United States v. Shkambi ( 2021 )

Case: 20-40543 Document: 00515812344 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/07/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 20-40543 April 7, 2021
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Francesk Shkambi,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:09-CR-193-5
Before Ho, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge:
The question presented is whether the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s compassionate-release policy statement binds district courts
in considering prisoners’ motions under the First Step Act (“FSA”). The
district court said yes and dismissed Francesk Shkambi’s motion for lack of
jurisdiction. That was wrong for two reasons. First, the district court did have
jurisdiction. And second, the policy statement is inapplicable. We reverse
and remand.
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No. 20-40543
I.
On May 7, 2020, Shkambi submitted a request for compassionate
release to his warden at FCI Elkton. Shkambi cited his concerns over
COVID-19. The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) denied the request in a written
response dated May 11, 2020. With his administrative remedies thus
exhausted, Shkambi filed the same request for relief in the federal district
court. He filed it as a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
In his § 3582 motion, Shkambi referred to FCI Elkton as “a cauldron
of disease and death.” He reported that “[o]ne in four inmates at FCI Elkton
ha[s] been infected with COVID-19.” Shkambi said he was one such inmate.
After displaying symptoms in April of 2020, Shkambi was taken to the
hospital where he tested positive for the virus. Though Shkambi recovered,
he expressed fear of reinfection. Specifically, Shkambi expressed fear that
taking prednisone—his gout medication—would weaken his immune system
and increase his risk of reinfection.
The district court pointed to three provisions of § 3582, which
authorize a sentence reduction where: (1) “extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant such a reduction,” (2) “such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,” and
(3) such a reduction is appropriate “after considering the factors set forth in
section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court noted that Congress didn’t define
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” and instead delegated that authority
to the Sentencing Commission. And it found that Shkambi’s extraordinary-
and-compelling-reasons argument “fail[ed] because it [wa]s untethered to
the Sentencing Commission’s binding applicable policy statement in section
1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines.” The district court thus concluded that
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Shkambi could not meet the requirements of § 3582, and it dismissed his
motion for lack of jurisdiction.
II.
We start, as always, with jurisdiction. See Shrimpers & Fishermen of
RGV v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 968 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2020)
(Oldham, J., concurring) (“Article III jurisdiction is always first.”). But the
district court did the opposite. Only after concluding that Shkambi’s claim
failed on the merits did the district court address its jurisdiction. The district
court stated that “section 3582 provides a limited grant of jurisdiction for a
district court to modify a term of imprisonment,” and it reasoned that
“[b]ecause [the relevant] cases speak in terms of section 3582 as a whole, it
follows that section 3582(c)(1)(A), and the limitations within, circumscribe
the Court’s jurisdiction.” The district court said the “rule of finality,” which
forbids courts from “modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it has been
imposed,” justifies viewing this inquiry as jurisdictional. Having concluded
that an exception to the rule did not apply (on the merits), the district court
purported to dismiss the motion (rather than deny it).
The district court’s jurisdictional concerns were misplaced. Section
3582(b) provides that “a judgment of conviction that includes . . . a
sentence” generally constitutes “a final judgment.” Notwithstanding that
final judgment, however, § 3582(c) authorizes the BOP or a prisoner under
certain circumstances to file a post-judgment “motion” for modification of a
sentence. It is plain from the text of § 3582 that such a “motion” shall be
filed—as Shkambi’s was—in the same docket that contains the prisoner’s
final judgment. In that sense, a § 3582 motion is no different than a
postconviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The latter motion is filed and
denied in our district courts every day. And no one would ever say that an
unsuccessful § 2255 motion should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It’s
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just denied on the merits—just as Shkambi’s § 3582 motion should have
been.
The district court took the contrary view because § 3582 imposes
statutory limits on sentence modifications. It’s true that § 3582 does not
authorize a district court to modify a sentence based on caprice or unbridled
discretion. It’s also irrelevant. All sorts of federal statutes impose legal limits
on district courts. (Again, § 2255 is a good example; it sharply limits the
circumstances for granting postconviction relief.) But not all legal limits are
jurisdictional ones. See Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848
(2019).
The district court plainly had jurisdiction over Shkambi’s § 3582
motion: Shkambi properly filed it in a court that had the power to grant it.
Then the district court exercised that jurisdiction by considering the merits
of Shkambi’s request. The district court got to the end and found Shkambi’s
motion meritless. But that does not mean the district court suddenly lost the
jurisdiction it previously exercised; it just means that Shkambi’s motion
failed on the merits. Cf. 14AA Charles Alan Wright et al.,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 3702.4, at 476–79 (4th ed. 2011)
(noting that, when a plaintiff in a diversity suit loses on the merits, that does
not mean the amount in controversy goes to zero and requires dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction).
III.
We turn then to the merits of Shkambi’s § 3582 motion. We begin
with the framework of compassionate release in federal courts. Then we turn
to the relevant FSA amendment and the quandary giving rise to our question
presented.
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A.
Compassionate release is not a new remedy. It dates back at least to
the Parole Reorganization Act of 1976. The Parole Act provided: “At any
time upon motion of the Bureau of Prisons, the court may reduce any
minimum term to the time the defendant has served.” 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g)
(repealed 1987). The capaciousness of that text authorized the BOP to
request (and district courts to grant) reductions for a wide range of reasons.
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act. In that act,
“Congress abolished federal parole and forbade the federal courts from
‘modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.’” United
States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1103–04 (6th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original)
(quoting Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, ch. 2, § 212(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1998
(enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c))). But Congress retained an exception for
compassionate-release motions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (1984)
(providing that “the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, may reduce the term of imprisonment” under certain conditions).
