Baires-Lemos v. Garland ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 19-60767      Document: 00515821800         Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/14/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 14, 2021
    No. 19-60767                           Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                              Clerk
    Berta Alicia Baires-Lemos,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A206 251 103
    Before Barksdale, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Petitioner Berta Alicia Baires-Lemos, a native and citizen of
    El Salvador, first entered the United States illegally in 2013 and was removed.
    She reentered illegally in 2015 and applied for immigration relief. She has
    filed a petition seeking review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-60767       Document: 00515821800           Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/14/2021
    No. 19-60767
    affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for
    withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against
    Torture (CAT).
    Baires claims the BIA’s decision upholding the IJ’s denial of relief was
    erroneous because the IJ failed to ask her to articulate her proposed social
    group. She further asserts the BIA erred in upholding the IJ’s finding that
    the threats she experienced in El Salvador did not rise to the level of
    persecution.     Finally, she claims the BIA erred in upholding the IJ’s
    conclusion that she had failed to prove it was more likely than not she would
    be tortured if returned to El Salvador.
    “When the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without an opinion, as is the
    case here, the IJ’s decision is the final agency decision for purposes of judicial
    review on appeal.” Chen v. Gonzales, 
    470 F.3d 1131
    , 1134 (5th Cir. 2006).
    We review the immigration court’s factual findings for substantial evidence;
    its legal conclusions, de novo. Zhu v. Gonzales, 
    493 F.3d 588
    , 594 (5th Cir.
    2007).
    According to Baires, she fled El Salvador with her youngest son
    because the gangs would not “leave [her] alone and in peace”.                She
    explained: her adult daughter’s ex-boyfriend was the leader of a gang; and,
    after her daughter ended the relationship, he threatened to kill Baires and her
    youngest son.
    While the ex-boyfriend threatened Baires’ daughter many times via
    text messages, Baires only testified to isolated incidents of verbal harassment.
    She testified the ex-boyfriend had once confronted her on her way home from
    work and warned she should not “cross through” that part of town. Later,
    he stopped her in the street and asked her why she was prohibiting her
    daughter from seeing him. As the IJ noted, Baires was never physically
    harmed by the ex-boyfriend, and neither were any of her children. Indeed,
    2
    Case: 19-60767      Document: 00515821800          Page: 3   Date Filed: 04/14/2021
    No. 19-60767
    Baires’ daughter, who was subjected to most of the ex-boyfriend’s threats,
    continues to live in El Salvador and has not been harmed.
    Baires has proven, at most, she suffered two incidents of harassment
    unaccompanied by physical harm or a significant deprivation of liberty. See
    Eduard v. Ashcroft, 
    379 F.3d 182
    , 187 n.4 (5th Cir. 2004) (defining
    persecution as “an extreme concept” requiring “more than a few isolated
    incidents of verbal harassment” (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted)).    As such, the evidence does not compel reversing the IJ’s
    determination that Baires did not establish harm rising to the level of
    persecution warranting withholding of removal. See Chen, 
    470 F.3d at 1134
    .
    According to Baires, it was erroneous for the IJ not to ask her to
    identify a particular social group (PSG). She contends: the proposed social
    groups of gender and family were raised in her testimony; and the IJ erred in
    failing to consider and make factual findings on those groups.
    Before the BIA, Baires asserted she was a member of two PSGs:
    “people in fear of violence in El Salvador”; and “Salvadorian Women Seen
    as Vulnerable and Unprotected by [a] Criminal Gang Organization”. These
    proposed social groups differ, however, from the groups raised in Baires’
    petition for review. For example, she contends that, through her testimony
    before the IJ, she “may have articulated” various family and gender based
    social groups, such as “Salvadoran mother of young single female unable to
    leave relationship with male partner”.
    Because Baires did not raise these proposed social groups in her appeal
    to the BIA, or otherwise challenge the IJ’s purported error in failing to ask
    her to articulate a PSG, she has failed to exhaust her available remedies, and
    we lack jurisdiction to consider such claims. See Omari v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 314
    , 321 (5th Cir. 2009).
    3
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    No. 19-60767
    Finally, the IJ reasonably denied Baires’ request for protection under
    CAT. In seeking to establish one of the conditions that must be satisfied for
    such relief, although Baires testified she would be killed by her daughter’s ex-
    boyfriend and his gang if she returned to El Salvador, as noted supra, there is
    no evidence in the record she was ever physically harmed by the ex-boyfriend
    or his gang. Baires identified only a single instance where the ex-boyfriend
    possibly threatened her, when she was on her way home from work.
    Baires claims mental suffering can constitute the requisite torture
    under BIA precedent and the ex-boyfriend’s persistent text messages to her
    daughter threatening the family satisfy the definition of torture. As Baires
    acknowledges, however, to constitute torture, mental pain and suffering
    must be “prolonged mental harm” caused by conduct such as “threatened
    infliction of severe physical pain or suffering” or “[t]he threat of imminent
    death” or “[t]he threat that another person will imminently be subjected to
    death”. 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.18
    (a)(4). The ex-boyfriend’s conduct would not
    cause the sort of mental pain and suffering protected against by CAT.
    Baires’ testimony regarding the murder of her cousin by gang
    members likewise does not establish “it is more likely than not” she will be
    tortured if returned to El Salvador. Mwembie v. Gonzales, 
    443 F.3d 405
    , 415
    (5th Cir. 2006). As the IJ noted, while Baires speculated her daughter’s ex-
    boyfriend was involved in the murder, she admitted she did not know why
    her cousin was killed or who had killed him.
    DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.
    4