Wright v. Un Pac Rr ( 2021 )

Case: 20-20334 Document: 00515768823 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/05/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 5, 2021
No. 20-20334
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Aisha Wright,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Union Pacific Railroad Company,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-203
Before Stewart, Higginson, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
Aisha Wright sued her former employer, Union Pacific Railroad
Company, alleging that Union Pacific violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, by suspending her, and later
terminating her, in retaliation for her 2016 lawsuit against the company and
her 2018 internal complaint. Wright also alleged that Union Pacific violated
the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 152, and the Texas Labor Code
(“TLC”), Tex. Lab. Code §§ 101.001 and 101.301, by retaliating against
her because of her requests for union representation. The district court
granted Union Pacific’s motion to dismiss, and Wright appeals. We
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AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Wright worked for Union Pacific Railroad Company from 1996 to
2018. Relevant to this case, in 2013, Wright began working as a claims
representative at Union Pacific’s Palestine, Texas location. In 2015, Wright
lodged complaints of discrimination and retaliation both internally at Union
Pacific and with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Union Pacific terminated Wright from the claims-representative
position in March 2016. But as a union member, Wright had “bumping”
rights that allowed her to seek another position with Union Pacific.
Exercising those rights, in April 2016, Wright began working as a materials
handler at Union Pacific’s Houston warehouse. The same month, Wright’s
new supervisor, Duane Merchant, asked Wright about her employment
discrimination claims. During that discussion, Merchant told Wright that
her husband had also filed a complaint against Union Pacific and actually
referred Wright to two attorneys.
In August 2016, Wright sued Union Pacific for the discrimination and
retaliation she allegedly experienced at the Palestine location. The parties
settled that case in January 2018. Five months later, in June 2018, Wright
disagreed with Merchant about her pay during some time off and appealed to
Merchant’s supervisor. Wright alleges that Merchant’s behavior changed
after this pay dispute, with Merchant trying to find ways to damage Wright’s
employment record.
On July 10, 2018, Merchant called Wright to review video of Wright
receiving merchandise. Apparently, some fuel injectors were missing from a
delivery of supplies. Wright maintained that she did nothing wrong.
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On July 19, 2018, Merchant informed Wright that she was writing
Wright up and instructed Wright to undergo coaching after work. When
Wright requested union representation for the coaching session, Merchant
called local union chairman Dennis Williams but was unable to reach him.
Merchant advised Wright that she should nonetheless proceed with
coaching. Wright agreed to coaching but again requested representation.
Wright then called a national union representative, Jeff Egnoske. During the
call, Wright experienced labored breathing, so much that Egnoske urged her
to seek medical attention. Wright went to the emergency room, where she
learned that she was having a panic attack.
Wright returned to work the next day, Friday, July 20, 2018. Again,
Merchant instructed Wright to undergo coaching. And again, Wright
requested union representation during the coaching session. In response,
Merchant placed Wright on a different assignment. After speaking with a
union representative, Wright asked Merchant to postpone the coaching
session until a union representative was available. Merchant responded that
Wright would work on another assignment until she completed coaching.
The same day, Wright called Union Pacific’s internal Equal
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) line. Wright complained that Merchant
had created a hostile work environment and discriminated against her.
Wright also complained that Merchant seemed to mock her for requesting
union representation before she would participate in the coaching session.
On Monday, July 23, the first business day after Wright’s internal
complaint, Merchant again instructed Wright to complete the coaching
session. Merchant informed Wright that failure to undergo coaching could
trigger discipline. When Wright requested union representation again,
Merchant suspended her for insubordination.
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On July 24, union representatives called Wright and instructed her to
come to work the next day for coaching with Merchant. Dennis Williams was
set to participate as Wright’s union representative. But when Wright arrived
at work on July 25, Merchant was not there. A supervisor tried calling
Merchant but could not reach her. Williams then instructed Wright to go
home.
The same day, Union Pacific notified Wright of a disciplinary hearing
against her. At the hearing on August 15, 2018, Wright testified that she
never refused coaching but simply requested to have a union representative
present. Wright also testified that she had received union representation for
earlier coaching sessions at Union Pacific. On August 23, 2018, a month after
Wright’s internal EEO complaint, Union Pacific terminated Wright for
insubordination.
Wright subsequently filed this action against Union Pacific. In her
complaint, Wright alleged that Union Pacific violated Title VII by
suspending her and then terminating her in retaliation for her 2016 lawsuit
against the company and her 2018 internal EEO complaint. Wright also
alleged that Union Pacific violated the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, and the TLC,
Tex. Lab. Code §§ 101.001 and 101.301, by retaliating against her for
requesting union representation during the coaching session Merchant
required.
