Spears v. Louisiana College ( 2023 )

Case: 20-30522 Document: 00516703991 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/06/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 6, 2023
No. 20-30522
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Carolyn D. Spears,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Louisiana College,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 1:18-CV-387
Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Davis and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Carolyn Spears sued her former employer, Louisiana College (“LC”),
alleging: (i) age discrimination, (ii) sex discrimination, (iii) disability
discrimination, (iv) unlawful retaliation, (v) breach of contract and (vi)
defamation. The district court denied Spears’s motion for partial summary
judgment on her retaliation and breach of contract claims and granted
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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summary judgment in favor of LC on her age discrimination, sex
discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, breach of contract, and
defamation claims. We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of her age
discrimination, sex discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation
claims and otherwise AFFIRM.
I. Background
LC is a nonprofit corporation which operates as a private, co-
educational college of liberal arts and sciences. Carolyn Spears, born in 1941,
became a full-time member of LC’s faculty in the Department of Health and
Physical Education in 1977 and was tenured in 1984. On February 28, 2007,
she executed a “Retirement Plan Options” agreement, in which she
“elect[ed] to retire by July 31, 2007, and receive the benefits available to
current retirees.” Retiring by this date allowed Spears to freeze her benefits
and avoid future premium increases or other changes.
Notwithstanding her retirement, Spears continued to teach, executing
yearly contracts under the title of “Senior Professor.” These contracts
expressly stated that they were “subject to non-renewal.” However, the
parties disagree about whether executing this option affected Spears’s tenure
status. The contracts also incorporated by reference “all college policies . . .
set forth in the Faculty Handbook[.]” The Faculty Handbook, in turn,
includes a “Definition of Tenure” which states, in relevant part, that
“[t]enure is the reasonable expectation of continued employment by the
College[.]” In 2012, Spears was diagnosed with adenocarcinoma and
underwent a full hysterectomy and radiation treatment. Her cancer
reoccurred in 2014, and she underwent treatment through summer 2016. In
August 2016, although no longer in treatment at that point, Spears applied
for and received long-term disability and sick leave from LC. The parties
dispute whether Spears intended to return to teaching after this. Spears avers
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that she had no intention of retiring and that other members of LC’s faculty
and administrative team engaged in a harassment campaign against her to
induce her to retire as a result of her involvement in filing a “whistleblower”
complaint and Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC)
complaints against LC.
Shannon Tassin, the head of the Human Resources Department at
LC, testified that Spears verbally told Tassin that she was “not returning.”
But Spears denied that she ever told Tassin she would not come back. In an
email sent from Spears to Tassin on March 16, 2017, Spears stated her
recollection that, “I will be paid my full contract for this year. . . and then
start next year[’]s contract when I start back August 1,” and asked Tassin
whether that was correct. Tassin’s reply, sent almost two weeks later,
declined to either confirm or deny that Spears would resume working on
August 1.
Beginning in the 2017–18 academic year, LC reorganized its
Department of Health and Physical Education by moving it out of the School
of Education and putting it under the Department of Nursing/Allied
Healthcare. This resulted in Spears being “demoted” from her position as
Chair of the Health and Physical Education Department and having her
salary decreased by approximately $500 per month. Spears contends this was
part of the campaign by LC to induce her to retire and that she was replaced
in her administrative roles by a younger, male subordinate.
In early 2017, Spears received a letter from Dr. Richard Brewer, then
President of LC, informing her that LC was “mov[ing] in a different
direction” and would not be renewing her contract as a Senior Professor for
the 2017–18 school year. Although the letter was dated February 2, 2017,
Spears claims she did not actually receive it until April 20, 2017. The date is
significant because Spears filed an EEOC complaint against Brewer and
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Cheryl Clark, another member of the LC administration, on January 25, 2017.
LC received notice of this complaint “on or around March 17, 2017.”1
Spears avers that LC did not in fact send her the termination letter until after
it had received the EEOC complaint, and that this action thus constitutes
retaliation. Spears had also been previously involved in another EEOC
complaint against LC: she and Joe Aguillard, the former President of LC, had
drafted an EEOC complaint and a whistleblower complaint in 2015, which
were discovered and seized by LC via a private investigator. Aguillard was
subsequently terminated in March 2016.
