Topletz v. Skinner ( 2021 )

Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 30, 2021
No. 20-40136
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Steven K. Topletz,
Petitioner—Appellant,
versus
Jim Skinner,
Respondent—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-820
Before Dennis, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge:
Steven Topletz lost a civil case in Texas state court, and the victorious
plaintiff served him with a number of discovery requests aimed at uncovering
his assets and sources of income in order to collect on the judgment. Topletz
supplied many of the requested records, but he failed to produce documents
related to a family trust of which he is a beneficiary. The Texas state court
ordered production, but the trustee—Topletz’s brother—purportedly
refused to provide Topletz with several of the trust documents. Instead, the
trustee sent a letter to Topletz stating that the trust agreement allowed
Topletz only to inspect the documents, not to obtain copies of them, and that
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
it would thus breach the trustee’s fiduciary duty to supply Topletz with the
requested records.
The state court granted a motion for contempt and sanctions against
Topletz, finding that the trust agreement did in fact grant him the right to
obtain the requested documents and that they were thus under his control for
purposes of discovery. The court sentenced Topletz to detention for
fourteen days or “until [he] has fully purged himself of this contempt by
serving on [opposing counsel] full and/or proper responses and/or
documentation.”
After his attempts at overturning the decision in state court failed,
Topletz filed a habeas petition in federal district court, arguing that the
contempt order violated his constitutional right to due process by requiring
him to produce documents that he could not obtain. He requested a
preliminary injunction to allow him to remain free during the adjudication of
his petition. The district court denied Topletz the preliminary injunction
because it found that he was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his habeas
claim, and Topletz now appeals. Because we agree that Topletz has failed to
show a substantial likelihood that the state court’s decision was contrary to
clearly established Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable
interpretation of the facts in light of the evidence, we AFFIRM.
I. Background and Procedural History
A. The Original Proceeding
In 2015, the 416th District Court in Collin County, Texas, found
Appellant Steven Topletz liable to Lynda Willis and awarded Willis damages
of approximately $1.1 million. 1 A year later, Willis served a series of post-
1
Neither the record nor the parties’ briefing reveals the nature of the original civil
suit against Topletz. However, the case records on the Collin County website lists the
2
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
judgment discovery requests on Topletz, seeking to discover his assets and
sources of income. While the requests were pending, Willis passed away, and
an independent administrator, Raygan Wadle, was appointed to manage her
estate. In 2019, Wadle entered an appearance in the civil case and filed a
motion to compel production of the records Willis had requested.
Topletz produced many documents responsive to the requests, but he
failed to supply, inter alia, documents related to the Steven K. Topletz 2011
Family Trust, a trust fund of which he is a beneficiary. Topletz asserted that
a confidentiality agreement prevented him from producing the documents.
In an April 18, 2017 email exchange with opposing counsel, Topletz’s
lawyer at the time appeared to acknowledge that Topletz had access to at
least the trust’s tax returns 2 and the trust formation agreement and stated
that he would produce these if the court ordered it so long as it also entered
a protective order guarding against their disclosure:
As I have said, we will produce the tax returns and the Steven
Topletz 2011 Family Trust[3] subject to the protective order
which I have previously signed and sent to you for entry by the
Court when you send me a signed copy of the protective order.
I also require an Order from the Court ordering the production
of the trust document subject to the protective order so we
eliminate the issue of Mr. Topletz being required to breach a
contractual agreement without an order of the Court.
“Case Type” as “Other Contract.” See Case Details, 416-04120-2012,
https://apps.collincountytx.gov/JudicialRecords/Case/Search. Additionally, during a
post-judgment hearing, counsel for the original plaintiff stated that “[t]he judgment
included fraud findings.”
2
Topletz contends that his counsel was referring to his personal tax returns, not
those of the trust. However, the state trial court found that the email was in reference to
the trust’s tax returns, and we must defer to this factual finding unless Topletz rebuts it by
clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
3
Many items in the record refer to the trust formation agreement as the trust itself.
3
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
The court issued the requested protective order, but during a subsequent
hearing on the motion to compel, Topletz argued that he should not be
required to produce the documents. Citing In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 184
(Tex. 2003), Topletz contended that his simply having access to the
documents did not mean that they were in his “possession, custody, or
control” as would make them subject to discovery under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 192.7(b). He argued that Wadle must instead attempt to get the
documents directly from the trust. The court ordered the parties to discuss
the matter off the record, and, according to statements by the court at a later
hearing, Topletz’s counsel agreed to produce the trust’s tax returns during
the off-the-record conversation.
On June 25, 2018, the court entered an order granting Wadle’s motion
to compel, requiring Topletz to produce the trust formation agreement for
the court’s in-camera review. If, based on the court’s review, it determined
that the trust was not “excused from production by applicable case law,” the
order continued, Topletz would be required to produce the trust and any
documents responsive to Wadle’s discovery request. Interlined beneath the
judge’s signature were the additional sentences: “**Defendant shall produce
the trust documents and the tax returns as requested. Defendant shall also
produce the other documents requested that are in his possession, custody or
control.”