That exception—like its Parole Act predecessor—“gave [the] BOP exclusive
power over all avenues of compassionate release.” United States v. Brooker,
976 F.3d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 2020).
In the first 34 years following enactment of the Sentencing Reform
Act, compassionate release required four things. First, it required a motion
from the BOP; without the BOP’s request, the prisoner could not obtain
relief. Second, it required one of two conditions now listed in
§ 3582(c)(1)(A); the one relevant to our appeal is “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Third, it required the
sentence reduction to be “consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission.” And fourth, it required the district
court to exercise its discretion to grant the BOP’s motion after considering
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the applicable sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See, e.g., United
States v. Lightfoot, 724 F.3d 593, 596–99 (5th Cir. 2013).
The second of these requirements was notoriously thorny. Congress
never defined or provided examples of “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” that might warrant a reduction. Instead, it delegated that authority
to the Sentencing Commission. The Sentencing Reform Act instructed the
Commission to “promulgat[e] general policy statements regarding the
sentencing modification provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A)” that “describe
what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for
sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific
examples.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). It provided just one restriction:
“Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an
extraordinary and compelling reason.” Ibid.The third requirement—consistency with the Commission’s policy
statements—was illusory. That’s because it took the Commission 22 years
to issue any policy statements under § 3582(c)(1)(A). And even after the
Commission issued its first policy statement in 2006, it was “little more than
an unenlightening repetition” that “parroted” the statute’s language. Jones,
980 F.3d at 1104. Like the statute, the policy statement said a court could
reduce a prisoner’s sentence “[u]pon motion of the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. And like the statute, the policy statement
provided that a court could do so if “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant the reduction” without defining “extraordinary and compelling
reasons.” Ibid. The only part of § 1B1.13 that did not come from § 3582 was
the Commission’s commentary. Application note 1 of the commentary
articulated four categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that
could warrant a sentence reduction: (A) medical conditions of the defendant;
(B) age of the defendant; (C) family circumstances; and (D) other reasons.
Id. cmt. n.1.
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B.
In December of 2018, President Trump signed the FSA into law. The
FSA made many changes to the United States Code, but it made only one
change to the compassionate-release framework in § 3582. See Brooker, 976
F.3d at 230.
Before the FSA amendment, the relevant provision of § 3582 read:
“[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, may
reduce [a prisoner’s] term of imprisonment . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
(2012). The FSA amended that text to read:
[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has
fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the
Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the
lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of
the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce [a
prisoner’s] term of imprisonment . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018) (italics indicating amendment). That
change was obviously very important. It eliminated the first of the pre-FSA
requirements for a § 3582 motion—namely, a motion by the BOP. For the
first time, prisoners like Shkambi could move on their own accord.
But the FSA left undisturbed the other three § 3582 requirements.
Prisoners like Shkambi still must show “extraordinary reasons”; they still
must show that compassionate release is consistent with applicable policy
statements from the Commission; and they still must convince the district
judge to exercise discretion to grant the motion after considering the
§ 3553(a) factors. And all of this is made more complicated by the fact that
the Commission—which took 22 years to adopt its first policy statement
under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)—has not yet adopted a new statement to
implement the FSA.
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The district court nevertheless thought itself bound by the old pre-
FSA policy statement that appears in § 1B1.13. That was error for three
reasons.
First, the text of § 1B1.13 says it only applies to “motion[s] of the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. That makes sense
because in 2006 (when the Sentencing Commission issued the policy
statement) and in November of 2018 (when the Commission last amended
it), the BOP had exclusive authority to move for a sentence reduction. See
Brooker, 976 F.3d at 231. When Congress enacted the FSA in December of
2018, it gave prisoners authority to file their own motions for compassionate
release; but it did not strip the BOP of authority to continue filing such
motions on behalf of its inmates. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (providing
that a court may grant compassionate release “upon motion of the Director
of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant”). So the policy
statement continues to govern where it says it governs—on the “motion of
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. But it does not
govern here—on the newly authorized motion of a prisoner.
Second, the text of the commentary confirms the limited applicability
of § 1B1.13. Application note 4 of the commentary makes clear that a
“reduction under this policy statement may be granted only upon a motion by
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.4 (emphasis
added). That note expressly limits the policy statement’s applicability to
motions filed by the BOP.
Third, the district court cannot rely on pieces of text in an otherwise
inapplicable policy statement. See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 282
(4th Cir. 2020) (refusing to “do some quick judicial surgery on § 1B1.13 . . .
[and] assume that what remains . . . applies to defendant-filed as well as BOP-
filed motions”). It’s true that application note 1 defines “extraordinary and
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compelling reasons” by articulating four categories of reasons that could
warrant a sentence reduction. But this “text may not be divorced from
context.” United States v. Graves, 908 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 356 (2013)); see also
Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012) (“The words of a
governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their
context, is what the text means.”). And the context of the policy statement
shows that it applies only to motions filed by the BOP. Just as the district
court cannot rely on a money-laundering guideline in a murder case, it cannot
rely on the BOP-specific policy statement when considering a non-BOP
§ 3582 motion.
For these reasons, we conclude that neither the policy statement nor
the commentary to it binds a district court addressing a prisoner’s own
motion under § 3582. The district court on remand is bound only by
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and, as always, the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). In
reaching this conclusion, we align with every circuit court to have addressed
the issue. See United States v. McGee, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL 1168980, at *12
(10th Cir. Mar. 29, 2021); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th
Cir. 2020); McCoy, 981 F.3d at 284; Jones, 980 F.3d at 1111; Brooker, 976 F.3d
at 234.
The district court’s order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction is
REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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