United States v. Liggins ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 19-40413      Document: 00515822221         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/14/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 14, 2021
    No. 19-40413                              Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                                 Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Clovis Shantez Liggins,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:15-CV-763
    Before Barksdale, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Clovis Shantez Liggins, federal prisoner # 16490-078, was convicted
    of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, or possess, with intent to distribute,
    five kilograms or more of cocaine, 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-40413      Document: 00515822221          Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/14/2021
    No. 19-40413
    cocaine), and 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a), 846. He was sentenced to, inter alia, life imprisonment.
    During Liggins’ criminal proceedings, the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act
    (FSA) was enacted. The FSA, inter alia, increased the quantity of crack
    cocaine necessary to impose the enhanced sentencing provisions of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)(iii) from 50 grams or more to 280 grams or more.
    Notwithstanding the FSA’s enactment, Liggins’ amended indictment
    alleged a conspiracy involving, inter alia, 50 grams or more of crack cocaine.
    Importantly, the jury’s special verdict also attributed to him 50 grams or
    more of crack cocaine.
    The presentence investigation report (PSR) determined Liggins was
    responsible for 1285.6 grams of crack cocaine and, according to the 2010
    version of the statute, he was subject to a mandatory life sentence because of
    his two prior felony drug convictions. See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A) (2010).
    At sentencing, the district court noted that, under the FSA’s amendments,
    50 grams of crack cocaine would not mandate a life sentence. See 
    id.
     The
    court, however, reasoned it was not bound by the jury’s drug-quantity
    determination because the jury found Liggins responsible for 50 grams or
    more of crack cocaine. The court then relied on the PSR, along with evidence
    presented at trial, to find Liggins responsible for 280 grams or more of crack
    cocaine. Consequently, the court imposed a mandatory life sentence under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A).
    Pursuant to a certificate of appealability granted by our court, Liggins,
    proceeding pro se, contests the district court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    motion. He contends: the court engaged in improper factfinding that
    increased his minimum statutory sentencing range in violation of Alleyne v.
    United States, 
    570 U.S. 99
     (2013), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000); and his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
    2
    Case: 19-40413      Document: 00515822221           Page: 3     Date Filed: 04/14/2021
    No. 19-40413
    (IAC) by failing to challenge the court’s factfinding at sentencing. Liggins
    asserts he should have been sentenced pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B),
    under which he would have faced a statutory sentencing range of 120 months
    to life. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B) (2010) (stating an offense involving 28
    grams or more of crack cocaine results in a statutory range of 120-months’
    imprisonment to life for a defendant with a prior felony drug conviction).
    Regarding § 2255 motions, we review the district court’s factual
    findings for clear error; its legal conclusions, de novo. United States v. Cavitt,
    
    550 F.3d 430
    , 435 (5th Cir. 2008). To succeed on an IAC claim, defendant
    must show counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and, as a result,
    defendant was prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687
    (1984).
    The Government concedes the court engaged in improper factfinding
    that increased Liggins’ mandatory minimum sentence. Under Alleyne, “facts
    that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury”.
    In that regard, our court has explained a court may not disregard a jury’s
    drug-quantity finding as it pertains to a mandatory minimum sentence. See
    United States v. Akins, 
    746 F.3d 590
    , 612 (5th Cir. 2014) (“We agree with
    [defendant] that the sentencing judge was in error insofar as he looked to a
    crack cocaine calculation that was in excess of the jury’s finding and that
    would trigger a higher sentence than the quantity found by the jury”.). In
    addition, the Government acknowledges: in the light of Akins, appellate
    counsel rendered deficient performance by failing on appeal to challenge the
    judicial factfinding; and Liggins suffered prejudice because of the error.
    VACATED; REMANDED for resentencing.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-40413

Filed Date: 4/14/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/15/2021