Williams v. McDonough ( 2023 )

Case: 22-40281 Document: 00516697122 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/31/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-40281
FILED
March 31, 2023
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Melvin Earl Williams, Jr.,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
April Dawn McDonough; M. McGuire,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:17-CV-811
Before Jones, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Melvin Williams challenges the district court’s
dismissal of his § 1983 excessive force claims pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994). For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40281 Document: 00516697122 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/31/2023
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I.
On an evening in November 2015, Williams was spending time with
his girlfriend, Melanie Younkman, at her home. According to Williams, they
got into an argument, and he put his hands on Younkman’s neck. She left
and ran to the police station. Meanwhile, Williams—unaware where
Younkman had gone—went to the backyard to smoke a cigarette. Shortly
thereafter, Younkman and Officers McDonough and McGuire met at the
house so Younkman could retrieve some of her possessions. The Officers
and Younkman began talking in the driveway, prompting Williams to walk
back around the side of the house.
Officer McDonough’s body camera video depicts the subsequent
events. When the Officers saw Williams, they asked him several times to get
on the ground. Williams raised his hands and asked, “What have I done?”
but did not comply. Officer McGuire attempted to grab Williams’s right
hand, but Williams jerked it away and attempted to flee. A prolonged
physical struggle ensued, during which the Officers attempted,
unsuccessfully, to detain Williams. When Williams finally wriggled away,
Officer McGuire warned him that he was “about to get tased.” About forty
seconds later, Officer McGuire deployed her taser, striking Williams’s chest
and causing him to fall to the ground. Williams remained still for a few
seconds, then stood back up, said “here I go, baby,” and began running
towards the garage. This prompted Officer McGuire to deploy her taser
again, causing Williams to fall near the garage door. As Williams attempted
to stand up, Officer McGuire tased him a third time, and he fell back down.
When Williams began to pull himself up, it became apparent that one of the
taser prongs was attached to his left eye, and Officer McDonough radioed for
medical assistance. Williams then climbed to his feet and ran into the garage
as the Officers again commanded him to “get down.” When Williams
realized he couldn’t get into the house, he ran out and attempted to climb the
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fence leading to the backyard. This proved impossible, so he returned to the
garage. For the next several minutes, Williams repeatedly asked Younkman
to let him into the house, while the Officers continued to order him to lay on
the ground and submit to handcuffing. Finally, about ten minutes into the
encounter, Williams complied. Williams was transported by ambulance to
the hospital. As a result of the incident, he was treated for a fracture to his
nasal bone, a laceration to his eye, and an irregular heartbeat.
The Officers charged Williams with resisting arrest in violation of
Texas Penal Code § 38.03(a). 1 He entered a no contest plea and was
sentenced to one hundred days in county jail. A few months later, Williams
sued the Officers 2 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for using excessive force in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Officers moved for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. Following a hearing, the district
court sua sponte raised the issue of whether Williams’s claims were barred
by Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87, and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue.
Concluding that they were, the court granted the Officers’ motions and
dismissed the case. Williams timely appealed.
II.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Hixson Bros., Inc., 453 F.3d 283, 284 (5th Cir. 2003). Summary
judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
1
A person violates this statute if he “intentionally prevents or obstructs a person
he knows is a peace officer . . . from effecting an arrest . . . of the actor . . . by using force
against the peace officer or another.” Tex. Penal Code § 38.03(a).
2
Williams also brought separate claims against the City of Denton and Denton
County, but this appeal concerns only the claims against the Officers.
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movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem.
Co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th Cir. 2017).
III.
The district court entered summary judgment for the Officers because
it concluded that Williams’s § 1983 suit improperly challenges his conviction
for resisting arrest. In Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87, the Supreme Court
prohibited such “collateral attack[s]” in the interest of finality and
consistency. See generally Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87). Accordingly, a plaintiff may not bring a
§ 1983 suit if success on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a
prior criminal conviction. 3 Id. Rather, the plaintiff must challenge the
conviction directly. Id.
Determining whether an action is Heck-barred is “fact-intensive” and
requires the court to analyze whether success on the § 1983 claim “requires
negation of an element of the criminal offense or proof of a fact that is
inherently inconsistent with one underlying the criminal conviction.” Bush
v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008). In other words, if the conviction
and successful § 1983 claim can co-exist, Heck is no bar to suit. See Poole v.
City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 426–27 (5th Cir. 2021).
