Joe Lanier v. Bobby Lumpkin, Director ( 2020 )


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  • Case: 19-50975     Document: 00515656063          Page: 1     Date Filed: 12/01/2020
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 1, 2020
    No. 19-50975                   Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Joe Leon Lanier,
    Petitioner—Appellant,
    versus
    Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
    Correctional Institutions Division,
    Respondent—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:04-CV-8
    Before Willett, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Joe Leon Lanier, Texas prisoner # 866198, seeks leave to proceed in
    forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s order construing his
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion as an unauthorized
    successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application and transferring it to this court. In
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-50975      Document: 00515656063            Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/01/2020
    No. 19-50975
    his motion, Lanier alleged: (1) he was denied the assistance of counsel after
    his sentencing during the period for seeking a new trial; (2) his appellate
    counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (3) he was denied counsel during
    his state habeas proceeding to assist in raising a claim that his trial counsel
    rendered ineffective assistance.
    By moving to proceed IFP on appeal, Lanier is challenging the district
    court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v.
    Taylor, 
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997). To obtain IFP status, Lanier must
    show both financial eligibility and a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. See Carson
    v. Polley, 
    689 F.2d 562
    , 586 (5th Cir. 1982).
    Even if Lanier can satisfy the financial-eligibility requirement, he has
    not shown a nonfrivolous appellate issue. See
    id. Lanier contends that
    his
    Rule 60(b)(6) motion was not a successive § 2254 application because the
    motion alleged defects in the integrity of his first § 2254 proceeding. In
    particular, he contends that he was entitled to Rule 60(b)(6) relief in light of
    three Supreme Court cases that issued after the proceeding and were
    favorable to him: Buck v. Davis, 
    137 S. Ct. 759
    (2017); Trevino v. Thaler, 
    569 U.S. 413
    (2013); and Martinez v. Ryan, 
    566 U.S. 1
    (2012).
    Lanier’s case is distinguishable from these three decisions, given that
    his Rule 60(b)(6) motion did not seek to overcome a procedural default. See
    
    Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 767
    , 779-80; 
    Trevino, 569 U.S. at 417
    ; and 
    Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17
    . Further, we have held that neither Martinez nor Trevino have been
    made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. See Clark v. Davis,
    
    850 F.3d 770
    , 784 (5th Cir. 2017). Thus, 
    Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 779-80
    , is
    inapposite. Also, contrary to Lanier’s arguments, a motion filed in a habeas
    proceeding asserting that a change in the law is a reason justifying relief,
    although labeled a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, is in substance a successive habeas
    application. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 
    545 U.S. 524
    , 530, 531 (2005). Further,
    2
    Case: 19-50975      Document: 00515656063           Page: 3     Date Filed: 12/01/2020
    No. 19-50975
    Lanier concedes that his Rule 60(b)(6) motion presented claims that were
    unavailable to him when he filed his initial § 2254 petition. A motion
    presenting new claims is likewise a successive habeas application in
    substance. See
    id. at 531-32.
              For these reasons, the district court did not err in construing Lanier’s
    Rule 60(b)(6) motion as an unauthorized successive § 2254 application and
    transferring it to this court. See id.; United States v. Fulton, 
    780 F.3d 683
    , 686
    (5th Cir. 2015). We, therefore, need not consider Lanier’s challenge to the
    district court’s alternative timeliness ruling. See Hinojosa v. Horn, 
    896 F.3d 305
    , 310 n.2 (5th Cir. 2018)
    Accordingly, we DENY the motion to proceed IFP on appeal and
    DISMISS Lanier’s appeal as frivolous. See 
    Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202
    & n.24;
    5th Cir R. 42.2. Lanier is WARNED that future frivolous, repetitive, or
    otherwise abusive filings will invite the imposition of sanctions, which may
    include dismissal, monetary sanctions, and restrictions on his ability to file
    pleadings in this court and any court subject to this court’s jurisdiction.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-50975

Filed Date: 12/1/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/1/2020