Following the order, Topletz sent a letter to Topletz’s brother, who
was one of the three trustees managing the trust, 4 and Topletz’s lawyer sent
a letter to his brother’s counsel. The letters included copies of the court’s
production order and Willis’s original document request, and they requested
copies of all responsive documents from the trust.
4
All three trustees are related to Topletz—they are his brother, his sister, and his
cousin.
4
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
An attorney for Topletz’s brother sent a letter in response that denied
the requests, asserting that, “[a]lthough the various beneficiaries may review
or examine [the financial] books during ordinary business hours, the terms of
the Family Trust stop there” and do not allow beneficiaries to “duplicate,
convert, or otherwise receive possession of any such information.”
“Transferring possession of such property by the Family Trust’s fiduciary to
you and others would constitute a direct breach of the fiduciary duty itself,”
the letter stated. The letter, however, concluded by advising that Topletz
could submit a request for a profit and loss statement or balance sheet, in
which case he would be provided with those documents on or before
September 30, 2018.
Topletz turned over to Wadle his personal tax returns, the trust
formation agreement, and some other unidentified trust-related documents,
as well as the letter from the trust denying his request. He then certified to
the court that he had produced all responsive documents in his possession,
custody, and control.
Wadle then filed a motion for contempt and sanctions against Topletz
for his failure to produce all of the requested documents related to the trust.
Following a series of hearings, 5 the court granted the motion and entered a
contempt judgment against Topletz on March 18, 2019. In its order, the
court found that Topletz had been ordered to produce but failed to turn over
the following specific documents related to the trust:
5
After the first hearing, Topletz filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas, arguing that the state trial court was
requiring him to produce documents that he did not have in his “possession, custody or
control.” The appeals court denied the petition, finding that the trial court’s production
order on its face required Topletz to produce only documents in his possession, custody,
or control and not any records that were not.
5
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
• Ownership certificates for all of the stock held by the
trust for the previous five years;
• All of the leases or contracts the trust had entered into
since 2012;
• The trust’s financial statements, including balance
sheets and profit and loss reports since 2012;
• A record of the trust’s accounts receivable showing
amounts owed to the trust;
• Ownership documents for any company owned by the
trust; and
• The trust’s tax returns.
These records were “freely available” to Topletz pursuant to paragraph 4.12
of the trust agreement, the court continued, which states
Each beneficiary who has attained the age of twenty-five years
shall have free access to those books, records and accounts at
all reasonable times during regular business hours. If such
beneficiary requests, a profit and loss statement, fully
disclosing the fiscal operations of the trust for the preceding
year, and a balance sheet, which accurately reflects the
financial status of the trust at the expiration of the preceding
year, shall be furnished to such beneficiary within ninety days
of the end of the fiscal year. Any beneficiary who has attained
the age of twenty-five years may cause the books, records and
accounts of any trust in which the beneficiary has a beneficial
interest to be audited at any time. . . .
No restriction in the agreement prevented Topletz from “obtaining
possession of or copying documents,” the court continued, and the records
were therefore “subject to [his] control” for purposes of discovery. The
court thus found that Topletz had refused to comply with the court’s
production order “without substantial justification.” The court also
characterized Topletz’s refusal as contrary to his previous agreement to
6
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
supply the documents. It thus held Topletz in contempt and ordered that he
be taken into custody “until [he] has fully purged himself of this contempt by
serving on [Wadle’s counsel] full and/or proper responses and/or
documentation” to Wadle’s requests, but not for a period “in excess of 6
months.”
Notwithstanding the 6-months language in its contempt judgment,
the court then signed a commitment order instructing law enforcement to
confine Topletz for 14 days, from March 18, 2019 to April 1, 2019, or until he
purged the contempt. 6
B. The State Habeas Petitions
The same day the state trial court entered the contempt judgment,
Topletz filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth District of Texas. 7 Again citing Kuntz, Topletz argued that the
trial court’s contempt order was void because he did not have possession,
control, or custody of the requested documents and he therefore could not
purge the contempt. The following day, the appeals court ordered Topletz
released while it reviewed his petition. However, six months later the court
issued a memorandum opinion denying Topletz’s petition.
The appeals court rejected Topletz’s comparison to Kuntz, which
concerned a post-judgment discovery request served on the CEO of an oil
consulting company for “recommendation letters” that contained
evaluations of oil and gas prospects. See In re Topletz, No. 5-19-00327-CV,
2019 WL 4302254 at *4 (Tex. App. Sept. 11, 2019) (citing Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d
179, 182 (Tex. 2003)). The consulting agreement between the CEO’s
6
Under Texas law, an order of commitment is an order to a sheriff to receive and
place a person in jail. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 16.20.
7
Topletz also filed a notice of appeal, but it was voluntarily dismissed. See Topletz
v. Wadle, No. 05-19-00308-CV, 2019 WL 2150917 (Tex. App. May 17, 2019).