Williams contends that he can succeed on his excessive force claims
without undermining his resisting arrest conviction because each relies on
“temporally and conceptually distinct” factual allegations. See Bush, 513
F.3d at 498. Per Williams, the sole act of pulling his hand away when Officer
McGuire tried to handcuff him provided the basis for his conviction. His
3
The only exceptions—inapplicable here—are if the prior conviction has been
overturned, expunged, declared invalid by an authorized tribunal, or called into question
through issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
4
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excessive force claim, in turn, challenges the Officers’ subsequent conduct
after he ceased resisting arrest—including the Officers’ repeated use of the
taser. See id. (noting that “a claim that excessive force occurred after the
arrestee has ceased his or her resistance would not necessarily imply the
invalidity of a conviction for the earlier resistance”). In other words,
Williams (now) admits to resisting arrest at the beginning of the encounter.
But he claims that afterwards—when the Officers tased him—he was fully
compliant.
This argument—which relies on a flawed post hoc rationalization—
fails for several reasons. First, it is belied by the Officers’ probable cause
affidavit, which describes Williams’s conduct throughout the encounter.
Williams avers that the affidavit is no evidence of the factual basis of the
conviction. But that’s incorrect. The very purpose of a probable cause
affidavit is to describe the factual allegations justifying an arrest. See Franks
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978) (noting that a probable cause affidavit
“must set forth particular facts and circumstances underlying the existence
of probable cause”). Indeed, we have previously relied on similar types of
evidence to discern the factual allegations underlying a conviction. See, e.g.,
Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2020) (relying on prison
disciplinary reports to “understand the basis of the underlying conviction”);
Knox v. City of Gautier, No. 21-60259, 2021 WL 5815923, at *3–4 (5th Cir.
Dec. 7, 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished) (relying on the factual allegations
that supported the state circuit court’s affirmance of the plaintiff’s
conviction to discern whether his claim was Heck-barred). 4
4
Although Knox and related unpublished opinions cited herein “[are] not
controlling precedent,” they “may be [cited as] persuasive authority.” Ballard, 444 F.3d
at 401 n.7 (citing 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4).
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Second, even setting the probable cause affidavit aside, Williams’s
own allegations demonstrate that success on his § 1983 claim would
invalidate his conviction. Williams’s operative complaint doesn’t concede
that he resisted arrest at the beginning of the incident. Rather, it contends
that he “fully complied with the [Officers’] commands and did not attempt to
flee.” Since such assertions in pleadings are “conclusively binding,” see Davis
v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 823 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(quotation omitted) (emphasis in original), Williams cannot now argue on
appeal that he initially resisted arrest but later complied. See Aucoin, 958 F.3d
at 383 (noting that a plaintiff’s claim challenges his conviction where he
“maintain[s] his innocence in the events that led up to his [] conviction”).
Indeed, “[w]here a complaint describes a single violent encounter in which
the plaintiff claimed he was an innocent participant[,] but the allegations are
inconsistent with his conviction, Heck applies to bar his excessive-force
claims.” Ducksworth v. Rook, 647 F. App’x 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Finally, were there any remaining doubt, footage from Officer
McDonough’s clear body camera video conclusively establishes that the
Officers’ taser deployments were not “subsequent, discrete” events
independent from the Officers’ initial attempt to handcuff Williams. Aucoin,
958 F.3d at 384. Rather, as discussed, the video shows that Williams
persistently attempted to evade the Officers throughout the entire incident,
including after he was tased. 5 Though the Officers repeatedly asked Williams
5
Williams’s deposition testimony is largely consistent with this version of events,
and to the extent it’s not, the clear video is dispositive. See Curran v. Aleshire, 800 F.3d
656, 663–64 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Scott instructs that a plaintiff’s version of the facts should
not be accepted for purposes of qualified immunity when it is ‘blatantly contradicted’ and
‘utterly discredited’ by video recordings.” (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81)
(2007)).
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to get on the ground and submit to handcuffing from the moment they saw
him, Williams did not comply until he was cornered in the garage nearly ten
minutes later. Thus, it’s clear that Williams’s conviction and his claims arose
from “a single violent encounter.” Daigre v. City of Waveland, 549 F. App’x
283, 286 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Therefore, Williams’s § 1983 claims
constitute an impermissible collateral attack on his conviction under Heck,
512 U.S. at 486–87, and the district court properly entered summary
judgment for the Officers.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
7