Hamilton v. Grooms ( 2021 )

Case: 20-30484 Document: 00515815973 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/09/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 9, 2021
No. 20-30484
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
David J. Hamilton,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Melvin Grooms, Master Sergeant at Camp C; Shannon
DeMarrs, Individually and in his official capacity, Assistant Warden at
Camp C; Unknown Barnett, Health Authority/Social Worker at Camp
C; Adam Hayes, Lieutenant Colonel; Luke Rheams, Colonel at Camp
C; Jeff Franklin, Major at Camp C,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:19-CV-486
Before Dennis, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-30484 Document: 00515815973 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/09/2021
No. 20-30484
David J. Hamilton, Louisiana prisoner # 108298, has moved for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. The district court found that Hamilton did not
exhaust his administrative remedies and granted summary judgment to the
defendants whom Hamilton successfully identified. The district court
further dismissed the claims against Unknown Barnett based on Hamilton’s
failure to exhaust. Also, the district court denied various motions.
By seeking leave to proceed IFP in this court, Hamilton is contesting
the district court’s denial of leave to proceed IFP and its certification that his
appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th
Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into an appellant’s good faith “is limited to whether
the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not
frivolous).” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Hamilton states that he wishes to challenge whether he exhausted his
administrative remedies and whether the district court appropriately denied
various motions. However, he offers only conclusory contentions and does
not meaningfully set forth his claims or significantly address the reasoning for
the district court’s disposition of his complaint and motions. His claims do
not substantively contest the certification decision. See Brinkmann v. Dallas
County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Fed.
R. App. P. 28(a)(8).
Even if Hamilton’s arguments could be liberally construed to contend
that the district court’s grant of summary judgment was improper because he
was excused from the exhaustion requirement, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972), he has not shown that there is a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the exhaustion issue, see Wilson v. Epps, 776 F.3d 296, 299, 302 (5th
Cir. 2015). The record, including his admissions in his complaint, supports
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Case: 20-30484 Document: 00515815973 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/09/2021
No. 20-30484
that he did not complete the administrative grievance process before he filed
his § 1983 complaint and instead pursued only the first step of the process.
The exhaustion requirement was not abrogated by the “backlogging” of his
first-step grievance or the rejecting of his grievances for noncompliance with
applicable procedural rules. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006);
Wilson, 776 F.3d at 301. Even if his first step grievance was not processed or
reviewed in accordance with the deadlines prescribed by the “backlogging”
policy, his failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not excused because
he did not pursue the remedy process to its end. See Wilson, 776 F.3d at 301.
Thus, Hamilton has failed to show that there is a nonfrivolous issue
on appeal. See Howard, 707 F.2d at 220. The district court therefore did not
err in deciding that his appeal was not taken in good faith. See id. at 219-20.
His request to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as
frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a “strike” under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763-64 (2015).
Hamilton is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be
able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated
or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious
physical injury. See § 1915(g).
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