Taajwar Ali v. Rodney Sneed ( 2020 )

Case: 20-20229 Document: 00515656236 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/01/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 1, 2020
No. 20-20229
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Taajwar Ali,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Rodney Sneed,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:18-CV-25
Before Haynes, Willett, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Taajwar Ali, an educational aide at Harris County Department of
Education Academic Behavior School, brought a Fourth Amendment
excessive-force claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against Rodney Sneed, his co-
worker who is a contract sheriff’s deputy at the school. Sneed moved for
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-20229 Document: 00515656236 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/01/2020
No. 20-20229
summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. When ruling on Sneed’s
motion for summary judgment, the district court flagged, in a footnote, “the
possibility that Sneed was not acting under the color of state law when he
allegedly punched Ali.” The district court noted that “defendants appear to
have conceded the issue” of state action. 1 Although the district court did not
determine whether Ali had pleaded state action to maintain his § 1983 claim,
it nevertheless denied Sneed’s motion for summary judgment. Sneed timely
appealed.
We need not address the merits of Sneed’s appeal because the district
court did not first determine whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction over
the case. See Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.
1980) (providing that state action “is required in order to invoke the district
court’s jurisdiction). “Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or
forfeited.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). Moreover, “[w]hen
a requirement,” such as state action, “goes to subject-matter jurisdiction,
courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that the parties have
disclaimed or have not presented.” Id. (citation omitted). Because the
district court did not determine whether the use of force was related to
Sneed’s state-granted authority, the district court did not fulfill its obligation
to determine if it had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly,
we REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to determine
if the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction.
1
However, the record reflects that Sneed did not concede the state action. In his
answer, Sneed “denies that he was acting within the scope of his employment at the time
of the alleged incident.”
2