In Re: Bruce Webster ( 2020 )

Case: 20-10530 Document: 00515656601 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/01/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 1, 2020
No. 20-10530
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
In re: Bruce Carneil Webster,
Movant.
Motion for an order authorizing the
United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas to consider
a successive 28 U.S.C. §2255 application
Before Willett, Ho, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Prisoner Bruce Carneil Webster moves this court for permission to file
a successive habeas petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2), arguing
that his conviction for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), is unconstitutional under United
States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). The felony offenses of kidnapping
resulting in death and conspiracy to commit kidnapping of which Webster
also was convicted were charged as predicates to his § 924(c) offense. 1
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
1
Webster received a sentence of death for his kidnapping offense, life
imprisonment for the conspiracy offense, and sixty months of imprisonment for the firearm
offense. On September 22, 2020, however, the Seventh Circuit affirmed an Indiana federal
Case: 20-10530 Document: 00515656601 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/01/2020
No. 20-10530
Section 924(c) defines a crime of violence in two alternative ways. Its
“residual clause” defines a crime of violence as a felony “that by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property
of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”
§ 924(c)(3)(B). Its “elements clause” defines a crime of violence as a felony
that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another.” § 924(c)(3)(A). Davis
declared the residual clause unconstitutionally vague but left the elements
clause intact.
Recently, in a matter involving Webster’s co-conspirator, Orlando
Hall, we held that kidnapping resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1202(a)(1), constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements
clause. See In re Hall, 979 F.3d 339, 343–47 (5th Cir. 2020). Given our
decision in In re Hall, Webster likewise fails to make the necessary prima facie
showing that his underlying claim relies “on a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). Accordingly,
Webster’s request for authorization to file a successive § 2255 petition is
DENIED.
district court’s vacatur of the death sentence based on a finding that Webster is
intellectually disabled and thus, under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002),
constitutionally ineligible for a death sentence. See Webster v. Watson, 975 F.3d 667 (7th
Cir. 2020).
2