7
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
employer and the oil companies it advised specified that the letters were the
property of the oil companies and could not be disclosed to third parties
without the oil companies’ consent. Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d at 182. In holding
that the letters were not in the CEO’s possession, custody, or control, the
Texas Supreme Court specifically relied upon the fact that producing the
documents would violate the consulting agreement and subject the CEO to
personal liability. Id. at 184.
The Texas appeals court held that no similar agreement limited
Topletz’s right to produce the requested documents. Topletz, 2019 WL
4302254 at *4. Quoting GTE Communications Systems Corp. v. Tanner, 856
S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993), the court stated that, for purposes of the Texas
civil discovery rule, “possession, custody, or control”
includes not only actual physical possession, but also
constructive possession, and the right to obtain possession
from a third party, such as an agent or representative. The
right to obtain possession is a legal right based upon the
relationship between the party from whom a document is
sought and the person who has actual possession of it.
Topletz, 2019 WL 4302254 at *4. The court held that Topletz had the legal
right to access the documents from the trustee, whom it described as
Topletz’s agent, 8 and that there existed “no contractual impediment to
production” of the documents. Id. The court accordingly held that Topletz
had “constructive possession of the trust’s financial documents and tax
8
Topletz heavily criticizes the court’s characterization of the trustee as his agent,
pointing out that it is well established that trustees are not agents of trust beneficiaries. See,
e.g., Taylor v. Mayo, 110 U.S. 330, 334 (1884) (“A trustee is not an agent.”). He seems to
argue that the existence of an agency relationship was the basis of the appeals court’s
holding. However, the appeals court’s stray mention of an agency relationship appears
largely incidental to its reasoning, which was based primarily on Topletz’s right to obtain
the documents and the lack of any legal impediment to their disclosure to Wadle or the
court.
8
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
returns[,] as was recognized by his former counsel who agreed to produce the
documents.” Id. The state trial court was entitled to find Topletz’s assertion
that he had tried and failed to obtain the documents not credible in light of
his counsel’s purported earlier agreement to produce them, the appeals court
concluded, and thus it was not clear error for the trial court to find that
Topletz had defied the production order and committed contemptuous
conduct. Id.Topletz then filed an emergency motion for rehearing with the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas and a second habeas petition with
the Texas Supreme Court. Topletz argued in both filings that, under Texas
law, the contempt order was void because it required him to rely on the
actions of a third party to purge the contempt. The appeals court and the
Texas Supreme Court summarily denied without opinion Topletz’s
rehearing motion and second habeas petition, respectively.
Following the denials, the state trial court issued a capias 9 for
Topletz’s arrest and amended its commitment order to mandate
confinement for 14 days following his arrest.
C. The Federal Habeas Petition
On November 12, 2019, Topletz filed the federal habeas corpus petition
that is the subject of the present appeal. In the petition, Topletz contends
that the contempt judgment denied him his federal constitutional right to due
process for two interrelated reasons.
First, because the Supreme Court has held that civil contempt is
inherently a conditional penalty that may only be validly applied to “compel
9
Under Texas law, a capias is a post-judgment writ ordering all state peace officers
to arrest a person and bring the person before the court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 43.015.
9
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
the doing of some act,” Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633 (1988),
Topletz argues that “[d]ue process requires a civil contempt order to
condition a contemnor’s release upon an act the contemnor alone can
perform.” Because the requested documents are in the hands of the trustee
and producing them requires some action on the trustee’s part, Topletz
contends that the contempt order is unconstitutional.
Second, Topletz argues that, even if it does not per se violate due
process to hold a litigant in contempt for failing to acquire documents from
third parties, the state trial court’s determination that Topletz could acquire
the specific documents at issue was based on insufficient evidence. He
contends that a civil contempt finding must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence, a standard that the state court did not explicitly cite.
And Topletz argues that the only evidence before the trial court
demonstrated that he had tried and failed to obtain the documents. Topletz
accordingly argues that it was irrational for the trial court to conclude by clear
and convincing evidence that it was possible for him to obtain the documents.
Because it violates due process for a state court to imprison a defendant when
the evidence is insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant
guilty, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979), Topletz argues that a
habeas corpus writ should issue.
On November 19, 2019, Topletz moved for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, asking the district court to enjoin Sheriff
Jim Skinner from arresting or holding him pursuant to the contempt
judgment. The Sheriff did not oppose a temporary restraining order, and one
issued on December 5, 2019. Following a hearing, however, a magistrate
judge issued a report recommending that Topletz be denied a preliminary
injunction. The magistrate judge found that Topletz was unlikely to succeed
on the merits of his habeas claim because both his contentions were likely to
fail.
