Pinkston v. Management & Training ( 2023 )

Case: 22-60161 Document: 00516719456 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/20/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
April 20, 2023
No. 22-60161 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
____________
Chaz D. Pinkston,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Management & Training Corporation; Jody Bradley;
Gabriel Walker; Bessie McKnight; Tonya Toomey;
Terry Daniels; Justin Green; Delando Miles; Karen
Brown; Trinity, Food Service Contractor for W.C.C.F; Robyn
Williams; Delvittia Davis, Nutritional Supervisor,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 5:18-CV-103
______________________________
Before Jones, Stewart, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Chaz D. Pinkston, Mississippi prisoner # 148934, filed and was given
leave to amend a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against dozens of
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 22-60161
defendants concerning his treatment as a prisoner in the Wilkinson County
Correctional Facility (WCCF). The parties consented to proceed to
judgment before a Magistrate Judge (MJ). Over the more than three years in
which this matter was litigated, the MJ issued several orders addressing the
individual claims. Some of the claims were dismissed either as frivolous or
for failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Pinkston has not
challenged these dismissals. The remaining claims were all dismissed
pursuant to motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants. It is
these dismissals that Pinkston appeals. We review the grant of summary
judgment de novo and apply the same standard as the district court. Nickell
v. Beau View of Biloxi, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2011). We note that
Pinkston has not briefed and consequently abandoned all issues not expressly
discussed below. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).
The MJ granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
Pinkston’s claims of conditions of confinement, including being given
inadequate food and being housed in a cell that was not clean, because he
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for these claims. See Johnson v.
Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 515 (5th Cir. 2004). Exhaustion is an affirmative
defense, and defendants must establish “beyond peradventure all of the
essential elements of the defense of exhaustion to warrant summary
judgment in their favor.” Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010).
The exhaustion requirement is not excused if the prisoner’s grievances are
rejected for noncompliance with procedural rules; if an inmate disregards the
rules, he does not properly exhaust his claims. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 218 (2007). On appeal, Pinkston has not shown that his claims
concerning the conditions of his confinement were exhausted or that the
district court erred by dismissing them without prejudice. See Dillon, 596
F.3d at 266; Johnson, 385 F.3d at 522.
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Pinkston also challenges the dismissal with prejudice on summary
judgment of his claims of the excessive use of force, the denial of visitation
rights, and the denial of his First Amendment right to practice his religion.
The standard of review is the same as discussed above. See Nickell, 636 F.3d
at 754. To support summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Duffie v. United States, 600
F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 2010). All facts and reasonable inferences must be
construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and the court must
not weigh evidence or make credibility calls. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d
156, 163-64 (5th Cir. 2009).
In the context of claims of excessive force, the Supreme Court has
held that the “core judicial inquiry” is “whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). For visitation
rights, the court has held that “prisoners have no absolute constitutional
right to visitation,” but “[e]ven so, limitations of visitation may be imposed
only if they are necessary to meet legitimate penological objectives.” Lynott
v. Henderson, 610 F.2d 340, 342-43 (5th Cir. 1980). As to Pinkston’s religious
practice claim, “inmates retain their First Amendment right to exercise
religion; however, this right is subject to reasonable restrictions and
limitations necessitated by penological goals.” Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22,
25 (5th Cir. 1995) (footnotes omitted). A restriction “is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 89 (1987). To challenge the MJ’s grant of summary judgment on
these claims, Pinkston has produced nothing but conclusory allegations and
unsubstantiated assertions. This is not sufficient to show that the MJ erred
in granting summary judgment. See Duffie, 600 F.3d at 371.
Pinkston argues that the MJ erred in denying his requests for
appointment of counsel. We will not overturn a decision regarding
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appointment of counsel unless the appellant shows a “clear abuse of
discretion.” Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). As is apparent
from the extensive pleadings in this case, Pinkston was more than able to
conduct this litigation, and his case did not present extraordinary
circumstances warranting appointed counsel. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691
F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
In his brief on appeal, Pinkston seeks default judgments against several
defendants for failing to enter appearances in this proceeding. He has also
filed 14 motions for default judgment for the same reason. Default judgments
are not appropriate or authorized in appellate practice. Accordingly, the
motions are DENIED.
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