United States v. Winans ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 19-30356     Document: 00515772580         Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/09/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 9, 2021
    No. 19-30356                          Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                             Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Dwayne Winans, Jr.; Bryson Tuesno,
    Defendants—Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:16-CR-175-1
    Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Following a jury trial, Defendant-Appellant Dwayne Winans, Jr., was
    convicted of two counts of bank robbery, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2113
    (a),
    two counts of carjacking, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2119
    , and four counts of
    brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-30356        Document: 00515772580        Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/09/2021
    No. 19-30356
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c). He was sentenced to 360 months of
    imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release.
    Codefendant-Appellant Bryson Tuesno was convicted of two counts of
    armed robbery and two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation
    to a crime of violence and was sentenced to 180 months and one day of
    imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. They
    both appeal.
    As his sole issue on appeal, Winans contends that the district court
    erred in denying his motion to dismiss his indictment, alleging a violation of
    his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. Although Winans’s indictment issued
    44 days after his arrest, 15 of those days were excludable, 10 for his transfer
    from another district, see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3161
    (h)(1)(F), and five for the pendency
    of the Government’s pretrial motion for detention, filed on Wednesday,
    August 24, 2016, and heard on Monday, August 29, 2016.                     See
    § 3161(h)(1)(D); United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 
    621 F.3d 354
    , 368-69
    (5th Cir. 2010).
    Winans here renews his assertion that the delay in holding a hearing
    on the Government’s pretrial motion for detention violated the Bail Reform
    Act and, pursuant to that act, the Government was entitled to no more than
    three excludable days, including weekends. His argument is not well-taken.
    His reliance on United States v. Tinklenberg, 
    563 U.S. 647
     (2011), is
    misplaced: That case did not involve the specified delays under the Bail
    Reform Act. That statute requires that weekends and legal holidays be
    excluded from the relevant three-day period, see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3142
    (f)(2), so
    the district court correctly determined that there was no violation of the Bail
    Reform Act. Only 29 countable days of the speedy trial clock had lapsed at
    the time his indictment issued, so Winans fails to show a violation of the
    Speedy Trial Act. The district court did not err in denying his motion to
    dismiss the indictment.
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    No. 19-30356
    Tuesno contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his
    convictions; specifically, that there was insufficient evidence to establish his
    identity as one of the two bank robbers. He complains about the lack of direct
    forensic or eyewitness evidence linking him to the crime scenes, but his
    complaint is without merit. See United States v. Royals, 
    777 F.2d 1089
    , 1091
    (5th Cir. 1985). When the circumstantial evidence is viewed in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution, it was sufficient for reasonable jurors to find that
    Tuesno was one of the two men who attempted to rob the Regions Bank and
    who robbed the Gulf Coast Bank on August 15, 2016. See Jackson v. Virginia,
    
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); United States v. Percel, 
    553 F.3d 903
    , 910 (5th Cir.
    2008); United States v. Williams, 
    264 F.3d 561
    , 576 (5th Cir. 2001).
    Tuesno also contends that the Government impermissibly called
    Gabriel as a hostile witness to impeach her with her prior statements to Agent
    Plummer. Tuesno urges that, because the Government knew Gabriel would
    be hostile, its attempt to impeach her with her otherwise inadmissible hearsay
    statements to Agent Plummer amounts to reversible error. He relies on
    United States v. Hogan, 
    763 F.2d 697
    , 702 (5th Cir.), opinion withdrawn in part
    on other grounds, 
    771 F.2d 82
     (5th Cir. 1985).
    True, the Government “may not call a witness it knows to be hostile
    for the primary purpose of eliciting otherwise inadmissible impeachment
    testimony.” United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 
    517 F.3d 751
    , 760 (5th Cir.
    2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, absent
    “something in the record to ground a finding that the Government’s
    ‘primary purpose’ in calling [the witness] was to elicit otherwise
    impermissible evidence through impeachment,” we will not find error. 
    Id.
    Tuesno also asserts that the Government knew Gabriel would be
    hostile and announced to the jury at the outset that it was calling Gabriel as
    a hostile witness, intending to treat her as such. However, that assertion is
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    No. 19-30356
    belied by the record, which, as the district court found, shows that the
    Government called Gabriel with the expectation that she would testify
    consistently with her prior statements.           The instant case is thus
    distinguishable from Hogan.      See 763 F.2d at 702.      Moreover, despite
    Gabriel’s memory problems, the Government was able to confirm through
    her testimony that she had purchased the Chevrolet Monte Carlo in question
    jointly with Tuesno and that the car was registered in both of their names.
    There is thus no support in the record for the contention that the
    Government’s “primary purpose” in calling Gabriel was to impeach her. See
    Cisneros-Gutierrez, 
    517 F.3d at 760
    .
    The claim also fails because the district court found Agent Plummer’s
    testimony about Gabriel’s prior statements to be otherwise admissible under
    FED. R. EVID. 803(2) and FED. R. EVID. 801(d). See Cisneros-Gutierrez,
    
    517 F.3d at 760
    . Tuesno conclusionally states that this was error, but he briefs
    no argument and cites no authority in support and has thus abandoned any
    challenge to those rulings. See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th
    Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748
    (5th Cir. 1987); Beasley v. McCotter, 
    798 F.2d 116
    , 118 (5th Cir. 1986).
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgments are
    AFFIRMED.
    4