After Wright filed her Second Amended Complaint, Union Pacific
moved to dismiss Wright’s suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court granted
Union Pacific’s motion. The court dismissed Wright’s Title VII claim for
failure to state a claim, holding that Wright did not show a causal connection
between her termination and her earlier lawsuit and internal complaint. The
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court also dismissed Wright’s RLA claim for lack of jurisdiction and,
alternatively, for failure to state a claim, reasoning that arbitration was the
exclusive remedy instead. The court similarly dismissed Wright’s TLC
claim for failure to state a claim.
Wright now appeals. She contends that she plausibly alleged
causation to support her Title VII retaliation claim, properly brought her
RLA retaliation claim in federal court, and plausibly alleged retaliation under
TLC §§ 101.001 and 101.301. We review each of these contentions in turn.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review both dismissals for failure to state a claim and dismissals
for lack of jurisdiction de novo. Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509
F.3d 697, 701–02 (5th Cir. 2007); Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158,
161 (5th Cir. 2001). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id.DISCUSSION
A.
First, Wright asserts that Union Pacific violated Title VII by
terminating her in retaliation for her 2016 lawsuit and her 2018 internal EEO
complaint. To establish Title VII retaliation, Wright must show that 1) she
engaged in protected activity, 2) she suffered an adverse employment action,
and 3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse
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employment action. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.
1996).
Finding “no evidence . . . that Merchant retaliated against Wright
after she complained,” the district court dismissed Wright’s Title VII claim
because she failed to show causation. But a plaintiff does “not have to submit
evidence to establish a prima facie case . . . at [the pleading] stage.” Chhim
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Raj v. La.
State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[A] plaintiff need not make
out a prima facie case . . . to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.”). Rather, Wright only needed “plausibly [to] allege
facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim to survive a motion to
dismiss.” Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir.
2019) (vacating Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of a Title VII claim, despite lack of
evidence, because plaintiffs plausibly alleged disparate treatment). Thus, the
district court erred to the extent it required Wright to substantiate her Title
VII retaliation claim with evidence at the pleading stage.
Beyond that, the parties dispute whether Wright plausibly alleged the
ultimate element of causation. To do so, Wright had to plead facts permitting
a reasonable inference that Union Pacific terminated her because of her 2016
lawsuit or her 2018 internal EEO complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. First,
Union Pacific contends that Wright’s 2016 lawsuit was too remote to have
caused retaliation. We agree.
By Wright’s own account, Merchant knew about the claims
underlying Wright’s 2016 lawsuit in April 2016. Yet Wright was not
suspended until July 2018, or terminated until August 2018, more than two
years later. Even given Merchant’s awareness of Wright’s 2016 lawsuit, this
two-year lapse is indeed too remote to permit a reasonable inference of
causation. See Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001)
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(holding that an adverse action taken twenty months after employer became
aware of protected activity “suggests, by itself, no causality at all”); Leal v.
McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of retaliation
claim because “a three-year lapse, at best, between the protected activity and
the adverse employment action is too attenuated temporally to state a claim
for relief, even if [plaintiff’s supervisor] was aware of the activity”).
But Wright’s 2018 internal complaint is a different matter. That call
to Union Pacific’s EEO line is fairly contemporaneous with Union Pacific’s
adverse actions. Merchant suspended Wright just one business day after
Wright complained internally. And about a month later, Union Pacific
terminated Wright. This close timing permits an inference of causation. See,
e.g., Outley v. Luke & Assocs., Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding
that “the close timing between [plaintiff’s] protected activity and the denial
of a raise—about two months—is sufficient to show causal connection”).
Union Pacific counters that Wright did not allege that Merchant or
any other decision-maker knew about the 2018 internal EEO complaint when
the adverse employment actions were taken. “We have determined that, in
order to establish the causation prong of a retaliation claim, the employee
should demonstrate that the employer knew about the employee’s protected
activity.” Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 883 (5th Cir.
2003) (citing Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2001);
Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. Facility Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d 164, 168 (5th Cir.
1999)). Quite logically, “[i]f an employer is unaware of an employee’s
protected conduct at the time of the adverse employment action, the
employer plainly could not have retaliated against the employee based on that
conduct.” Chaney, 179 F.3d at 168. At the pleading stage, this means that
Wright was required to allege facts permitting at least an inference of her
employer’s knowledge of her protected conduct in order to establish the
required causal link between her conduct and the alleged retaliation. See
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Manning, 332 F.3d at 883 & n.6; Chaney, 179 F.3d at 168. We conclude that
Wright sufficiently alleged such facts.