10
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
First, the magistrate agreed that due process prohibits imprisoning an
individual for civil contempt when the contemnor is incapable of purging the
contempt. The magistrate found, however, that because the contempt order
allowed Topletz to produce “full and/or proper responses [to] and/or
documentation [of]” the trust documents, it permitted Topletz to purge the
contempt through means other than producing the trust documents
themselves. According to the magistrate, Topletz could purge the contempt
by providing evidence of his genuine effort to obtain the documents, filing
suit against the trust, or providing a summary of information he gained
through his personal review of the documents. Because Topletz introduced
no evidence that he was unable to purge contempt through these alternative
avenues, the magistrate judge concluded, he had failed to show a substantial
likelihood that he would succeed on his first argument.
As to Topletz’s second challenge, the magistrate stated that, in a
habeas proceeding challenging a state judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)
provides that a state court’s factual findings are presumed correct and a
petitioner has the burden of rebutting them by clear and convincing evidence.
The magistrate found that, in light of Topletz’s prior counsel’s purported
agreement to provide the documents, Topletz had failed to rebut the
presumption that the state court was correct that he could produce them.
Similarly, the magistrate found that Topletz offered no analysis as to why the
evidence on which the state court relied failed to rise to the clear and
convincing evidence standard, and he therefore failed to show that the state
court employed the incorrect standard. Accordingly, the magistrate found
that Topletz was unlikely to prevail on this ground.
Finally, the magistrate judge found that, given the small likelihood
that Topletz would prevail on the merits, the public interest in ensuring
judgment creditors are able to discover judgment debtors’ finances that
would be served by denying an injunction outweighed any public interest in
11
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
avoiding the imprisonment of innocent people that would be served by
issuing an injunction. The magistrate judge thus concluded that the public
interest weighed in favor of denying a preliminary injunction and
recommended that Topletz’s motion be denied.
On January 27, 2020, the district court overruled Topletz’s objections
and adopted the magistrate judge’s recommended findings and conclusions,
denying Topletz’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Topletz filed a timely
notice of appeal. 10
II. Standard of Review
This court reviews the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for
abuse of discretion, with any underlying legal determinations reviewed de
novo and factual findings for clear error. Dennis Melancon, Inc. v. City of New
Orleans, 703 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2012).
III. Discussion
To obtain a preliminary injunction, Topletz was required to show a
substantial likelihood that his habeas petition will be granted on the merits,
irreparable injury in the absence of a preliminary injunction, a balance of
hardships favoring the issuance of the injunction, and no adverse effect on
the public interest. See Melancon, 703 F.3d at 268.
When a habeas petition challenges a petitioner’s incarceration
pursuant to a state court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was enacted as
part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
limits the scope of federal review. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
376–77 (2000). As an initial matter, Topletz argues that courts in this circuit
10
Because Topletz appeals the denial of a preliminary injunction and not “the final
order in a habeas corpus proceeding,” no certificate of appealability is required. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Johnson v. Thaler, 421 F. App’x 431, 431 (5th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished).
12
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
are divided as to whether a habeas petition challenging a contempt order
should be brought under § 2241, which authorizes habeas relief generally, or
§ 2254, which contains the AEDPA limitations. However, our caselaw
makes clear that the two statutes do not represent an either/or dichotomy.
“[Section] 2241 empowers a federal court to grant writs of habeas corpus
while § 2254 applies to a subset of those to whom § 2241(c)(3) applies,”
mandating the deferential AEDPA standard of review specifically when “a
person is in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Hartfield v.
Osborne, 808 F.3d 1066, 1073 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Medberry v. Crosby, 351
F.3d 1049, 1059 (11th Cir.2003)) (cleaned up). In other words, Ҥ 2254 is
not an independent avenue through which petitioners may pursue habeas
relief.” Id. Instead, all habeas petitions (as distinguished from the § 2255
habeas motions available to prisoners held pursuant to a federal court
conviction) are brought under § 2241, and § 2254 places additional limits on
a federal court’s ability to grant relief if the petitioner is being held in custody
“pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
As to whether § 2254 applies here, a person who is incarcerated
pursuant to a state court’s contempt judgment is, according to the ordinary
meaning of the terms, in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly stated as much in dictum. See
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001) (“Incarceration pursuant to a
state criminal conviction may be by far the most common and most familiar
basis for satisfaction of the ‘in custody’ requirement in § 2254 cases. But
there are other types of state court judgments pursuant to which a person
may be held in custody within the meaning of the federal habeas statute. For
example, federal habeas corpus review may be available to challenge the
legality of a state court order of civil commitment or a state court order of
civil contempt.”). And while our court does not appear to have addressed
the matter directly, at least one of our sister circuits has held that AEDPA
applies to a state contemnor who seeks federal habeas relief. See Chadwick v.
13
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 606 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J.) (applying the AEDPA
review limitations contained in § 2254 to state civil contemnor’s federal
habeas petition). Thus, the AEDPA standard applies to Topletz’s federal
habeas petition.
