Granier v. Hooper ( 2023 )

Case: 22-30240 Document: 00516690572 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/27/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 22-30240 March 27, 2023
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Justin Granier,
Petitioner—Appellant,
versus
Tim Hooper, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary,
Respondent—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:18-CV-901
Before Clement, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Justin Granier petitions for habeas relief from his state conviction of
second-degree murder. But he cannot meet the strictures of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
I.
A Louisiana grand jury charged Granier with murdering Luke Villar,
a DeLaune’s Supermarket employee, while Villar was cleaning the store
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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parking lot. Granier pleaded not guilty. At trial, both sides agreed to empanel
Juror Gladys Mobley (“Juror Mobley”) without objection. The Louisiana
jury found Granier guilty of second-degree murder. Granier was sentenced
to life imprisonment, without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
Granier appealed. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed. The
Louisiana Supreme Court denied review. Granier did not petition for
certiorari.
After his conviction became final, Granier filed an application for
post-conviction relief in Louisiana state court. The trial court denied all
claims. The Louisiana Court of Appeal and Louisiana Supreme Court denied
his writ applications.
Granier filed a second petition for post-conviction relief in state court,
raising his claim of juror bias for the first time. Specifically, he argued that
Juror Mobley knew and failed to disclose during voir dire that her son, Sam
Mobley, was interviewed as part of the murder investigation.
The trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing. Upon learning that
Juror Mobley died before the hearing, Granier filed a motion to submit an
investigator’s hearsay affidavit. The trial court admitted the hearsay
evidence. The Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed, and the Louisiana
Supreme Court denied Granier’s writ application.
On remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Sam
Mobley and Granier’s trial counsel, Wade Petite, testified. Upon Granier’s
motion, the trial court ordered the State to disclose any information related
to the search of Sam Mobley’s residence. The State produced Sam Mobley’s
application for employment at DeLaune’s Supermarket as well as detective
notes documenting Sam Mobley’s interview, Juror Mobley’s relationship to
Sam, and Juror Mobley’s address.
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Granier then filed a supplemental memorandum, adding a Fifth
Amendment prosecutorial misconduct claim for failure to disclose Juror
Mobley’s connection to the case. The State filed multiple motions to dismiss.
The trial court rejected all the State’s motions. The Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed. It stated:
Defendant’s complaint regarding the seating of the now-
deceased juror fails to allege a claim which, if established,
would entitle him to relief. La.C.Cr.P. art 928. See also Burton
v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A party who
seeks a new trial because of non-disclosure by a juror during
voir dire must show actual bias, either by express admission or
proof of specific facts showing a close connection to the
circumstances at hand that bias must be presumed.”). In
addition, defendant has failed to show the state withheld
material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
ROA.4176.
Subsequently, Granier filed a petition for federal habeas review under
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The magistrate judge concluded that, absent factual findings on
whether Granier could prove his allegations, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
decision was “contrary to clearly established federal law.” ROA.1010. The
magistrate judge therefore ordered a federal evidentiary hearing. After the
hearing, however, the magistrate judge agreed with the State and
recommended the court deny the claims on the merits. The district court
agreed but granted Granier a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on his
juror bias and prosecutorial misconduct claims.
II.
Our review is highly deferential to the state court’s decision.
AEDPA’s relitigation bar applies to both of Granier’s claims because the
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state courts adjudicated them on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under
the relitigation bar, we are authorized to grant habeas relief only if there “is
no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision
conflicts with [the United States Supreme] Court’s precedents.” Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). We can only review the state court record
in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Shoop v. Twyford, 142 S. Ct. 2037,
2043 (2022); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). These standards
doom Granier’s claims for both (A) juror bias and (B) prosecutorial
misconduct.
A.
We first address Granier’s juror bias claim. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees the right to an impartial jury. See U.S. Const. amend. VI;
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 377 (2010). “On federal habeas review,
state court findings concerning a juror’s impartiality are factual
determinations entitled to a presumption of correctness.” Buckner v. Davis,
945 F.3d 906, 910 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036
(1984) (finding that a question of juror bias “is plainly one of historical fact”);
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 386 (emphasizing, on direct review of a federal
conviction and hence without the added strictures of AEDPA, that reviewing
courts must resist “second-guessing the trial judge’s estimation of a juror’s
impartiality”).
To bring a claim of bias, Granier “must first demonstrate that a juror
failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further
show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge
for cause.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556
(1984). Granier must first point to a clear voir dire question that Juror Mobley
failed to answer truthfully. See Hatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 602 (5th
Cir. 2009). Then Granier must show that Juror Mobley lied. See id.4
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Specifically, Granier must show that—on the record before the state court—
Juror Mobley knew about her son’s connection to the case and lied, not
merely that she provided an inaccurate or incomplete answer. See id.Allegations based on “subjective,” “vague and ambiguous” questions are
insufficient. Id. Then of course, even assuming he could show that Juror
Mobley was unconstitutionally biased, Granier would also have to show that
the Louisiana state court’s contrary determination was not only wrong but
was so wrong that it contravened AEDPA’s relitigation bar. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d).
Granier cannot come close to meeting these standards. He does not
identify any voir dire question that Juror Mobley failed to answer honestly.
Nor can he state a claim—much less overcome the relitigation bar—by
arguing that Juror Mobley failed to disclose her knowledge. The record
before the state court—which is all that matters for the relitigation bar, see 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)—contained only Sam Mobley’s testimony, Wade
Petite’s testimony, and the police notes. Taken together, they don’t prove
that Juror Mobley failed to disclose anything.
Granier also argues that we should imply Juror Mobley’s bias. This
implied-bias claim faces two insurmountable hurdles. First, Granier
concedes that he cannot meet the McDonough Power Equipment framework.
And second, it’s impossible for Granier to show that the state court
contravened “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States” if he cannot point to a relevant holding from the
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (holding that “clearly established Federal law” in
§ 2254(d)(1) “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s
decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision” (emphasis
added)); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (same). But Granier can
point to no such holding. The best he can muster is Justice O’Connor’s
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concurrence in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), and Justice Brennan’s
concurrence in McDonough Power Equipment. But concurrences do not create
clearly established law. See Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Accordingly, we
cannot rely on these authorities, and Granier’s bias claims fail.
B.
Granier also brings a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, alleging that
the State violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process when it withheld
information about Juror Mobley and failed to correct her during voir dire.
The success of this claim depends on his juror bias claim. Because his juror
bias claim fails, his prosecutorial misconduct one does too.
III.
Finally, even if Granier could satisfy AEDPA’s rigid threshold
requirements, he still cannot show that “law and justice require” his release.
28 U.S.C. § 2243. That’s because “law and justice do not compel issuance
of the writ in the absence of factual innocence,” and Granier has never
claimed to be factually innocent. Crawford v. Cain, 55 F.4th 981, 993–94 (5th
Cir. 2022).
AFFIRMED.
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