United States v. Williams ( 2021 )

Case: 19-60251 Document: 00515808493 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/05/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 5, 2021
No. 19-60251 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Akida Williams,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:19-CV-30
Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Akida Williams, federal prisoner # 75251-097, appeals the district
court’s transfer of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to this
court, arguing that the district court erred in characterizing it as an
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 19-60251 Document: 00515808493 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/05/2021
No. 19-60251
unauthorized successive motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.
The district court’s transfer order is an appealable collateral order
over which we have jurisdiction. See United States v. Fulton, 780 F.3d 683,
688 (5th Cir. 2015); 28 U.S.C. § 1631; 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). We review
de novo whether the district court properly construed Williams’s purported
Rule 60(b) filing as a successive § 2255 motion. In re Coleman, 768 F.3d 367,
371 (5th Cir. 2014). As an initial matter, we deny the Government’s motion
to dismiss the appeal as barred by Williams’s plea agreement waiver of appeal
and collateral review because the Government did not seek to raise it—and
the district court did not sua sponte enforce it—in any of Williams’s
postconviction proceedings. See United States v. Del Toro-Alejandre, 489 F.3d
721, 722-24 (5th Cir. 2007).
While Williams’s Rule 60(b) motion purportedly challenged the
integrity of his habeas proceedings, it explicitly sought vacatur of his sentence
rather than to reopen his § 2255 proceedings. However, Rule 60(b) is not a
proper vehicle for challenging a criminal judgment; rather, challenges to a
criminal judgment are properly brought under § 2255. See United States v.
Mosavi, 138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (5th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, because
Williams’s Rule 60(b) motion sought substantive relief on the basis of claims
unsuccessfully raised in prior § 2255 motions, the district court properly
construed it as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion. See Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005). Because Williams had not obtained prior
authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, the district court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain it. See United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th
Cir. 2000).
Williams further argues that the district court did not warn him,
pursuant to Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003), that it intended to
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Case: 19-60251 Document: 00515808493 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/05/2021
No. 19-60251
recharacterize his Rule 60(b) motion as a successive § 2255 motion.
However, Castro only applies to first § 2255 motions, not second or
successive § 2255 motions. See Castro, 540 U.S. at 383. In this case, the
district court recharacterized Williams’s Rule 60(b) motion as a second or
successive § 2255 motion, not an initial § 2255 motion.
We, therefore, DENY the Government’s motion to dismiss and
AFFIRM the district court’s order transferring the § 2255 motion to this
court under § 1631.
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