Under AEDPA, if an adequate state “corrective process” for raising
a claim exists that the petitioner could avail him or herself of, a federal court
may only consider the claim if the petitioner has exhausted available state
remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). And when the petitioner has done so and
the state court has rejected the claim on the merits, federal courts may
provide relief only when the state court adjudication was either “contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d). The petitioner has the burden
of rebutting the presumption that the state court’s determinations of fact are
correct by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 2254(e)(1).
Topletz contends that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction
because the contempt order against him likely violates his right to due process
as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutional protections
due a contemnor differ depending on whether the contempt is civil or
criminal in nature, with criminal proceedings necessitating significantly
greater procedural protections. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441–43
(2011). Though this court has in the past stated that whether contempt is
civil or criminal turns on “the apparent purpose of the trial court in issuing
the contempt judgment,” Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1985)
(quoting In re Hunt, 754 F.2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1985)), the Supreme Court
has more recently disavowed such an analysis, see Feiock, 485 U.S. at 635(“[T]he Court has eschewed any alternative formulation that would make
14
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
the classification of the relief imposed in a State’s proceedings turn simply
on what their underlying purposes are perceived to be.”).
Instead, the Supreme Court has held that “the purposes for which
relief is imposed are properly drawn from an examination of the character of
the relief itself.” Id. at 636. “If the relief provided is a sentence of
imprisonment,[11] it is [civil] if the defendant stands committed unless and
until he performs the affirmative act required by the court’s order, and is
[criminal] if the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period.”
Id. at 632 (internal quotations omitted). “Imprisonment for a fixed term
similarly is coercive,” and thus civil, “when the contemnor is given the
option of earlier release if he complies.” Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994).
There are some indications in the record that the state court’s
contempt order was intended to be punitive, motivated at least in part by a
desire to punish Topletz’s past noncompliance rather than to secure his
future compliance. 12 Nevertheless, the state court’s commitment order
11
Other types of contempt sentences, such as a fine, may also be considered civil if
they serve a remedial purpose, including compensating a complainant for losses suffered as
a result of the contemnor’s defiance. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829 (1994) (citing United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303–
04 (1947)).
12
For example, during the contempt hearing, Topletz’s counsel asked Topletz how
he would obtain the trust documents if he was ordered jailed. In overruling an objection to
the question, the court stated:
He can answer the question, but it doesn’t answer the problem that I have
which is he’s had over a year to produce it, and he has been told and asked
repeatedly to produce, and he’s been given every opportunity to produce
them that didn’t involve him going to jail. . . . So I can tell you it is irrelevant
to this court how he plans to get them if he goes to jail today because that’s
something he should have thought about in the last four hearings we had
on this and the last year before he’s actually facing jail time today.
15
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
permits Topletz to secure his release by “purg[ing] himself of the contempt
by producing the documents previously ordered.” Because Topletz’s
sentence is conditional, we evaluate it as a civil contempt order for which the
full panoply of constitutional due process rights afforded to a criminal
defendant do not apply. See Feiock, 485 U.S. at 636–37; Turner, 564 U.S. at
441.
A. Topletz Has Not Demonstrated that It Clearly Violates Due
Process to Use Civil Contempt to Compel the Production of Items
Held by a Third-Party that the Contemnor Has a Legal Right to
Obtain.
Topletz first argues that using civil contempt to compel an individual
to produce documents that are in another party’s actual possession is a per se
violation of due process because the ability to purge the civil contempt is not
within the contemnor’s sole control.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
fewer protections to a civil contemnor than a criminal contemnor. See
Turner, 564 U.S. at 441; Feiock, 485 U.S. at 635. As the Supreme Court has
explained, it is specifically “[t]he conditional nature of the imprisonment”
for civil contempt, which is “based entirely upon the contemnor’s continued
defiance,” that “justifies holding civil contempt proceedings absent the
safeguards” of criminal due process like “indictment and jury.” Shillitani v.
United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370–71 (1966). Therefore, “the justification for
coercive imprisonment as applied to civil contempt depends upon the ability
of the contemnor to comply with the court’s order.” Id. at 371 (citing Maggio
v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948)). And when that rationale does not exist
because the contemnor “has no . . . opportunity to purge himself of
contempt,” confinement of a civil contemnor violates due process. Id.Under the oft-repeated aphorism, civil contemnors must “carry ‘the keys of
their prison in their own pockets.’” Id. at 368 (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F.
448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902)).
