
Francisco Coto-Mendoza pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after
deportation and was sentenced to 37 months in prison. On appeal, he argues
that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court did
not adequately explain the reasons for its sentence. We AFFIRM.
I. Background
Coto-Mendoza is a citizen of El Salvador. He entered the United
States without authorization and has been deported back to El Salvador four
times. During his time in the United States, he has been convicted of theft,
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assault, as well as numerous alcohol related crimes. In his most recent run-
in with the law, Coto-Mendoza pleaded guilty to re-entering the country
illegally.
Coto-Mendoza’s Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)
recommended a sentencing range of 37 to 46 months, which accounted for
his extensive criminal history.1 At the sentencing hearing, the district court
adopted the PSR’s factual findings, as well as the probation officer’s
conclusions regarding the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines calculations.
The district court also indicated that it had read the sentencing memorandum
submitted by Coto-Mendoza’s counsel.
Coto-Mendoza’s counsel proceeded to ask for a below-Guidelines
sentence given Coto-Mendoza’s age, difficult childhood, gainful
employment, family considerations, and his “mostly nonviolent criminal
history.” Counsel also acknowledged Coto-Mendoza’s problems with
alcohol but maintained that he planned on going back to El Salvador.
After allowing Coto-Mendoza to speak on his own behalf, the district
court pronounced that, “pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553,” Coto-
Mendoza was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment, as well as a term of
supervised release with accompanying conditions. The district court then
asked Coto-Mendoza’s counsel if he had “any objection to any of these
conditions.” Coto-Mendoza’s counsel responded: “No, your Honor.”
Along with the verbal pronouncement, the district court provided a
written Statement of Reasons for Coto-Mendoza’s sentence. In that
document, the district court noted that Coto-Mendoza’s sentence was
“within the guideline range,” and “[i]n determining the sentence, the
1
Neither party objected to the sentencing range.
2
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No. 20-10451
[district court] considered the advisory guidelines, as well as statutory
concerns listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” The district court opined that the
sentence was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the
Court’s sentencing objectives of punishment, deterrence, and protection of
the public.” Further, the district court maintained that even if the
Sentencing Guidelines calculations were incorrect, it would still impose the
same sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
After the district court filed its written judgment, Coto-Mendoza
timely appealed his sentence.
II. Standard of Review
We undertake a two-step process in reviewing a criminal sentence, in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). See United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 752
(5th Cir. 2009). At step one, we consider whether the district court
committed a “significant procedural error,” such as “failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If a significant procedural
error was committed, we must remand for resentencing “unless the
proponent of the sentence establishes that the error ‘did not affect the district
court’s selection of the sentence imposed.’” Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d at
753 (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)). If there
was no significant procedural error, we continue to the second step in the
Gall analysis and “consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Here,
Coto-Mendoza raises only a procedural challenge.
III. Discussion
Coto-Mendoza only raises one issue on appeal: whether the district
court adequately responded to his arguments for a below-Guidelines
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sentence when it merely stated that the sentence was imposed pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3553. Coto-Mendoza argues that “sentencing courts have been
required to explain their reasons for rejecting non-frivolous arguments for an
out-of-range sentence[],” and our past decisions have “never authorized a
sentencing court to say as little as it did here.”
Coto-Mendoza focuses his challenge on the standard of review.
Generally, if the defendant failed to object to a procedural error, we review
only for plain error. See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338,
1343 (2016). To succeed on plain error review, the defendant must
demonstrate: (1) “an error that has not been intentionally relinquished or
abandoned”; (2) that is “plain—that is to say, clear or obvious”; and (3)
“affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. Assuming all three of these
conditions are met, we will only exercise our discretion to correct the
forfeited error if the it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).
By contrast, while conceding that he did not object to the district
court’s alleged lack of explanation, Coto-Mendoza argues that Holguin-
Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762 (2020), should alter the standard
of review for his unpreserved challenge—namely, that the Supreme Court’s
holding that no separate objection is necessary to preserve a claim of
substantive reasonableness should also extend to Coto-Mendoza’s claim of
procedural reasonableness. Coto-Mendoza acknowledges the Holguin-
Hernandez Court never addressed the issue of improper procedure, yet he
invites us to reconsider our circuit precedent in light of that decision. We
decline that invitation.
