Moody v. LeBlanc ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-31170
LAMON LAMAR MOODY, IV
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JAMES M LEBLANC,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(98-CV-337)
June 30, 2000
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JOLLY, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Lamon Lamar Moody was convicted in Louisiana state court for
attempted first-degree murder. Moody seeks federal habeas relief
claiming an error in jury instructions, ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to object to the jury instructions, and the
improper admission of a hearsay statement.
Moody was charged with attempting with a friend, Brady
Lockhart, to kill several people in an apartment after an argument;
Moody’s defense was that, although he was with Lockhart at the
time, he only fired his gun into the air and did not intend to hurt
anyone. Following Moody’s conviction after a jury trial, he
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
appealed in state court, which affirmed the judgment. He sought
and was denied state post-conviction relief. Moody then filed his
federal petition, which was denied. Moody received a COA from this
court on the issues he appeals today.
A flawed jury instruction violates due process if it relieves
the state of having to prove each element of the offense.1
Louisiana law requires that for first-degree murder or its attempt,
the jury must find that the offender has specific intent to kill or
to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person.2 A jury
instruction must make clear that intent must be proved as to the
particular defendant.3
Moody contends that the jury instruction in his case did not
require a finding that Moody had specific intent to kill but rather
suggested that if the jury found that if a co-conspirator had the
intent to kill, that intent could be inferred to Moody. Although
the trial court’s instruction as to specific intent did not make it
clear that Moody, not Lockhart, must have had the requisite intent,
the court’s other comments made it clear that intent must be proved
as to Moody. Any error in the instructions thus did not rise to
the level of a federal constitutional deficiency.
Moody’s claim of ineffective assistance turns on the merits of
his jury instruction contention. As we find no cognizable error in
1
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520 (1979).
2
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:30; State v. Holmes, 388 So.2d 722,
726 (La. 1980).
3
Flowers v. Blackburn, 779 F.2d 1115, 1117, 1121-22 (5th Cir.
1986).
2
the instruction, the failure to object to the instruction does not
amount to ineffective assistance.
Moody correctly contends that a hearsay statement was admitted
into evidence against him. Even assuming that Moody did not waive
this argument during his state appeals, however, we find no error
cognizable as a federal habeas claim, where an evidentiary error
must be a “crucial, critical, or highly significant factor in the
context of the entire trial.”4 The relevant statement did not
contradict Moody’s own testimony that he shot into the air, not at
the apartment. Although the statement suggested that Moody knew
that Lockhart said he would shoot someone, common sense would
indicate that Moody must have thought of that possibility when they
took loaded guns from their friend’s home and returned to the scene
of the initial altercation. The hearsay statement was thus not a
highly significant factor in the context of the entire trial.
AFFIRMED.
4
See Thomas v. Lynaugh, 812 F.2d 225, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1987).
3