16
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 17 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
Topletz contends that the state court’s contempt judgment violates
this principle because he must rely on the trustee’s cooperation to produce
the documents needed to purge his contempt, and thus the trustee “holds
the keys” to his prison. Topletz’s argument falls short of the high bar set by
AEDPA, which requires him to show that the state court’s adjudication of
this issue 13 was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The only Supreme Court case that Topletz cites in which the Court
actually addressed the limits the Constitution places on a civil contempt
13
As related above, Topletz filed a new habeas petition with the Texas Supreme
Court rather than appealing the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas’s decision
denying his petition. Because the Texas Supreme Court denied Topletz’s habeas petition
without written opinion, it is unclear what grounds the court relied upon in denying the
petition. It is possible that the Texas Supreme Court denied Topletz’s petition on
procedural grounds because his claims had already been or could have been raised in his
first state habeas petition. See Ex parte Barber, 879 S.W.2d 889, 891 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (discussing abuse of writ doctrine in the criminal context, which generally prohibits
“an applicant for a subsequent writ of habeas corpus [from] rais[ing] issues that existed at
the time of his first writ” application). This would be an independent and adequate state
law ground for upholding the decision and sufficient reason to deny his federal petition
absent a showing of cause for and prejudice from the default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 750 (1991). But Sheriff Skinner does not contend that Topletz’s second petition
was denied on procedural grounds, and federal courts generally “will presume that there is
no independent and adequate state ground for a state court decision when the decision
fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and
when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the
face of the opinion.” Id. at 735 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983)). We accordingly assume that the Texas Supreme Court
adopted the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas’s reasoning on Topletz’s first
state habeas petition when it denied his second, following the normal rule that a court
should “look through” to “the last clear state decision on the matter” in order to evaluate
the state court’s reasoning. Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 641, 651 (5th Cir. 1999).
17
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 18 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
order’s release conditions is Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. at 371–72. 14
In Shillitani, the Supreme Court held that, after a grand jury proceeding had
concluded, it violated due process to continue to hold two civil contemnors
who had been jailed for refusing to testify before the grand jury. Id. at 371–
72. “Once the grand jury ceases to function,” the Court reasoned, “the
rationale for civil contempt vanishes, and the contemnor has to be released.”
Id. at 372. Thus, the “Federal law” on the issue that is “clearly established
. . . by the Supreme Court of the United States” is at most that a civil
contempt order violates due process if and when it becomes actually
impossible for a contemnor to purge the contempt. There is no clearly
established Supreme Court precedent that a civil contempt order’s release
condition may never require the cooperation of a third party for its
fulfillment. Unless the third party’s refusal to cooperate makes the
contemnor’s complying with the order actually impossible, Shillitani has
nothing to say about the matter.
Moreover, Topletz’s claim that he must rely on the trustee’s
voluntary cooperation to obtain the requested documents is simply not true.
The Texas state trial court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of
Texas both concluded that, under Texas law, the terms of the trust
agreement give Topletz a legal right to acquire the requested documents.
14
Topletz also cites Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 77 (1948). However, Maggio was
an appeal of a federal contempt order, and it centered on whether the substantive federal
standard for contempt had been met. There is no indication that the Court’s ruling was
based on constitutional due process, and the decision thus says nothing of the minimum
standards that are mandated for state court contempt proceedings under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Moreover, Maggio says little more than Shillitani
regarding the limits of federal civil contempt—it simply holds that a federal civil contempt
order should not be entered if the contemnor can demonstrate an actual inability to comply
with the antecedent court order. Id. at 77–78. For the reasons discussed infra, § III.B,
Topletz has not demonstrated an inability to comply with the state court’s production
order in the present case.
18
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 19 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
Sheriff Skinner asserts that the trustee’s refusal to provide the documents
was not the result of a genuine unwillingness to cooperate, but rather a
scheme between the trustee and Topletz to hide Topletz’s assets in order to
frustrate a judgment creditor. But even if the trustee’s refusal is genuine,
Topletz has legal recourse and can file suit to compel the trustee to give him
the documents that he has a legal right to obtain.
A rule that due process does not permit the use of civil contempt to
compel the production of documents that are in the hands of third parties
would also overturn longstanding precedents and would likely be unworkable
in practice. Since at least 1993, Texas courts have held that possession of a
tangible item such that it is subject to discovery under the state’s rules of civil
procedure “includes not only actual physical possession, but constructive
possession, and the right to obtain possession from a third party, such as an
agent or representative.” GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp., 856 S.W.2d at 729. And
the current Texas Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly state that
“[p]ossession, [c]ustody, or [c]ontrol of an item means that the person either
has physical possession of the item or has a right to possession of the item that is
equal or superior to the person who has physical possession of the item.” TEX. R.
CIV. P. 192.7(b) (emphasis added). Depriving courts of the right to use civil
contempt to compel production of items subject to this rule would render
them impotent to enforce it, thereby allowing a party to evade discovery
simply by storing records with a third party. It is also notable that no court
has held that the plain language of Texas’s rule violates federal due process;
indeed, longstanding decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court suggest the
opposite. See, e.g., Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 361 (1929) (affirming federal
civil contempt order based on noncompliance with production order where
the trial court had “found that the books of account were with the bankrupts
or under their control” (emphasis added)).
19
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 20 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
Nor is it an answer that the court could likely order production of the
documents directly from the trust pursuant to Texas’s rule for nonparty
discovery. See In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d at 184 n. 4 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P.