Jason Tinsley and Sonia Tinsley, a younger couple, were hired by LC
and ultimately took over Spears’s classes and faculty duties. The parties
dispute whether the Tinsleys were hired to “replace” Spears. After Spears
was terminated, Spears’s sister, Charlotte McIntosh posted to an LC alumni
Facebook group complaining about this decision. Brewer responded in a post
which Spears avers constituted defamation.
Spears brought claims against LC for age, gender and disability
discrimination2 and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §623 (“ADEA”) and/or Title II of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. §1231, et seq. (“ADA”), as well as claims under Louisiana
state law for defamation and breach of her employment contract. LC moved
for summary judgment to dispose of all of Spears’s claims against it, and
Spears moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted
LC’s motion for summary judgment and denied Spears’s cross-motion for
1
The notice is dated March 9, 2017.
2
Spears also alleged religious discrimination below but does not appeal the district
court’s dismissal of that claim here.
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partial summary judgment, dismissing all of Spears’s claims on July 24th,
2020. Spears now appeals to this court.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard on appeal as was applied below. Tiblier v. Dlabal,
743 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“[T]his court construes ‘all facts and inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.’” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir.
2012) (quoting Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010)).
The summary judgment movant bears the burden of proving that no
genuine issue of material fact exists. Latimer v. SmithKline & French Labs.,
919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990). However, if the non-movant ultimately
bears the burden of proof at trial, the summary judgment movant need not
support its motion with evidence negating the non-movant’s case. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Rather, the summary judgment
movant may satisfy its burden by pointing to the mere absence of evidence
supporting the non-movant’s case. Id.Once the summary judgment movant has met this burden, the non-
movant must “go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). We must resolve factual controversies
regarding the existence of a genuine issue for trial in favor of the non-movant.
Id. But a factual dispute precludes summary judgment only if the evidence
presented by the nonmovant is sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact
to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). Unsupported, conclusory, or inadmissible evidence is
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insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.; Clark v. Am.’s
Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1997).
III. Discussion
A. Age Discrimination
The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1). “[L]iability depends on whether the protected trait actually
motivated the employer’s decision.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000). The individual’s age must have “actually
played a role in [the employer’s decision making] process and had a
determinative influence on the outcome.” Id. at 141. Therefore, the plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the “but-for”
cause of the challenged adverse employment action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009). This can be shown by direct or
circumstantial evidence. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141.
Where, as here, a plaintiff relies crucially on circumstantial evidence,
she must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that she (1)
was at least forty years old; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone younger or
treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employees. Smith v.
City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 196 (5th Cir. 2003). If the plaintiff makes
out this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to produce
evidence that the adverse action was taken for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason. Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 395
(5th Cir. 2002). If such a reason is produced, then the employee must
provide evidence to rebut the reasons given as pretext for discrimination. Id.6
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Here, the district court held that Spears had failed to even make a
prima facie case that she was replaced by someone younger, and thus that LC
was entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Spears argues that the
district court erred in finding that she had failed to present a prima facie case
that she was replaced by someone younger.
The district court found that Spears’s former courses had been spread
among several teachers at LC, concluding that such an action does not
constitute replacement. But Spears asserted that her classes were only
distributed this way during her sick leave. After her termination, she was
replaced in her chair position by Sonia Tinsley, and her classes were taken
over by Jason Tinsley. Additionally, Spears argues that the district court
erred at the outset in concluding that she was not “replaced” if her classes
were in fact spread out between different teachers. We agree. Employers
may not circumvent Title VII protections by “fractioning” an employee’s
job. See, e.g., Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir.
1997); Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 752 (6th Cir. 1992); Hardy v. Shell
Chem. Company, 693 F.Supp.2d 611, 620, n.25 (E.D. La. 2010). Spears has
made a prima facie case that she suffered age discrimination.
Thus, the burden shifts to LC to produce evidence that the adverse
action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Tyler v. Union
Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 395 (5th Cir. 2002). If such a reason is
produced, then the employee must provide evidence to rebut the reasons
given as pretext for discrimination. Id. Here, LC argues that Spears’s
contract was not renewed for the 2017-18 school year because she informed
the College that she would not be returning. But Spears asserts that she never
told anyone that she was not coming back. And as Spears points out, the fact
that she was “terminated” logically belies the argument that LC believed that
she was not returning. Emails between Spears and the Director of Human
Resources/Payroll at LC, which Spears introduced into the record, also
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indicate that Spears did in fact intend to come back. Taking this evidence in
the light most favorable to Spears, there is at minimum a genuine issue of fact
as to whether Spears told LC that she would not be returning. If she did not,
LC has failed to assert a plausible non-discriminatory reason for Spears’s
termination. The district court erred in dismissing this claim at the summary
judgment stage.
