Brown v. Brown ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 19-60299     Document: 00515811111         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/07/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 7, 2021
    No. 19-60299                          Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                             Clerk
    Carl R. Brown,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    T. Brown; C. Trotter; C. Murtaugh; O. Elery; Mr.
    Denise, Supervisor,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:16-CV-830
    Before Clement, Higginson, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Carl R. Brown, former federal prisoner # 39138-044, appeals the
    dismissal of his suit against five federal prison employees for violating his
    Fifth Amendment right to equal protection by discriminating against him on
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-60299      Document: 00515811111            Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/07/2021
    No. 19-60299
    the basis of his religion, Hebrew Israelite, at his job in the prison. The district
    court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), concluding that Brown’s claim presented a
    new context for a claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
    Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971), and that special factors
    counseled against extending Bivens to imply a remedy for a prisoner’s
    employment discrimination claim against his federal jailers.
    Brown raises five issues on appeal. “We review a dismissal on the
    pleadings under Rules 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) de novo, accepting all well-
    pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the
    plaintiffs.” Haddock v. Tarrant Cnty., Texas, 
    986 F.3d 893
    , 897 (5th Cir.
    2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Stratta v. Roe, 
    961 F.3d 340
    , 349 (5th Cir. 2020).
    First, Brown argues that the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
    is unconstitutional because it permitted the district court to deny his claim
    for damages due to his lack of physical injury. Brown misunderstands the
    district court’s ruling. The district court did not “concede[]” that Brown
    stated a valid claim for relief, as he asserts; it concluded that he did not state
    a claim for relief under Bivens.
    It is this decision, the basis for the district court’s dismissal, that
    Brown challenges second. He argues that he stated a cognizable claim for
    relief based on the defendants’ violating his right to be free from
    discrimination based on his religion. However, the district court concluded
    that his case presented a Bivens claim in a new context, and it listed special
    factors, including the availability of the administrative remedy program, the
    limitations imposed by the PLRA, and Congress’s silence on prisoner
    employment claims and exclusion of religious discrimination claims under
    Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Because Brown does not challenge
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    No. 19-60299
    these conclusions, we consider these issues to be abandoned. See Yohey v.
    Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty.
    Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Brown also argues
    that he has a constitutionally protected interest in freedom from
    discrimination based on 
    28 C.F.R. § 551.90
    . However, Brown did not argue
    in the district court that he had a private right of action against the defendants
    based on § 551.90, and we will not address it now. Ball v. LeBlanc, 
    792 F.3d 584
    , 596 n.8 (5th Cir. 2015).
    Third, Brown complains that the district court did not allow him to
    amend his complaint to seek nominal or punitive damages. “Generally a
    district court errs in dismissing a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim
    under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.”
    Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores, 
    982 F.3d 395
    , 402 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted). “Although leave to amend should be
    freely give[n] ... when justice so requires, a district court may refuse leave to
    amend if the filing of the amended complaint would be futile, i.e., if the
    complaint as amended would be subject to dismissal.” Varela v. Gonzales,
    
    773 F.3d 704
    , 707 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). Because the district court determined that amendment would be
    futile, we review that decision de novo. 
    Id.
     We conclude that, as Brown did
    not state a claim for relief under Bivens, the district court did not err by
    concluding that amending his complaint to request different unavailable
    damages would have been futile. See 
    id.
    Fourth, Brown argues that the district court should have construed his
    complaint against the defendants in their individual capacities. The district
    court decided that, to the extent Brown intended to sue the defendants in
    their official capacities, the claims were barred by the doctrine of sovereign
    immunity. Then, it construed his claim against the defendants in their
    individual capacities and considered the questions instructed by the Supreme
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    No. 19-60299
    Court in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
    137 S. Ct. 1843
    , 1854 (2017), ultimately declining to
    extend Bivens relief to this novel context. Thus, this claim lacks merit.
    Last, Brown argues that the district court should have permitted him
    to subpoena the defendants and should have held an evidentiary hearing.
    However, a district court does not err by dismissing a complaint without
    permitting discovery if the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to suggest
    that discovery would reveal evidence in support of a viable claim. See Quinn
    v. Guerrero, 
    863 F.3d 353
    , 365 (5th Cir. 2017). Furthermore, there is no
    requirement that a district court conduct a hearing before dismissal. Alderson
    v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 
    848 F.3d 415
    , 423 n.10 (5th Cir. 2017). As the
    district court accepted Brown’s factual allegations and Brown has not
    explained how the lack of a hearing prevented him from adequately
    presenting his claim, any error in the district court’s failing to hold a hearing
    was harmless. See Brewster v. Dretke, 
    587 F.3d 764
    , 767 (5th Cir. 2009).
    In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    4