Williams v. GTE Communication ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-10120
Summary Calendar
ARTHUR WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
G.T.E. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:98-CV-2720)
July 10, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Arthur Williams appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of GTE Communications Systems with respect to
Williams’s claim of retaliatory termination. Williams failed to
file a timely notice of appeal of the judgment but did timely
appeal the district court’s denial of Williams’s post-judgment
motions for reconsideration. Consequently, we lack jurisdiction
over this appeal except for the limited purpose of determining
whether the district court abused its discretion in denying those
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
motions. See Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d
465, 470 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1005 (1999).
GTE Communications Systems d/b/a GTE Supply fired Williams on
July 16, 1998, after Williams allegedly destroyed an entire day’s
shipping information which was used for the tracking of purchases
by GTE Supply’s customers. Williams claims that his termination
was in retaliation for filing racial discrimination claims with the
EEOC.
The trial court found that Williams failed to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation because he offered no evidence
other than his subjective belief that the relevant decisionmakers
had knowledge of the EEOC charges when he was terminated. Thus,
Williams failed to establish a causal connection between his
protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Chaney
v. New Orleans Public Facility Management, Inc., 179 F.3d 164, 168
(5th Cir. 1999); Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d
398, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1999).
Alternatively, the trial court found that GTE Supply
terminated Williams only after an investigation of complaints by
other employees who reported that Williams had intentionally erased
the shipping information from a computer disk. Because Williams
presented no evidence that GTE Supply’s reason for termination was
pretextual, summary judgment was proper on this basis as well. See
Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 408; Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119
F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1997).
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On appeal, Williams presents no arguments related to the
merits of his case but argues only that the district court should
have asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Personal
jurisdiction, however, was asserted over the defendant and in fact
has never been challenged by the defendant. Because Williams
failed to raise any substantive issue regarding the dismissal of
his retaliation claim, such issues may be deemed waived. See
Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.2d 233, 238 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998).
Even assuming that Williams preserved any error relating to
the merits of his case, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Williams’s motions for reconsideration.
Williams’s basis for reconsideration was the claim that he had
“discovered new evidence not available at summary judgment.”
Williams argued that the relevant decisionmakers knew Williams
previously filed an EEOC claim at the time of his termination
because a third party mentioned that fact in their presence.
Williams further argued that his termination was a pretext for
discrimination because GTE Supply had a backup copy of the shipping
information which he allegedly erased, implying there was no reason
to fire him for destroying the other copy since the information was
not lost. The district court denied the motions for reconsideration
because Williams failed to explain why this new evidence was
previously unavailable to him and because the new evidence was
insufficient to establish that GTE Supply’s explanation for the
termination was a pretext for discrimination or to establish a
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causal connection between Williams’s protected activity and the
adverse employment action.
Federal Rule of Procedure 60(b) allows a district court to
relieve a party from a final judgment based on newly discovered
evidence which could not have been timely discovered by due
diligence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Williams’s motions because Williams provided no explanation
for why this information was unavailable to him previously.
Furthermore, the mere fact that an employer keeps a backup of vital
information does not suggest that terminating an employee for
intentionally destroying the primary copy of that information is a
pretext for retaliatory discrimination.
AFFIRMED.
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