B. Sex Discrimination
To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII, a
plaintiff must show that (1) she was within the protected class; (2) she was
qualified for the position sought; (3) she was subject to an adverse
employment action; and (4) the position sought was filled with someone
outside the protected class. Blow v. City of San Antonio, 236 F.3d 293, 296
(5th Cir. 2001). Spears is a woman, was qualified for the position she held,
and was terminated. The district court nevertheless held that Spears failed
to make a prima facie case, accepting LC’s assertion that Spears was not
replaced because her duties had been distributed between a number of
employees. As discussed supra, we disagree. And while LC observes that
some of the employees who took over Spears’s duties were female, Jason
Tinsley, whom Spears asserts began teaching her classes after her
termination, was not. Spears has thus at least made a prima facie case of
gender discrimination.
LC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Spears is
that she said she would not return for the 2017–18 academic year. We have
explained above, however, that there are at least an issue of fact as to whether
this was mere pretext. The district court thus erred in dismissing Spears’s
sex discrimination claim at the summary judgment stage.
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C. Disability Discrimination
The ADA prohibits employers “from discriminating against a
‘qualified individual with a disability on the basis of that disability.’” Burton
v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. 798 F.3d 222, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688,
694 (5th Cir. 2014)). In a termination action under the ADA, the employee
may either present direct evidence that she was discriminated against
because of her disability or make a prima facie case of discrimination. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Direct evidence “is
evidence that if believed, proves the facts of discriminatory animus without
inference or presumption.” Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 310
n.6 (5th Cir. 2004). Absent direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must
make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing she (1) has a disability;
was regarded as disabled, or has a record of a disability; (2) was qualified for
the job; and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment decision on account
of her disability. Cannon v. Jacobs Field Services North America, Inc., 813 F.
3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 697). “If [s]he
makes that showing, a presumption of discrimination arises, and the
employer must ‘articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action.’” Id. at 590 (quoting EEOC v. Chevron Phillips
Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 2009)). “The burden then shifts to
the plaintiff to produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that the
employer’s articulated reason is pretextual.” Id. (citing Chevron Phillips
Chem. Co., 570 F3d. at 615).
As with Spears’s other discrimination claims, she has set forth a prima
facie case of disability discrimination. It is undisputed that Spears had cancer
and underwent treatment for cancer, that she was qualified for her job, and
that Brewer explicitly stated that her contract was not renewed “because she
was too ill to teach.” At the summary judgment stage, taken as true, these
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facts present evidence of disability discrimination which set forth a prima
facie case of disability discrimination. The burden thus shifts to LC to
produce evidence that the adverse action was taken for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason. Yet as explained above, a fact issue exists as to
whether LC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Spears—
that she informed LC she would not return—was pretext. Spears’s disability
discrimination claim should have been allowed to go forward as well.
D. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) she participated in a Title VII protected activity; (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action by her employer; and (3) there is a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing
Aryain v. Walmart Stores Tex., LP, 534 F.3d 473, 484 (5th Cir. 2008)). Spears
argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
LC on her retaliation claims, and in failing to grant summary judgment in her
favor.
There is no dispute as to the first two prongs: Spears participated in
Title VII protected activity in her filing of EEOC complaints, and she was
terminated. The district court held that Spears has established a prima facie
case of retaliation, reasoning that LC had not presented evidence that it
terminated Spears for a legitimate reason before learning of her EEOC
complaint, creating an issue of fact as to whether her termination letter may
have been backdated. Additionally, it is uncontested that LC knew about the
drafts of EEOC complaints which were seized in February 2016. Thus, it
found that Spears had established a prima facie argument that her termination
had a causal connection with her filing of these EEOC complaints.
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LC does not contest this holding, but argues that the district court was
correct in finding that LC carried its burden in demonstrating a legitimate,
non-retaliatory reason for her termination, and that Spears failed to show that
this reason was pretextual. We disagree. As discussed supra, there is at
minimum a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Spears told LC that
she did not intend to return to work after her medical leave. LC did not carry
its burden, and the district court erred in entering summary judgment on this
claim.