According to Wright’s complaint, Merchant initially agreed to coach
her with union representation present. But after Wright complained
internally, Merchant suspended her for refusing to undergo coaching without
union representation. Then, when union representatives scheduled a
coaching session with Wright and Merchant, Merchant did not show. This
alleged change in Merchant’s behavior, coupled with the close timing of the
adverse actions taken by Union Pacific, permits an inference that Merchant
knew about Wright’s 2018 internal EEO complaint. Cf. Robinson v. Jackson
State Univ., 714 F. App’x 354, 361 (5th Cir. 2017) (“All the categories of
evidence outlined above [including] temporal proximity [and] . . . changed
decisionmaker behavior following complaints, . . . are among the prototypical
circumstantial indicators of decisionmaker knowledge (and of causation in a
broader sense).”). At least at the pleading stage, Wright plausibly alleged a
causal link between her 2018 internal EEO complaint and her subsequent
suspension and termination. We therefore reverse the district court’s Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal of Wright’s Title VII claim and remand for further
proceedings.
B.
Next, Wright contends that Union Pacific violated the RLA by
terminating her in retaliation for her requests for union representation. See
45 U.S.C. § 152, Third and Fourth. The provisions enumerated in RLA
§ 152 protect “employees’ freedom to organize and to make choice of their
representatives” without company interference or pressure. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 440 (1989)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, RLA claims are
classed as either “major” disputes, which fall within district courts’ narrow
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jurisdiction, or “minor” disputes, which are subject to binding arbitration.
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 302–04 (1989)
(“Conrail”). Concluding that arbitration was the proper remedy here, the
district court dismissed Wright’s RLA claim for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim. We agree that
dismissal was warranted.
Federal jurisdiction over an RLA claim turns on whether the dispute
is categorized as “major” or “minor.” Id. “Major” disputes concern “the
formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them . . . . They look
to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to
have vested in the past.” Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723
(1945). “Minor” disputes “contemplate[] the existence of a collective
agreement already concluded.” Id. They relate “to the meaning or proper
application of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation.”
Id. In other words, “the claim is to rights accrued, not merely to have new
ones created for the future.” Id.In major disputes, “district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to
enjoin a violation of the status quo pending completion of the required
procedures, without the customary showing of irreparable injury.” Conrail,
491 U.S. at 303. By contrast, district courts do not have jurisdiction over
minor disputes, which are “subject to compulsory and binding arbitration
before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, [45 U.S.C. § 153], or before
an adjustment board established by the employer and the unions representing
the employees.” Id. “[I]f there is any doubt as to whether a dispute is major
or minor a court will construe the dispute to be minor.” BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Int’l Ass’n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail & Transp. Workers – Transp. Div., 973 F.3d
326, 335 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
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Union Pacific bears a “relatively light burden . . . in establishing
exclusive arbitral jurisdiction under the RLA.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307.
Wright’s RLA claim is a minor dispute if her termination was “arguably
justified by the terms of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement.” Id.Wright contends that her RLA retaliation claim is not a minor dispute
because it is independent of the governing collective-bargaining agreement
(the “CBA”). But this assertion fails because Wright’s claim rests upon the
CBA’s implied terms. Wright alleges that Union Pacific previously provided
union representation during coaching sessions but then terminated her for
requesting such representation for her latest coaching session. Union
Pacific’s past practices regarding union representation involve the CBA’s
implied terms. See Conrail, 491 U.S. at 311. As a result, Wright’s RLA claim
is a minor dispute subject to arbitration. See Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen (Div.
of TCU) v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 894 F.2d 1463, 1469 (5th Cir.
1990) (finding that “claims based on implied terms—specifically, the past
practices of the parties . . .—do have some arguable basis sufficient
to render this a minor dispute”).
Fairly clearly, Union Pacific meets its “relatively light burden” here.
Wright is not negotiating a new collective agreement for the future. Instead,
Wright asserts that Union Pacific previously provided her, and other
employees, union representation during coaching and discipline. That is,
Wright alleges that Union Pacific violated a right that had “vested in the
past.” Burley, 325 U.S. at 723. It follows that Wright’s RLA claim is a minor
dispute and subject to the RLA’s exclusive and compulsory arbitration
provisions.
Moreover, Wright sued only Union Pacific. Her RLA claim is thus
not bound up with a claim against her union. See Trial v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 896 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that “[a]n
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exception to the exclusive [arbitral] jurisdiction of the [National Railroad
Adjustment] Board exists, however, when the employee has not only a
dispute with the employer . . . but also a claim against the union”). This
further demonstrates that Wright’s RLA claim is a minor dispute subject to
arbitration. The district court properly dismissed Wright’s RLA claim for
lack of jurisdiction.
Finally, Wright contends that Union Pacific violated TLC §§ 101.001
and 101.301 by terminating her in retaliation for her requests for union
representation. But “[t]he RLA’s arbitral remedy is mandatory and
exclusive for minor disputes. State law claims that involve these disputes
are pre-empted.” Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 594 (5th Cir.
1993) (citations omitted). Wright’s TLC claim is identical to her RLA claim.
Thus, the RLA preempts Wright’s TLC claim. And the district court
therefore properly dismissed it.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal
of Wright’s Title VII retaliation claim and REMAND for further
proceedings. We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Wright’s
remaining claims.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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