205). That Texas provides litigants and its courts with an alternative avenue
for obtaining documents does not bear on whether the method at issue here—
compelling a litigant to produce the records through civil contempt—violates
due process. The question presented turns solely on whether it is possible
for Topletz to purge the contempt, and not whether the contempt was the
only possible avenue of achieving the Texas court’s goal. See Shillitani, 384
U.S. at 371–72.
The district court below relied heavily on what the parties refer to as
the contempt order’s “safety valve” in holding that its release condition did
not violate due process. Because the contempt judgment permits Topletz to
enter “full and/or proper responses [to] and/or documentation [of]” the
requested documents, the court concluded that Topletz could purge the
contempt even if it is not possible for him to obtain the documents by, for
example, providing evidence of his genuine effort to obtain the documents or
summarizing the information that he gained through his review of the
documents.
While the contempt judgment may well allow Topletz to purge the
contempt by methods other than supplying the documents, its validity is not
dependent on the order containing such a safety valve. As discussed in more
detail infra, an inability to comply with the court’s order is always an
affirmative defense to contempt under Texas law. See Ex parte Chambers, 898
S.W.2d 257, 261 (Tex. 1995) (“Although the inability to comply defense
technically rebuts the willfulness element of contempt liability, the relator
bears the burden of proving his inability to comply.”). Topletz has simply
not carried his burden of proving the affirmative defense. Because the inquiry
into whether civil contempt is justified is ongoing, see Shillitani, 384 U.S. at
20
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 21 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
371–72, Topletz could likely file a motion to lift the contempt and introduce
evidence establishing that it is not possible for him to comply with the state
court’s production order if he truly cannot get the documents, thereby
succeeding on his affirmative defense. It is therefore unnecessary for the
contempt order to explicitly permit Topletz to purge the contempt by other
avenues in order to comply with due process, for the contempt judgment
itself would be rescinded if Topletz demonstrated his inability to produce the
documents. Put another way, either the contempt order contains a safety
valve, or Texas’s substantive law of contempt provides one. The same result
adheres regardless of whether the order contains a safety valve.
In sum, Topletz has not established that using civil contempt to
compel the production of items held by a third party is clearly contrary to
established federal law. Topletz has thus not demonstrated a likelihood that
the state court’s determination that the contempt order did not on its face
violate the federal Due Process Clause was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, 15 and he is accordingly unlikely
to succeed on the merits of his first claim.
B. Topletz Has Not Demonstrated that the State Court Clearly
Erred in Finding Facts that Satisfied the Elements of Contempt.
Topletz next contends that, even if it does not per se violate due
process to use civil contempt to compel an individual to produce documents
held by a third party, there was insufficient evidence for the state trial court
15
It is also not clear that Topletz properly exhausted his claim in state court as
AEDPA requires. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). His state habeas petition never explicitly
linked his argument that the contempt judgment was void to federal due process
protections, as opposed to the substantive Texas law on civil contempt or the due process
protections guaranteed by the Texas Constitution. Because Topletz’s claim fails in any
event and this court has jurisdiction to deny a habeas petition “on the merits,
notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts
of the State,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), we do not reach this issue.
21
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 22 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
to find him in contempt for failing to produce these specific documents. 16 It
is well established that federal due process prohibits convicting an individual
of a crime where, based on the evidence before the trial court, no rational trier
of fact could have found the individual guilty of the charged offense. See
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979). This rule is recognized in the
AEDPA standard of habeas review, which permits a federal court to grant
relief if a state court judgment “was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
In Texas, there are three elements that must be proven in order for an
individual to be found in contempt of court. A court must find that there
exists: “(1) a reasonably specific order; (2) a violation of the order; and (3)
the willful intent to violate the order.” 17 Chambers, 898 S.W.2d at 259. An
inability to comply with the order is considered an affirmative defense that
the potential contemnor bears the burden of proving. Id. at 261 (citing Ex
parte Kollenborn, 276 S.W.2d 251, 253–54 (Tex. 1955)).
16
Sheriff Skinner argues that Topletz did not properly exhaust this claim in state
court as AEDPA requires. Topletz did not raise the sufficiency of the evidence in his first
state habeas petition to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas, but he did raise
it in his second state habeas petition to the Texas Supreme Court (though he did not link
his argument to federal due process protections). As with Topletz’s first claim, his
sufficiency of the evidence claim fails in any event. We therefore do not address whether
Topletz properly exhausted his second claim in state court.
17
Although these elements are generally stated in the context of criminal contempt,
the difference between civil and criminal contempt under Texas law turns on whether the
“nature of the court’s punishment” is coercive, remedial, or punitive. In re Reece, 341
S.W.3d 360, 365 (Tex. 2011). Like under federal law, when a Texas contempt sentence is
coercive or remedial, it is civil in nature, and when it is punitive, it is criminal. See id. In
other words, it is the court’s choice of sentence and its association with coercion or
remediation over punishment that distinguishes civil contempt from criminal contempt,
not the elements that must be proven to find an individual in contempt.