E. Breach of Contract
To state a breach of contract claim, Louisiana law requires a plaintiff
to show that “(1) the parties consented to be bound through offer and
acceptance; (2) the obligor failed to perform a conventional obligation; and
(3) the failure to perform resulted in damages to the obligee.” Crescent City
Surgical Centre v. Cigna Health and Life Ins. Co, No. 18-11385, 2020 WL
1503534 (E.D. La. March 30, 2020) (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 1927 & 1944
and Favrot v. Favrot, 2010-0986 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/9/2011); 68 So.3d 1099,
1108–09)). The plaintiff must also “allege a breach of a specific provision of
the contract.” Id.; Loque v. Allstate Ins. Co., 314 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2003).
Spears moved for partial summary judgment on her breach of contract
claim, contending that the non-renewal of her annual contracts violated her
tenure. The district court denied her motion on two grounds. First, the
district court held that Spears’s complaint did not assert a breach of contract
claim in the first place. Second, the court held that Spears failed to show that
there was no genuine dispute of fact as to whether she still had tenure when
she was terminated.
Initially, we disagree with the district court’s determination that
Spears did not adequately plead a claim for breach of contract. The district
court found that Spears failed to allege the elements of a breach of contract
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claim with “sufficient particularity” and “failed to identify in her Complaint
any specific contract provision LC allegedly breached.” But the basis of
Spears’s breach of contract claim is that she had tenure when she was
terminated, and therefore that she could be terminated only for cause.
Although LC and the district court are correct that Spears’s complaint does
not explicitly delineate a breach of contract claim, it is axiomatic that a
plaintiff must plead facts, not legal theories. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of
Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014). Spears’s complaint adequately alleges
facts stating the elements of a breach of contract claim. She alleged the
existence of a contract under which she, as a tenured teacher, could be
terminated only with cause, and alleged that she was terminated without
adequate cause or for pretextual reasons. Thus, the district court erred in
dismissing Spears’s breach of contract claim as failing to present a cause of
action for breach of contract.
However, we agree with the district court’s dismissal of the breach of
contract claim because LC did not breach the adjunct professor contract in
failing to renew it. Spears argues that LC breached the 2016-2017 adjunct
professor contract by failing to renew it.3 However, the contract that Spears
alleged LC breached expressly stated that it was (1) subject to nonrenewal,
(2) limited to the period of time specified in the contract, and (3) offered no
expectation of any future contracts.4 In contrast, the tenured faculty contract
3
Spears, however, does not dispute that LC paid her for the full term of the
contract.
4
While Spears presented an email from Aguillard, LC’s former president, in which
he told Spears to consider her tenure “ongoing” even after her retirement, such evidence
cannot be proffered to change the interpretation of the “clear and explicit” terms of the
adjunct professor contract, under which Spears was not entitled to continued employment
on a yearly basis. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046 (“When the words of a contract are clear
and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in
search of the parties’ intent.”).
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Spears previously executed—which expired in 2007—notably did not
include any language stating that it was subject to the same limitations as the
adjunct professor contract. While Spears is correct that the adjunct professor
contract incorporated the faculty handbook, the handbook merely defines
tenure as the “the reasonable expectation of continued employment by the
College on an annual contractual basis,” an expectation that the adjunct
professor contract explicitly disclaimed. Moreover, Spears herself conceded
that she understood that she was not guaranteed employment from year to
year under the adjunct professor contract. The district court thus properly
dismissed Spears’s claim for breach of contract because the adjunct professor
contract expressly disclaimed any expectation of continued employment, and
Spears has pointed to no other contract as forming the basis of her claim. We
affirm the district court’s dismissal of her breach of contract claim.
F. Defamation
Defamation requires proof of five elements in Louisiana law: (1)
defamatory words; (2) publication; (3) falsity; (4) actual or implied malice;
and (5) injury. See Carter v. Catfish Cabin, 316 So.2d 517, 521 (La. App. 2 Cir.
1975); Tate v. Bradley, 837 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1988). If facts sufficient
to establish even one element of the defamation tort are absent, a plaintiff’s
cause of action fails. See Costello v. Hardy, 2003-1146 (La. 1/21/04); 864 So.