We begin by emphasizing the limited holding of Holguin-Hernandez:
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it was not deciding the issue of
“what is sufficient to preserve a claim that a trial court used improper
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procedures in arriving at its chosen sentence.” Holguin-Hernandez, 140 S. Ct.
at 767.2 We note that the Supreme Court has cautioned against overruling its
earlier precedents by implication. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237
(1997) (“We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other courts
should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an
earlier precedent.” (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we remain bound by
the plain error standard for forfeited errors set forth in Molina-Martinez, 136
S. Ct. at 1343, and United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993). See
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237 (“We reaffirm that ‘[i]f a precedent of this Court
has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.’” (quotation omitted)). Because we hold that Holguin-Hernandez
does not apply to the facts of this case, we review for plain error.3
On the merits, Coto-Mendoza takes issue with the district court’s
brief explanation, arguing that a “bare statutory citation would only barely
explain the sentencing rationale.” Even so, a “brief” explanation does not
necessarily amount to an inadequate one. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that “when a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to
a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). If the defendant “presents
2
This sentiment was reemphasized in Justice Alito’s concurrence. Holguin-
Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 767 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the Court was not deciding
“what is sufficient to preserve a claim that a trial court used improper procedures in arriving
at its chosen sentence”).
3
Even if we were to use a less demanding standard of review, we would reach the
same conclusion. The record shows that the district judge considered Coto-Mendoza’s,
mitigation arguments, examined the § 3553(a) factors, and provided a reasoned basis for its
decision. See United States v. Becerril-Pena, 714 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2013).
5
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nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence,” circumstances may
sometimes “call for a brief explanation.” Id. at 357.
Assuming arguendo that Coto-Mendoza’s arguments were
nonfrivolous, we conclude that the district court provided him an adequate
explanation.4 The district court gave Coto-Mendoza a sentence at the
bottom of the Guidelines range after adopting the PSR’s factual findings and
the probation officer’s conclusions regarding the non-contested Sentencing
Guidelines calculations. The district court also read the sentencing
memorandum submitted by Coto-Mendoza’s counsel—which included
information about Coto-Mendoza’s childhood, employment, family,
criminal history, and multiple deportations—and heard both Coto-
Mendoza’s counsel’s argument and Coto-Mendoza’s personal request for a
more lenient sentence. Finally, in its written Statement of Reasons, the
district court explained how it “considered the advisory guidelines, as well
as statutory concerns listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” and concluded that
Coto-Mendoza’s sentence was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
achieve the Court’s sentencing objectives of punishment, deterrence, and
protection of the public.”5 Indicating that it gave some thought to the matter,
the district court also noted that it would impose the same sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3553, even if the Guidelines calculations were incorrect.
Examining the facts before us, we cannot conclude that the district
court’s (admittedly brief) explanation of Coto-Mendoza’s sentence
4
In making this determination, we are not limited to the district court’s affirmative
statements about sentencing. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007) (noting
that the “context and record” made it clear the sentencing judge considered the evidence
and arguments).
5
We note that “punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public” are all
specific factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–
(C).
6
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amounted to plain error. See United States v. Becerril-Pena, 714 F.3d 347, 349-
51 (5th Cir. 2013). Upon review of the entire record, we conclude that Coto-
Mendoza has “not shown that the district court committed significant
procedural error in declining to explicitly address his arguments for a shorter
sentence.” Id. at 351.6
For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
6
Coto-Mendoza seeks to distinguish Becerril-Pena by pointing to the fact the
district court in that case adopted a PSR that “expressly anticipated and addressed
arguments for an out-of-range sentence.” Upon review of the record, we conclude that
many of the arguments Coto-Mendoza’s counsel raised in support of a below-Guidelines
sentence were addressed in the adopted PSR, as well as in the sentencing memorandum,
both of which the district court explicitly reviewed prior to sentencing.
7