United States v. Jackson ( 2021 )

Case: 19-30433 Document: 00515934332 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/12/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 12, 2021
No. 19-30433
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Melvin Jackson,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:19-CV-1975
Before Haynes, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Melvin Jackson was convicted of felony firearm possession after he
was involved in an alleged shooting. 1 To determine his base offense level, the
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
1
Jackson was also convicted of a drug trafficking conspiracy and possession with
the intent to distribute heroin, but those convictions are not relevant to this appeal.
Case: 19-30433 Document: 00515934332 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/12/2021
No. 19-30433
district court applied U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(1) and sentenced him to 120
months. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1). After an unsuccessful direct appeal,
Jackson filed this pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting that his
counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he did not object to the
application of § 2A2.1(a)(1). See United States v. Jackson, 662 F. App’x 310,
319 (5th Cir. 2016) (affirming conviction but vacating and remanding
sentence); 700 F. App’x 392 (5th Cir. 2017) (affirming sentence). The
district court denied Jackson’s petition, and we granted a certificate of
appealability on the ineffective assistance claim.
In evaluating a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion, we review its
factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United
States v. Faubion, 19 F.3d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1994). We review ineffective
assistance claims de novo. Id.To prevail on his ineffective assistance claim, Jackson must establish
that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient in that it “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,” and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced
his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). Our
review of counsel’s performance is “highly deferential,” and we “indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689.
Jackson argues his counsel’s failure to object was deficient because
binding caselaw required a showing of specific intent to kill for the
§ 2A2.1(a)(1) sentencing enhancement to apply.
To provide constitutionally adequate performance, counsel must
“research relevant facts and law, or make an informed decision that certain
avenues will not be fruitful.” United States v. Conley, 349 F.3d 837, 841 (5th
Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 210 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir.
2
Case: 19-30433 Document: 00515934332 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/12/2021
No. 19-30433
2000)). Counsel must also discover and bring to the court’s attention
“[s]olid, meritorious arguments based on directly controlling precedent.” Id.As a preliminary point, the record belies counsel’s alleged deficiency
because counsel timely objected at sentencing to the application of
§ 2A2.1(a)(1) on mens rea grounds; counsel thus brought this argument to
the court’s attention. Moreover, Jackson’s argument that counsel should
have objected based on insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill is
unavailing because that objection would not have been meritorious. Jackson
relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S.
344 (1991), but that decision is not directly controlling. Braxton addressed the
mens rea showing for attempted killing under 18 U.S.C. § 1114. Id. at 350–51.
However, § 2A2.1(a)(1) incorporates the mens rea showing for murder under
18 U.S.C. § 1111. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1 cmt. 1. Plus, at the time of Jackson’s
sentencing, our decision in United States v. Villanueva directly contradicted
the objection that Jackson argues his counsel should have made. 541 F. App’x
486, 487 (5th Cir. 2013). Although Villaneuva was an unpublished opinion,
its reasoning was based on the text of § 1111 and binding, precedential caselaw
interpreting that text. Id. (citing United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 392 n.20
(5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lemus-Gonzalez, 563 F.3d 88, 92 (5th Cir.
2009)).
Jackson has thus failed to show that his counsel’s performance was
deficient, and we do not address whether Jackson has shown that counsel’s
performance prejudiced him. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Jackson’s § 2255 petition.
3