United States v. Ramirez ( 2000 )


Menu:
  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 99-40860
    _____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    MODESTO RAMIREZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ---------------------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. L-98-CR-620-3
    October 31, 2000
    Before REAVLEY, BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Modesto Ramirez appeals his conviction on one count of
    conspiracy to possess in excess of 1000 kilograms of marijuana
    with intent to distribute in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    ,
    841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A), and on one count of possession with
    intent to distribute 416 pounds of marijuana in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    .
    Ramirez argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his
    conviction on either count.   We disagree and AFFIRM his
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    conviction.
    This Court reviews a claim of insufficient evidence to
    determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
    the evidence proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt.     Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80, 
    62 S.Ct. 457
     (1942); United States v. Ramirez, 
    145 F.3d 345
    , 350
    (5th Cir. 1998).    The evidence, both direct and circumstantial,
    and all inferences reasonably drawn from it, is viewed in the
    light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.     United States v.
    Resio-Trejo, 
    45 F.3d 907
    , 910 (5th Cir. 1995).
    To prove a drug conspiracy, the Government must establish
    “1) the existence of an agreement between two or more persons to
    violate federal narcotics laws; 2) the defendant’s knowledge of
    the agreement; and 3) the defendant’s voluntary participation in
    the agreement.”     United States v. Gonzales, 
    79 F.3d 413
    , 423 (5th
    Cir. 1996).   The Government produced ample evidence, through the
    testimony of Osvaldo Serrano Martinez and Georgi Kirilov, of a
    conspiracy to distribute illegal narcotics.     Each testified that
    they had transported drugs for Roberto Ramirez and Frank
    Hernandez, two charged conspirators.     Martinez further testified
    to conversations regarding drug shipments that he overheard while
    working construction at the home of charged conspirator Jose
    Ramirez.
    Mere presence or association with conspirators alone will
    not support an inference of participation in the conspiracy,
    2
    United States v. Maltos, 
    985 F.2d 743
    , 746 (5th Cir. 1992), there
    must be some further evidence from which the jury could infer the
    defendant’s knowledge and participation.    
    Id. at 748
    .   In this
    case, Esmeraldo Guerra testified that Ramirez, during a
    conversation with other truck drivers following the arrest of
    Georgi Kirilov, had stated that “they had set up Georgi . . .
    [and] something else had gone through.”    The government then
    called Agent Butler to impeach Guerra’s testimony that the
    remarks were merely idle conversation, or gossip, between
    drivers.   Regardless of the context in which the statements were
    made, they are consistent with the government’s theory at trial
    that the conspirators would “set up” an individual transporting a
    relatively small load of marijuana, so a larger load could pass
    through undetected.    It would not have been unreasonable for the
    jury to infer that the statements described by Guerra evinced
    Ramirez’s involvement in and knowledge of the conspiracy.
    Count Three of the indictment charged that Jose and Modesto
    Ramirez, “aiding and abetting each other,” possessed with intent
    to distribute 416 pounds of marijuana.    On September 14, 1993,
    outside the home of Juan Gerardo Sanchez, police seized a
    tractor-trailer containing seven duffel bags filled with
    marijuana.    Sanchez had been hired to drive the trailer to
    California.    The government presented significant circumstantial
    evidence placing Modesto at the scene when the marijuana was
    loaded into the trailer.    First, Modesto had delivered the
    3
    trailer to Sanchez’s home.   After which, a witness reported
    seeing several men in a white Cadillac and a white El Camino
    loading something into the trailer.    A later government witness
    testified to seeing Modesto driving a white El Camino on several
    occasions.   Modesto’s brother-in-law, Valentine Espinoza, owned a
    white Cadillac.   Espinoza’s wife, Modesto’s sister, testified
    that on the night in question Valentine and Modesto were supposed
    to be together.   Modesto also turned in a false log book showing
    that he was supposedly between Eloy, Arizona and Buckeye, Arizona
    on the night the loading took place.   Fuel records, however,
    showed that he was in fact in Laredo, Texas.   This false
    assertion is probative of Modesto’s guilty knowledge.    See United
    States v. Meyer, 
    733 F.2d 362
    , 363 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that
    “[f]alse exculpatory statements may be used . . . as substantive
    evidence tending to prove guilt”).    The evidence is sufficient to
    show Modesto’s constructive possession of the marijuana, see
    United States v. Jones, 
    133 F.3d 358
    , 362 (5th Cir. 1998), and
    the large quantity of marijuana involved in this case is
    sufficient to establish the intent to distribute.    United States
    v. Sanchez, 
    961 F.2d 1169
    , 1176 (5th Cir. 1992).    We, therefore,
    AFFIRM the conviction in its entirety.1
    1
    Believing the evidence is insufficient to support Ramirez’s
    conspiracy conviction, Judge Dennis would reverse the conviction
    under Count 2 of the indictment.    As to the substantive count,
    Judge Dennis joins the opinion of the Court.
    4