2d 129, 139. Moore v. Cabaniss, 29,834 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/24/97); 699 So.2d
1143, 1146, writ denied, 97-2667 (La. 1/0/ 98); 705 So.2d 1108 (“failure of any
one of these elements of proof is fatal”). The question of whether a
communication is capable of a particular meaning and whether that meaning
is defamatory is a legal question for the court: it must determine “whether a
listener could have reasonably understood the communication, taken in
context, to have been intended in a defamatory sense.” Cooksey v. Stewart,
41,336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/23/06); 938 So.2d 1206, 1211, writ denied, 06-2348
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(La. 12/8/06); 943 So.2d 1087 (citing Sassone v. Elder, 626 So.2d 345, 352
(La. 1993)).
Spears argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of LC on her state law defamation claim. Spears asserted
a claim against LC for defamation based on a Facebook posting by Dr. Brewer
made in response to an online comment made by McIntosh, Spears’s sister,
that was critical of LC’s termination of Spears.
The district court held that the posting was not false or defamatory
and that there was “no evidence to suggest that LC made the post with
malice, actual or implied, or that it violated any confidentiality owed.” Spears
argues that this letter contained multiple false statements; in particular, that
1) she had retired from LC’s full time faculty in 2007; 2) she had served as a
contract adjunct senior professor which constituted only a year-to-year
engagement on an as-needed basis; and 3) that LC paid Spears “her full salary
for two years without her ever teaching a single student, although it was not
obligated to do so.” Spears argues that this is “defamatory because it
impliedly accused her of being a ‘gold-digger’ or ‘free-loader’ and held her
up to contempt and ridicule.” She also argues that the language is
defamatory per se. Id. The elements of injury and malice are presumed in
cases of per se defamation. See Bell v. Rogers, 29,757 (La. App. 2 Cir.
8/20/97); 698 So. 2d 749, 754.
We agree with the district court that the letter’s language is not
defamatory per se. “Words which expressly or implicitly accuse another of
criminal conduct or by their very nature tend to injure one’s personal or
professional reputation, even without considering extrinsic facts or
surrounding circumstances, are considered defamatory per se.” Costello v.
Hardy, 2003-1146 (La. 1/21/04); 864 So. 2d 129, 140. Spears argues that this
letter tends to damage her personal or professional reputation. On its face,
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the language in Brewer’s letter falls well short of language previously found
to be per se defamatory in Louisiana. See, e.g., Maggio v. Liztech Jewelry, 912
F. Supp. 216 (E.D. La. 1996) (per se defamatory to describe a competitor’s
merchandise designs to have been ‘purloined’); Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So.2d
355 (La. 1982) (false accusation of a lawyer’s lying to the court and
attempting to suborn a new judge defamatory per se); Garrett v. Kneass, 482
So.2d 876, 880 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986) (false accusation of threats on a political
candidate’s family defamatory per se); Goldsmith v. Unity Ind. Life Ins. & Sick
Benefit Ass’n, 128 So. 182 (La. App. Orleans Par. 1930) (imputing loathsome
disease or sexual misconduct is defamatory per se).
If the language was not defamatory per se, it may still be capable of
defamatory meaning. However, to prevail on such a claim Spears would then
need to show, inter alia, actual or implied malice. Malice, or fault, “is a lack
of reasonable belief in the truth of the statement giving rise to the
defamation.” Bussie v. Lowenthal, 535 So.2d 378, 381 (La. 1988). Yet the
district court found, “Spears’[s] only support for the assertion that the post
was made in bad faith is her personal belief and feelings, and uncorroborated
assertions are inadequate to support a defamation claim.” Spears thus fails
to “provide the quality or quantity of evidence to establish a prima facie case”
of defamation under Louisiana law. Esiverne v. Times Picayune, LLC, 950
So.2d 858 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2006); Roux v. Pflueger, 2009-0009 (La. App. 4
Cir. 7/8/09), 16 So. 3d 590, 596, writ denied, 2009-1799 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So.
3d 309 (rejecting “[p]laintiffs[’] use [of] their personal beliefs and feelings to
support their assertions that Defendants acted in alleged bad faith”).
We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
LC with respect to Spears’s defamation claim.
***
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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM IN PART; REVERSE IN
PART; and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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