Cantu v. Carr ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-10441     Document: 00515809616         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/06/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 6, 2021
    No. 20-10441                    Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                       Clerk
    Blanca Estella Cantu,
    Petitioner—Appellant,
    versus
    Michael Carr, Warden,
    Respondent—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:20-CV-67
    Before Jolly, Elrod, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Blanca Estella Cantu, federal prisoner # 14220-078, was convicted of
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, resulting in serious
    bodily injury from the use of the heroin, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    . She
    appeals the district court’s denial of her 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     petition, arguing
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-10441        Document: 00515809616          Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/06/2021
    No. 20-10441
    that she is entitled to relief under Burrage v. United States, 
    571 U.S. 204
    (2014). We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its
    factual findings for clear error. Padilla v. United States, 
    416 F.3d 424
    , 425
    (5th Cir. 2005).
    The primary vehicle for collateral attacks on a federal conviction or
    sentence is 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 
    243 F.3d 893
    , 900–01 (5th Cir. 2001). However, under the savings clause of § 2255(e),
    a federal prisoner may assert a collateral challenge in a § 2241 petition if the
    remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
    of his detention.” Id. at 901 (quoting 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    (e)). It is the
    prisoner’s burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of § 2255, and that burden
    “is a stringent one.” Christopher v. Miles, 
    342 F.3d 378
    , 382 (5th Cir. 2003).
    A prisoner shows the § 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective if “(1) the
    petition raises a claim ‘that is based on a retroactively applicable Supreme
    Court decision’; (2) the claim was previously ‘foreclosed by circuit law at the
    time when [it] should have been raised in petitioner’s trial, appeal, or first
    § 2255 motion’; and (3) that retroactively applicable decision establishes that
    ‘the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent offense.’” Garland
    v. Roy, 
    615 F.3d 391
    , 394 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Reyes-Requena, 
    243 F.3d at 904
    ).
    Cantu fails to satisfy the third prong of this test. As Burrage explained,
    its holding reflects the “ordinary meaning” of the phrase “results from” in
    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(C). Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210. Cantu has not shown,
    and the record does not suggest, that this phrase was used and understood in
    her case in any but its ordinary, Burrage-approved sense. As for the argument
    that her plea agreement and guilty plea are now void because she would have
    assessed the risks of going to trial differently in view of Burrage, the district
    court was correct that it is unavailing. See Brady v. United States, 
    397 U.S. 742
    , 757 (1970); Morse v. Texas, 
    691 F.2d 770
    , 773 (5th Cir. 1982) (“A formal
    2
    Case: 20-10441      Document: 00515809616           Page: 3    Date Filed: 04/06/2021
    No. 20-10441
    admission of guilt by a plea of guilty, if voluntarily made and with the effective
    assistance of counsel, cannot subsequently be invalidated on contentions that
    it was made through subjective fear of receiving a heavier penalty if convicted
    after trial . . . .”). Because Cantu has not met the requirements of the savings
    clause, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
    3