22
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 23 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
As a threshold issue, Topletz argues and the district court found that
the state court was required to find that these elements were satisfied by clear
and convincing evidence. Although the federal standard for civil contempt
requires that contempt be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence,
see U.S. v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1976), Topletz has cited no cases
indicating that Texas employs this evidentiary standard in its courts or that
the federal Due Process Clause mandates that the standard be used in state
proceedings. But because the standard would be met in any event, we assume
arguendo that it applies.
Sufficient evidence was introduced in the state court proceedings for
the state trial court to find that each of the elements of contempt was
satisfied. As to the first element—a reasonably specific court order—the
state court’s June 27, 2018 production order included several directives to
Topletz. In addition to the interlined statement under the judge’s signature
stating that “Defendant shall produce the trust documents and the tax
returns as requested,” the order incorporated several of Willis’s discovery
requests, specifically commanding Topletz to produce “any documents
related to [the trust and] responsive to Plaintiff’s Request Nos. 9, 10, 14, 18,
27, and 28.” Those requests were, in turn, for:
9. All certificates evidencing ownership of common or
preferred capital stock in any corporation, mutual fund, bond
fund or investment trust issued to you or any attorneys-in-fact,
agents, servants, employees or trustees acting on your behalf or
for your interest during the last five (5) years.
10. All leases or other executory contracts of whatever kind or
nature to which you are a party or in which you have any legal
or equitable interest and/or have had any legal or equitable
interest during the last five (5) years.
....
23
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 24 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
14. All financial statements, including balance sheets and profit
and loss statements issued from January, 2012, to the present,
by any business in which you have owned any legal equitable
interest.
....
18. A complete list of all accounts and notes receivable due to
any of Your parent companies, subsidiaries, and/or affiliates
showing amounts owed and names of entitles owing funds to
any business which you have any legal or equitable interest
covering the period from January, 2013, to the present.
....
27. For the last three (3) years, every Entity agreement (for
example, articles of incorporation, certificates of formation,
etc.) for every Entity that you have or had any interest in.
28. All share certificates and other documents indicating
ownership in any type of corporation, limited liability company
or any type of partnership in which you have an interest and/or
have had an interest in the last five (5) years.
Topletz makes no argument that these requests, in conjunction with the state
court’s specification that he produce everything responsive to them that was
related to the trust, were not sufficiently clear or specific for him to know
what was expected of him.
Regarding the second contempt element, a violation of the order, the
state court found that Topletz had failed to produce six different categories
of documents related to the trust that he had been ordered to turn over.
Topletz argues that two of the documents the court found he failed to
produce were not included in the state trial court’s June 27, 2018 production
order. Specifically, he contends that Willis had requested only balance sheets
and profit and loss statements related to Topletz’s businesses, and the
court’s production order incorporating the requests therefore did not extend
24
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 25 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
to the trust’s balance sheet and profit and loss statements. Similarly, Topletz
contends that the trust’s tax returns, which the court faulted him for not
producing, were not covered by any of the identified discovery requests or
the court’s order to produce “the tax returns as requested.” Yet, even if
Topletz is correct, he raises no argument that any of the other four categories
of documents that the court found he failed to produce were not clearly
covered by the state court’s production order, nor that the state court clearly
erred in finding that he had failed to turn these four categories of documents
over. Topletz’s failure to produce any of the documents that he was ordered
to turn over would constitute a violation of the court’s production order, and
Topletz essentially concedes that he failed to produce several categories of
documents that were included in the order. Thus, sufficient evidence existed
for the state court to find that the second element of contempt—a violation
of the court order—was also satisfied.
As to the final element of contempt, the district court appears to have
found that, given Topletz’s awareness of the order and lack of effort to
comply with its terms, Topletz’s failure to comply was willful. Indeed, the
court described his failure as a “refusal to comply.” Topletz’s only argument
to the contrary is that there was no evidence that he was able to produce the
documents. But this contention fails to recognize that, under Texas law, it is
his burden to prove an inability to comply with the court’s order. See
Chambers, 898 S.W.2d at 261 (“Although the inability to comply defense
technically rebuts the willfulness element of contempt liability, the relator
bears the burden of proving his inability to comply.”). Thus, the operative
question is not whether there was any evidence showing his ability to produce
the documents, but rather whether he introduced evidence showing his
inability. Topletz offers only the letter from the trustee purporting to deny
his request for the documents, but the state court was within its rights to find
this evidence was outweighed by the evidence of the terms of the trust
agreement, which gave Topletz a legal right to obtain the documents.
25
Case: 20-40136 Document: 00515958830 Page: 26 Date Filed: 07/30/2021
No. 20-40136
Under AEDPA, it is Topletz’s burden to rebut the presumption that
the district court’s factual conclusions were correct by clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). He has not demonstrated that the district
court’s conclusions that the elements of contempt were satisfied were
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, he
has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on his second claim.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Topletz has failed to show that the district
court erred in finding that he is not likely to succeed on the merits of his
habeas petition, which is a necessary condition for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial
of his motion for a preliminary injunction.
26