Cross v. Apfel ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-51083
Summary Calendar
VICKIE CROSS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
USDC No. A-98-CV-750- SS
June 29, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Vickie Cross appeals the Commissioner's denial of Social
Security disability benefits. The administrative law judge ("ALJ")
found that Cross was not entitled to benefits, and the Appeals
Council denied Cross' request for review, making the ALJ's decision
the final decision of the Commissioner. Cross sought judicial
review, and the parties consented to try the case before a
magistrate judge, who affirmed the Commissioner's decision to deny
benefits.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Cross argues that she has been unable to work since August 13,
1993, due to multiple chemical sensitivity disorder and
psychological impairment. She maintains that the magistrate judge
erred in affirming the Commissioner's decision that Cross is not
entitled to disability benefits because she is able to perform past
relevant work. Specifically, Cross asserts that the ALJ
disregarded evidence that she is unable to work because of her
sensitivity to chemicals in the any workplace where her past
relevant work could be performed.
We review the Commissioner's denial of benefits to determine
whether it is supported by substantial evidence and the proper
legal standards were used to evaluate the evidence. See Falco v.
Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is
more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance, relevant and
sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support
the conclusion. See id. We may not reweigh the evidence but must
examine the record to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner's decision. See Bowling v. Shalala, 36
F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1995).
In determining whether an individual is disabled, the
Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation, considering
whether: (1) the individual is working presently, (2) the
individual has a severe impairment, (3) the impairment is listed in
or equivalent to an impairment listed in the appendix to the
regulations, (4) the impairment prevents her from performing past
relevant work, and (5) the individual can perform substantial
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gainful employment available in the national economy. See
Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). The
claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, and if
she offers such proof, the government bears the burden of proof on
the final step. See id. An unfavorable finding on any of the five
steps ends the analysis against the claimant. See id.
The ALJ followed these steps in reaching his conclusion, and
we agree that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ's
decision. There was expert medical and vocational evidence from
which the ALJ could reasonably conclude that Cross' sensitivity to
chemicals was not severe and would not prevent her from performing
past relevant work. There was expert medical testimony that tests
of Cross' physical condition did not substantiate her complaints.
A vocational expert testified that Cross could work in an office
environment. Finally, there was expert medical testimony and
medical reports which showed that, although Cross suffers
psychological impairments, her mental condition is not severe
enough to prevent her from working. The ALJ's decision shows that
he did not disregard evidence that Cross believed would support her
contentions, as Cross asserts.
Since the ALJ's decision comports with the relevant legal
standards and is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the
denial of benefits.
AFFIRMED.
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